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KANSAS OPEN BOOKS PREFACE

When I ﬁnished writing this book in 1992, I believed that the principles
Louis Dembitz Brandeis laid down for the best way to govern in a democracy still held true but that the speciﬁc failures of both government and
monopolistic capitalism that led him to develop them were only of historical interest. I had no idea, however, that strikingly similar problems
would appear just a few decades later.
* * *
The word progress comes from Latin and means to move forward or advance, and that is what American Progressives thought they were doing
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: proposing ways to
move the United States forward to a more just and egalitarian society.
Brandeis also believed in that goal. Where he differed from most other
Progressives, however, was in his prescription for getting there.
Progressivism, which ﬂourished roughly between 1890 and 1920, was
in large measure a response to the industrialization that swept across
the United States in the years after the Civil War. The United States had
never been a nation of true economic equality, but the huge fortunes
that characterized what historians call the Gilded Age were a comparatively new phenomenon. So too were the equally huge numbers of workers necessary to keep industrialism proﬁtable, and the abject poverty
suffered by too many of those workers. Many of them were recent immigrants or children of immigrants, but others were people whose families
had been in the country for many years. The new technologies, which
enabled a relatively few number of businesses to dominate whole segix
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ments of the economy, meant that millions of Americans had no choice
but to go to work for the gargantuan corporations, for whatever they
paid.
If that sounds familiar, it is because something analogous is happening in the United States of the early twenty-ﬁrst century. Technological
advances, the creation of enormous fortunes coupled with great disparities in income, confusion and stark disagreement about what it means to
be “American”—the pattern that Brandeis and the Progressives saw—is
now being repeated.
As in the ﬁrst decades of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the Progressive Era
saw waves of refugees from violence and poverty ﬂocking to the United
States. In both eras the reaction was and has been mixed. The fear
brought by technological change and its impact on the workplace,
coupled with the emergence into the American mainstream of people
who could not be mistaken for the stereotypical white men of European
ancestry who had dominated public life, resulted in anti-immigrant populism.
If we think of Facebook and Amazon instead of oil empires or railroad
monopolies, of Central American immigrants instead of newcomers
from Eastern Europe or Asia, and of proposals to build walls instead of
legislation limiting the number of immigrants from less favored nations,
the similarities between then and now are fairly obvious. In those cases
there were calls to break up the monoliths. In those cases some voices
were raised in support of the migrants. The same voices questioned the
massive economic inequalities and the implicit threat to democracy they
presented. Those voices were labeled “Progressives” then; they identify
themselves as “progressives” today.
Most Progressives appealed to the federal government to rectify the
glaring economic and social inequalities, as do most of today’s “progressives.” The role of the government, they argued, was to become more
active in the economic ﬁeld, serving the citizenry by regulating big business. That implied a larger and more powerful central government than
that which already existed. Progressive thinkers and leaders envisioned
it staffed by people like themselves whose expertise in economics and
politics would ensure that the government moved in the right direction.
Brandeis agreed with the goal of greater equality but ultimately came
to disagree with the methods espoused by his fellow Progressives. To
him, big government was just as much a threat as was big business. “Nei-
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ther our intelligence nor our characters can long stand the strain of unrestricted power,” he proclaimed.1 He was certain that an overly large
dose of power corrupted both those who exercised it and the actions
they took. “If the Lord had intended things to be big, he would have
made man bigger—in brains and character,” Brandeis told a U.S. Senate
committee in 1911.2
The immediate threat to individual liberty and to democracy, he believed, was the trusts—the forerunners of today’s multinational corporations. In some instances, he wrote in 1933, they had amassed “such
concentration of economic power that so-called private corporations
are sometimes able to dominate the state.”3 That resonates now, when
modern progressives view corporate money in elections and in the halls
of government as a threat to democracy. The trusts’ control of workers’
income was also a threat. Workers, he argued, had to be paid what today would be called a living wage—another similarity between then and
now. Brandeis’s concern, however, was not only the workers’ economic
well-being. People living in relative poverty would not have the time or
inclination to function as involved citizens and, without that, democracy
could not exist.
Other Progressives focused on economic equality; Brandeis, on citizenship within a democracy. He supported maximum hours and minimum-wage laws, but he still viewed citizens and smaller institutions rather
than the government as the key players in the achievement of economic
equality. Because big government posed a danger to democracy, he advocated balancing employers’ power with the power of unions, instead of
more government regulation, and even went so far as to call for a role for
workers in the management of businesses. He told young people eager
to work for social and economic justice to go to the states rather than to
Washington, seeing states not only as laboratories for the kind of experimentation that would result in wise policies but also as a balance against
the power of the federal government.
Above all, Brandeis believed, it was crucial to remember that the role
of government in a democratic state, and indeed of democracy itself, was
to enhance individual liberty and fulﬁllment. That was why people came
together to form and maintain a government. Economic well-being was
important in itself, of course, but it was only the ﬁrst step in achieving
true democracy. He agreed with Abraham Lincoln’s formulation in the
Gettysburg Address that government had to be not only for the people
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but by the people.4 Economic security freed citizens to participate in
government: to take the time to educate themselves about existing and
proposed policies and to assess current ofﬁcials and candidates for ofﬁce. The people who were best suited to understand how to reach the
goal of individual well-being were the people themselves. The answer to
inequality was to enhance the ability of the citizen to participate in the
governmental policymaking process and of the worker to have an active
voice in corporate policymaking, rather than rule by experts.
“Power to the people” was not yet a slogan in Brandeis’s day but, as the
following pages indicate, it is one that he would have understood. And
that took him beyond Progressivism.
Philippa Strum
Washington, D.C.
November 2019

NOTES
1. Louis Dembitz Brandeis (hereafter LDB), “The Employer and Trades
Unions,” address to the Boston Typothetæ, April 21, 1904, reprinted in LDB,
Business, a Profession, ed. Ernest Poole (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1914), 13–27,
at 17.
2. LDB, testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hearings on Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engage in Interstate
Commerce, 62d Cong., 2d sess., 1911, pt. 16, 1146–1291, at 1170.
3. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933), LDB dissenting, at 565.
4. Abraham Lincoln, address at Gettysburg, November 19, 1863, http://rmc
.library.cornell.edu/gettysburg/good_cause/transcript.htm.
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INTRODUCTION

In our Democracy, the hopeful sign would be recognition of
politics & government as the first of the sciences & of the arts. 1
Most American political scientists define politics as the struggle to
obtain and use power in the public arena. 2 They emphasize process
and institutions and the ways in which power is acquired or lost. Those
scholars particularly interested in process and power examine phenomena such as elections, media, political consultants, direct mailings,
funding and expenditures, negotiations with and among politicians
and interest groups, and the relationships among congressional committees, economic interest groups, and the federal bureaucracy. Those
choosing to concentrate on institutions and power analyze the formal
institutions mandated by the Constitution, the alterations they have
undergone during more than two centuries, and the institutions
unmentioned in that secular bible but of major current consequence
today: political parties, corporations, unions, pressure groups, media,
political action committees, the "alphabet agencies" that constitute a
major portion of the executive branch, and the White House staff.
It is fashionable to stress the "science" in political science rather than
the "political," which could imply choices among competing values.
Louis Dembitz Brandeis, by contrast, never specifically defined
politics, although politics played a major role in his life. His political
ideas are apparent in a number of sources: the political causes with
which he chose to be involved; the speeches he made, both as a lawyer
1
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and a statesman, during the years before he joined the United States
Supreme Court; the articles he wrote about various aspects of American political and economic life, some of them collected into books;
the letters he sent to innumerable correspondents; the advice he gave
to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt before and during their
presidencies; and his Supreme Court opinions. These sources suggest
that Brandeis's view was less akin to much of today's American processoriented political science than to the democratic spirit of Thomas
Jefferson . Like other political thinkers and politicians, he cared about
power. Unlike many, he emphasized not means but goals, and the
purpose most important to him was the establishment, by the government and other institutions, of policies that would best enhance individual fulfillment. Indeed, the only justification for any political,
economic, or social institution was its contribution to that overarching
goal. Although he believed that the human need for emotional and
intellectual interaction necessarily resulted in the creation of community, and although he pointed out the concomitant responsibility of
the individual to the community and its well-being, he never forgot that
the legitimacy of government-that most formal expression of community-depended upon its serving as the extension of individuals . 3
His individualism was far from selfish. The individual had always
to be treated as subject, never as object; and to whatever extent the
state affected the individual, it was justified in doing so only if it extended the individual's freedom . This view, he believed, was what
the Founding Fathers had in mind. 4
Brandeis's emphasis on individual freedom did not imply approval
of the self-centered capitalist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries or of the worker whose only interests were private. Crucial
to individual fulfillment was a participation in the political process
that both contributed to the enhancement of freedom and became
an element of individual fulfillment . Brandeis would have agreed
with Rousseau that a human being's faculties can be fully exercised
and developed only in a civil state , where citizens enjoy the freedom
that comes from "obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself."5 Similarly, he paralleled John Stuart Mill in viewing fulfillment
of "public duty" as aiding in the development of character and of
a government that "can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social
state ."6
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Brandeis repeatedly emphasized that human beings had not only
rights but responsibilities. The citizen who had adequate time and
knowledge to participate in the political process and did not do so
was reprehensible, for he or she was guilty of taking without giving.
Brandeis became known as "the people's attorney" because of his devotion to public causes - a devotion for which he refused to accept
remuneration and in fact spent substantial amounts of his own money
as well as his time and energy. He did so out of a conviction that
individuals who possessed talents that might help others had an
obligation to use them and that involvement in public policymaking
was one of the highest forms of civilized behavior. Leaving politics
to the politicians was inexcusable. He considered it "obvious" that no
democratic government could work well without citizen participation.
"It is customary for people to berate politicians," he noted. "But after
all, the politicians, even if their motives are not of the purest, come
much nearer performing their duties as citizens than the so-called 'good'
citizens who stay at home ."7 Just as Mill declared that "the contented
man, or the contented family, who have no ambition . . . to promote
the good of their country or their neighborhood . . . excite in us neither
admiration nor approval, "8 so Brandeis argued that "public discussion
is a political duty" and a nonparticipating citizenry was the "greatest
menace to freedom ."9
His political thought, then, centered on such basic concepts as the
individual, liberty, rights, responsibilities, power, justice, human possibilities, and human limitations . Most of these words have been used
by a multiplicity of political theorists and politicians. Brandeis, however, combined them into a unique formulation of the ideal state that
maximized individual involvement in both the political process and
economic decisionmaking and that secured political and economic
autonomy in the industrial age. He did not view the state as an entity
that would do for others what they could not do for themselves; rather,
it was to be both the expression of the cumulative will of individuals
and the mechanism by which they would control their own lives.
These premises led to his opposition to bigness in both governmental
and economic institutions. The basic unit of democracy is the
individual; of capitalism, the dollar and the work unit. Two of the
key questions with which Brandeis wrestled were how to reconcile
the emphasis on individual dignity implicit in democracy with the
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emphasis on profits that is so central to capitalism and how to respond
to the assertion that capitalism demanded the creation of ever-larger
entities. He-thought that overly large institutions inevitably lost their
ability to think in terms of individuals and to respond to their needs .
Worse, they tended to be beyond the intellectual understanding and
control of any individual. This problem was as true in the political
sphere as it was in the economic. A federal executive branch so big
that it could not be comprehended, much less controlled, by the
president was as undesirable and dangerous as a corporation whose
chief executive officer did not know what the company's departments
were doing. Bigness resulted not in the efficiency that often was claimed
for it but in sloppiness, inattention to detail, and, ultimately, injustice
either to the taxpayers who funded the public bureaucracies or to the
workers within a private corporate entity. Perhaps Brandeis would
not have agreed that "small is beautiful," but he would have joined
Socrates in advocating moderation in all things, including institutional
size .
His insistence upon institutions large enough to be efficient but small
enough to be controllable was and continues to be misinterpreted by
the leaders of the New Deal and their heirs as a sentimental and
unsophisticated yearning for an earlier age that could and should not
be replicated. Their scorn, coupled with Brandeis's preference for
action and short speeches and articles rather than for political treatises,
has led to his being ignored as an American political thinker with
ideas well worth considering. Today's scholars remember him primarily
for the opinions he wrote during his twenty-three years of service on
the Supreme Court. Lawyers focus only on the opinions and on his
contribution to sociological jurisprudence, which lay in his insistence
that facts about society's needs were key in ascertaining whether
particular legislation was constitutional.
This response is particularly unfortunate because Brandeis may have
had some of the answers to the problems that continue to plague
American society. It has become a commonplace for American politicians following in the footsteps ofJimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan
to appeal to the electorate's inchoate sense that big government has
somehow gotten out of hand; the government repeatedly expresses
surprised dismay at the "necessity" to spend taxpayers' money to "bail
out" huge corporations on the verge of economic collapse; General
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Motors, that exemplar of"bigger is better," is rethinking and retrenching; 10 and neither big government nor big business has demonstrated
the will or the knowledge to solve the problems of poverty, homelessness, inequality, individual financial insecurity, or unemployment.
Perhaps it is time to revisit Brandeis.
It is conceivable that his ideas, and particularly his rejection of the
popular belief that big, centrally managed corporations were not only
the organic wave of the future but crucial to the nation's economic
well-being, were wrong. The unwillingness of the New Deal to try
them out rendered that speculation moot. Anyone who reads Brandeis,
however, will find the accusation of naivete itself naive. Brandeis
understood quite well how the economy worked and the impact that
his thinking, if implemented, would have on it. That fact can be demonstrated by explaining how his thought reflected his experiences and
how experience was filtered through the stubborn insistence on human
dignity that was a constant of his life . This book, therefore, is the
story not only of his thought but also of the context in which it
developed.
Brandeis was not a philosopher, nor, despite his continuous and
eclectic reading, did he derive his ideas primarily from books. As a
young man he had read Emerson and James, and his approach was
both pragmatic and utilitarian, but he would have been puzzled if
asked to what school of political thought he belonged. He had premises
and first principles. He regularly addressed the question of how to
make institutions work in keeping with those principles, but, consonant
with both the American distaste for ideology and his view of himself
as an activist, he had no interest in producing a treatise expounding
his philosophy, nor did he employ the vocabulary of political theory
common to the academy. "I have no rigid social philosophy. I have
been too intense on concrete problems of practical justice," he maintained.11 "As a whole, I have not got as much from books as I have
from tackling concrete problems," he added. "I have generally run
up against a problem, have painfully tried to think it out, with a
measure of success, and have then read a book and found to my
surprise that some other chap was before me. " 12
Brandeis did not use the theorist's phrase "political virtue," for
example, and yet it is implicit in his discussion of civic responsibility.
The focal point of his thinking, as that of William James, was the
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individual. 13 Brandeis had copied passages from James into the
notebooks he kept while in law school, and although there is no record
of his ever having used the word "pragmatism," his approach to social
problems surely can be given that name. The key mechanism he
employed to bring the individual and society into harmony was
experience. He considered experience filtered through intelligence to
be the primary source of knowledge about almost everything, including
the way the good state could best be achieved. In this view he paralleled
not only James 14 but John Dewey. Interestingly, John Dewey, reviewing Felix Frankfurter's Mr. Justice Brandeis, praised Brandeis's "strict
adherence to this policy of reference to factual context" and added,
"Nor can I imagine any sound social or ethical philosophy in which
this idea is not fundamental ."15 Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism
was based on experimentation. 16 He had acknowledged that while
there was "real uncertainty and contingency" in the universe and the
world was "in some respect . . . incomplete and in the making," there
was "in things a grain against which we cannot successfully go." The
coexistence of uncertainty and of something immutable required
experimentation if truth was to be found: "We cannot even discover
what that grain is except as we make this new experiment or that fresh
effort ... in a world where discovery is genuine, error is an inevitable
ingredient of reality." 17 Human beings had to use error, "to turn it
to account, to make it fruitful." 18 Like Dewey, Brandeis viewed experience and experimentation as good in and of themselves because of
the knowledge that could be derived from them. Certainly experience
was central to his thought. He learned from it; he regarded speculation
without experimentation as useless. His openness to new ideas was
one aspect of an extraordinary mind and character; in this, he personified the approach to politics that he espoused. To see how his ideas
developed may be to understand why they took the shape they did.
There were ways in which Brandeis's thought resembled that of
late nineteenth-century English reform liberals, although there is no
indication that he was familiar with their thinking. Rather, faced with
similar problems, he came to many similar solutions . One historian
has described the Fabian vision "of a society that was scientificallywhich is to say, rationally-organized, in which all the parts were
arranged, ordered, regulated, planned, so as to make for the most
efficient and equitable whole;" 19 it was a vision that Brandeis shared.
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He would not have agreed, however, with their desire to move power
from the individual to the state or with their distrust of the average
person. 20 Instead, he would have seconded John Dewey's statement
that "democratic equality may be construed as individuality"; 21 individualism was fostered by political equality and, eventually, by economic equality as well.
There are two additional, unusual elements in Brandeis's thought
that should be noted before turning to its evolution and the role that
the times in which he lived played in its formulation. The first is the
relationship between traditional civil liberties and economic rights;
the second is the nature of citizenship.
Americans generally use the term "civil liberties" to connote the
individual's right to be free from governmental action. They employ
a separate category of "civil rights" to describe equal treatment of all
citizens by the government and the government's assumption of
responsibility to ensure equal treatment by various private bodies such
as employers, places of public accommodation, and universities.
Human rights as defined by such post-World War II documents as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have included
a category more usually found in European polities and generally given
the rubric "economic rights": the right to an assured income, to adequate medical treatment, to education. 22 American civil libertarians
still are embroiled in the questions of the extent to which such etonomic
rights should be part of national policy and the degree to which they
can be subsumed under already existing sections of the Constitution.
Brandeis may have been one of the few major political figures in
the twentieth century to adopt a peculiarly American approach that
would reject the perceived dichotomy between civil liberties and economic rights. He did not speak of economic rights but of economic
liberty, or, rather, ofliberty in the economic sphere as part of an allencompassing liberty that made life worth living. Brandeis used the
words "rights" and "liberties" somewhat interchangeably, meaning both
the moral demand of the individual to be free from governmental
interference and the individual's claim on the government for provision
of such services as education without which a citizen could not participate meaningfully in the political process. He viewed the Founding Fathers as sharing his belief that "Liberty ... [is] the secret of
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happiness," 23 and in many ways his mature thought was an attempt
to outline the roles that could be played by the national and state
governments, law, and economic entities in ensuring individual liberty.
"Liberty" meant as much control of one's fate as is humanly possible;
economic liberty meant an extensive degree of control by the individual
over his or her life in the economic sphere. Brandeis saw political and
economic liberty as inextricably interrelated. A person deprived of
economic liberty could not be a politically free and active citizen.
Because he postulated the necessity for both economic and political
liberty, Brandeis went beyond progressivism. Most Progressives
viewed the proper role of government as the creation and maintenance
of a relatively even economic playing field, which required government
to become the regulator of big business on behalf of the citizen.
Brandeis ultimately rejected the idea of government regulation of big
business in favor of the conviction that, like political democracy,
economic democracy can best be guarded by individuals rather than
by the state. His vision of economic liberty was similar to his picture
of political liberty: a society in which members of an entity, whether
citizens of a democratic political system or workers in a factory, make
the decisions most important to their lives. One might in fact argue
that Brandeis was a republican about politics but a democrat when
it came to the economy. He accepted the necessity for representative
government in the sprawling United States, although he preferred
the pure democracy practiced by the Jewish communities in Palestine
on their kibbutzim. His goal of worker-participation, although he never
described it in detail, appears to have been closer to one of pure
workplace democracy. He developed an economic counterpart to Mill's
belief that as people know their own interests best, 24 the only government that can be trusted to adopt policies in the people's best interest
is one chosen by the people themselves; the only people who can
articulate and create workplace policies that will be just are those who
are most affected by them.
The second element of importance to Brandeis's thought is the
nature of citizenship, or more specifically, civic duty and civic courage. 25 To him, as to the Greek philosophers, civic virtue was involvement in public life. 26 It was obvious to Brandeis that citizenship
brought responsibilities as well as rights, for the whole premise of
democracy is that the citizens will rule. Citizens were obliged to
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participate actively in the political process and not only because their
failure to do so would prevent the political system from being truly
democratic. Citizen responsibility was a means, but it was also a good
in itself; it was a method by which human beings developed their full
potential. "The development of the individual is .. . both a necessary
means and the end sought," Brandeis declared. "The great developer
is responsibility. "27 Human beings would grow as a result of fulfilling
their democratic responsibilities in both the political system and the
workplace. Here Brandeis went beyond Plato to concentrate on the
beneficent effects of civic "virtue" not only on the "polis" but on the
individual as well. Thus there was a psychological component to
Brandeis's thought: Democracy was not only, as Winston Churchill
is reputed to have said, "the worst political system ever invented except
for all the others"; it was the system best designed to produce truly
free, fully developed human beings.
The performance of civic duty depended upon adequate leisure.
Without time to inform themselves, citizens could not participate
intelligently in the political process. Here Brandeis, whose life-style
and work habits tended toward the puritanical, departed from the
Protestant work ethic. Puritans sought the measure of a person in
his or her work. Brandeis found it, in good part, in the citizen's use
ofleisure time for participation in political life and other self-fulfilling
activities. "Leisure does not imply idleness," according to Brandeis.
"It means ability to work not less but more, ability to work at something
besides breadwinning . . .. Leisure, so defined, is an essential of successful democracy. "28 Leisure was a psychological as well as a physical
necessity. He could "do twelve months' work in eleven months, but
not in twelve," Brandeis said, and assumed the same was true of other
people. 29 The intelligent use of leisure was as good for the citizen as
it was for the society. Any economic system that did not permit
adequate leisure time therefore doomed both individual self-fulfillment
and any hope of democracy.
To Brandeis, a major component of the free, developed person was
courage. Personal courage was a theme of his life, and he demonstrated
it on dozens of occasions. Perhaps one of the earliest examples occurred
when his eyes gave out while he was a student at Harvard Law School
and a number of doctors told him he would have to abandon his goal
of becoming a lawyer. Brandeis ignored them and kept looking until
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he found a doctor who agreed that by minimizing his own reading
and relying on fellow students to read most of the necessary material
to him, he could continue in the law. The "only" requirement was
that Brandeis develop a photographic memory, and so he did, going
on to earn the highest grades of any student in the law school's
history. 30
Civic courage was simply that sort of personal courage extended
into the public arena. To Brandeis, personal liberty and courage in
the civic sphere were inextricably linked. The Founding Fathers, he
would write, not only "believed liberty to be the secret of happiness,"
but they also "believed ... courage to be the secret of liberty."31
Brandeis equated moral courage and civic virtue with freedom. It was
only the good citizen who could truly be free, for the willingness to
face the vicissitudes of public life was a prerequisite of liberty. Brandeis
learned civic courage from the adults in his abolitionist family, whose
abhorrence of slavery made them highly unpopular with their Kentucky neighbors. He needed it again as a Bostonian. During his student
days at Harvard and his early years as a practicing attorney, he was
"taken up" by Boston Brahmins, invited to their homes and their
soirees. 32 His experiences as a lawyer, however, convinced him that
many of the ideas held by the welcoming Brahmins were wrong. He
began to oppose their deeply held beliefs about the preponderant power
employers should enjoy and their view of state legislatures as properly
being little more than the instruments of the propertied classes.
Brandeis came to believe in equal power for employees and employers,
and he was shocked at the ability of capitalists to buy legislative votes.
His popularity with many of his Brahmin acquaintances quickly
disintegrated, but he was certain that as a citizen he had an obligation
to speak for what was right. Repeatedly, throughout his life, in making
opponents of the big banks and the money trust, Charles S. Mellen
and the massive New Haven Railroad empire, J. P. Morgan and the
steel trust, President Taft and the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate in
the Pinchot-Ballinger affair, Brandeis demonstrated his own civic
courage. 33 He expected no less of the people around him; moreover,
he made it a part of his belief system and of his political thought.
Involvement in public life was a challenge, and there was nothing
Brandeis relished more. "Bear in mind," he told an admirer, "that
in canoeing I have enjoyed not only floating down streams. Paddling
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up them was also a feature." 34 He was known among his summer
neighbors on Cape Cod as a man who would brave the wildest waters
in his canoe. His canoeing might almost be a metaphor for his approach to the political process: "Floating down" was to be enjoyed,
but "paddling up" was to be expected and was to be greeted with zest.
Being a citizen in the contentious world of public policy was more
than a responsibility; it was fun.

1
EARLY IDEAS: CONFORMITY
AND THE SEEDS OF EVOLUTION

The brain is like the hand. It grows with using. 1

In 1913 a reporter asked Brandeis, "How came you by your democracy? You were not bred to it?" Brandeis replied, "No; my early
associations were such as to give me greater reverence than I now
have for the things that are because they are. I recall that when I began
to practice law I thought it awkward, stupid, and vulgar that a jury
of twelve inexpert men should have the power to decide. I had the
greatest respect for the Judge. I trusted only expert opinion." Later,
he said, "I began to see that many things sanctioned by expert opinion
and denounced by popular opinion were wrong." And he added,
"Experience oflife has made me democratic." By "democratic" he meant
able to see the virtues of the ordinary, non expert individual. 2
Brandeis was "bred" to a belief in political democracy but not to
the egalitarian economic definition of democracy he had adopted by
1913 and would retain for the remainder of his life. His early thinking,
like that of most young people, was quite different from his later ideas.
He was unlike many thoughtful young people, however, in his tendency to adhere to established truths rather than to rebel against them.
The young Brandeis was far more conservative, or at least quite
different in his conservatism, from the mature Brandeis. One might
describe his early economic ideas as those of a nineteenth-century
laissez-faire liberal. The personal liberty he emphasized throughout
his adult life initially was the liberty to vote, to participate in political
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affairs, and to earn one's living without governmental interference .
By the second decade of the twentieth century, he was defining liberty
quite differently. Brandeis learned from experience, and as his experiences accumulated his ideas changed considerably.
Louis David Brandeis was born on November 13, 1856, in Louisville, Kentucky, the youngest of four children. His father, Adolph,
was a partner in a prosperous business that included a grocery and
general-produce store, a wholesale grain outlet, a flour mill, a tobacco
factory, an 1,100-acre farm, and a river freighter . Adolph had emigrated from Prague as a young man with limited funds, partly in the
traditional search for economic success that brought so many others
to the United States. Another element, however, in Adolph's move
and that of the twenty-six other members of his family and two related
families who later joined him was their sympathy for Austria's democratic Revolution of 1848 and their reaction to its failure. 3 The families
possessed a strong sense of morality and of social responsibility as
well as a commitment to public service. Brandeis's first memory was
of his mother carrying food and coffee to the Union soldiers outside
his family's home in Louisville. Although Adolph became sufficiently
wealthy to employ servants, who in nineteenth-century Kentucky
invariably were black, the family never treated them as slaves or supported the "peculiar institution. "4
Brandeis's idol was his uncle Lewis Dembitz, whose last name
Brandeis substituted for his original middle name. Dembitz was
a delegate to the convention that nominated Lincoln for president
in 1860, served as Louisville's assistant city attorney, drafted the
first "Australian" ballot law ever to be adopted in the United States,
created a local tax-collection system, translated at least part of Uncle
Tom's Cabin into German, and translated the books of Exodus and
Leviticus into English. He possessed a seemingly unquenchable thirst
for knowledge, reading a dozen languages, becoming a good enough
amateur astronomer to forecast the 1869 eclipse of the sun to the
minute, and writing a treatise on Kentucky Jurisprudence that was considered definitive. 5 Brandeis remembered his uncle as "a living university."6 His uncle's ties to the organized Jewish community and his
concern for the future of Jews later helped impel Brandeis toward
Zionism and the political thought that resulted from his involvement
in it.
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Brandeis's parents acknowledged their Judaism but were not interested in its rituals. His mother, dismissing the notion "that sins can
be expiated by going to divine service and observing this or that
formula," taught her children that "only goodness and truth and
conduct that is humane and self-sacrificing towards those who need
us can bring God nearer to us" and that "our errors can only be atoned
for by acting in a more kindly spirit." She strove to imbue them with
"the highest ideals as to morals and love" and insisted that the family
talk about politics rather than money or other similarly "vulgar" matters at the dinner table. So Brandeis began life with a mixture of
the belief in laissez-faire capitalism typical of his father's occupation,
the political idealism and cultural background of sophisticated, liberal middle European Jews, and a view of public service as a moral
imperative. 7
Neither his early education in Louisville nor his years at the AnnenRealschule in Dresden (1873-1875) altered his ideas, although they
added substantially to his knowledge. By the time he left Dresden
for Boston he was fluent in French, Latin, German, and Greek; he
had studied literature, mineralogy, geography, physics, chemistry,
and mathematics; and he was knowledgeable about music and art.
Most important to him, however, the Annen-Realschule had taught
him to think. He was excited by his discovery there that "ideas could
be evolved by reflecting on your material." He knew exactly what he
wanted to do: "to go back to America and . . . study law. My uncle,
the abolitionist, was a lawyer, and to me nothing else seemed really
worth while ."8 Even then, it appears, he equated being an attorney
with taking a moral stance.
His three years as an undergraduate and as a graduate student at
the Harvard Law School (1875-1878) were spent using the newly
introduced case method to study the law. His courses-contracts,
property, torts, civil procedure, criminal law, evidence, equity, trusts,
constitutional law, sales, real property, wills, and bills and notesreflected a legal system predicated on the dominance of private
property and designed to protect it. After a few months of practicing
commercial law with a relative in St. Louis, Brandeis returned to
Boston to join his wealthy socialite classmate Samuel Warren in
opening a law firm representing small factory owners and merchants.
At the same time , he was asked to teach a course on evidence at
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Harvard; a few years later, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
hired him to teach a course on business law. 9
There is no indication that Brandeis had any early doubts about
the laissez-faire capitalism implicit in his law school studies, even after
the devastating economic experiences his father underwent when
Brandeis was a teenager. Adolph's business began to falter in 1872,
and he realized that the country was about to experience a recession.
He therefore sold the business and took his family to Europe, fully
expecting to return after a year or so to reestablish himself, but for
various reasons the family came back to Louisville in 1875. Adolph
then established a cotton business, only to see it collapse within two
years. In 1878 he and his son Alfred founded a retail store that,
although ultimately successful, did not do well while Brandeis was
at Harvard. The only money Brandeis's family could spare while he
was in law school was a loan of a few hundred dollars from Alfred,
so Brandeis maintained himself by tutoring the son of Prof. James
Bradley Thayer and other young students and by proctoring examinations. He lived so frugally that by 1878 he had not only managed
to repay his brother but had saved some money that, beginning a
lifelong pattern, he invested in what he considered to be nonspeculative bonds. His successful law practice, his frugality, and his
conservative investments would make him a millionaire twice over
by the time he joined the Supreme Court in 1916. Adolph had been
sufficiently disturbed by his own financial problems, however, to regret
his son's having decided against a "safe" teaching career in favor of
the chancier prospects of private practice. 10
In 1897, testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee
against a proposed law raising tariffs, Brandeis sounded the theme
of laissez-faire. He announced, "I appear for those who want to be
left alone, those who do not come to Congress and seek the aid of
the sovereign powers of the government to bring them prosperity."
His clients wished to be "left undisturbed in business" rather than
artificially protected from competition. He lambasted reliance upon
governmental involvement in the economy as destructive of "the old
and worthy sturdy principle of American life which existed in the
beginning when men succeeded by their own efforts." 11 There are
echoes oflaissez-faire individualism in his 1904 statement: "Few things
in the world are worth while having that are not attained by struggle. "12
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None of his letters or speeches suggests any doubt that small-scale
capitalism, presumably typified by his clients, was good and that it
was only the growing "excesses" of capitalism by "the great captains
of industry and of finance" that were leading to social discontent. 13
It seems fair to assume that the son of a small businessman, educated
at Harvard about a legal system designed in part to protect small
business and using that system on behalf of his business clients, initially
held beliefs supportive of small-scale laissez-faire capitalism.
Brandeis's economics may have been traditional, but he quickly
developed a novel approach to the practice of the law. 14 In his first
heady years as a practitioner he simply rejoiced in the excitement of
cases, particularly those involving litigation. Soon, however, he became choosier. His frugality at Harvard had taught him that minimizing his material needs brought akind of freedom . He had no desire
to work for clients whose claims he felt to be illegitimate; frugality
meant he would not have to. "I would rather have clients," he said,
"than be somebody's lawyer." 15 "Having clients" meant that he would
pick his cases and that he would use his ability to understand,
frequently better than his clients did, their legal and related problems
and to decide the best way of handling them. He insisted on knowing
the underlying situation that led to immediate concerns. The result
was a familiarity with his clients' businesses that eventually would alter
his political thinking. For the moment, however, he saw his approach
as no more than a wise way to practice law . 16
Apparently, as a younger attorney, conditioned by his early life
and the dominant mores, Brandeis saw no reason to question the
premises oflaissez-faire capitalism . By 1905 and after more than two
decades of practice, however, he had begun to wonder about the social
utility of large corporations and about their impact on a society and
a governmental system that had taken small-scale capitalism as a given.
His earlier views may have been in part no more than those attitudes
to be expected from the son of a small businessman and the lawyer
for others, but an additional aspect of his thinking was his concept
of the practice of law. He liked the idea of the independent attorney
functioning in a laissez-faire economy as much as he disliked the trend
he thought he saw among twentieth-century lawyers. He considered
it immoral for lawyers to function as guns for hire, particularly when
their employers were corporations attempting to affect the political
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process. He reminded the Harvard Ethical Society in 1905 that in
the early United States, "nearly every great lawyer was then a statesman; and nearly every statesman, great or small, was a lawyer." He
much regretted that lawyers no longer held "a position of independence, between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the
excesses of either" but had turned their backs on the people in order
"to become adjuncts of great corporations." 17
The perception of public service as a duty, not only of the lawyer
but of any citizen and not only of any citizen but particularly of the
lawyer, was part of Brandeis's family legacy. His association with
Samuel Warren made him a member of Boston society and led to
his involvement in the public-oriented concerns that were among his
new acquaintances' interests. He found himself speaking before
Edward Everett Hale's Unitarian congregation on the obligation of
citizens to pay their taxes, testifying before the state Insurance Committee about a bill designed to value policies uniformly for taxation
purposes, appearing at hearings of the state legislature to argue against
women's suffrage (a position he would reject within a few years),
and involved in a move to limit the impact of lobbies on the state
legislature. 18
Even if his family heritage, his new position in the world of the
Brahmins, and his own inclination had not led him into public life,
his clients' concerns would have done so. In 1886 Warren & Brandeis
represented a number of paper manufacturers who were attempting
to repeal a city ordinance that, as a purported health measure, required
all imported rags to be disinfected in Boston. Despite the fact that
his clients had already had the rags disinfected abroad, they were forced
to pay the monopolistic Boston Disinfecting Company five dollars a
ton for disinfecting them again. Brandeis, satisfied that the sanitizing
process abroad was sufficient for health purposes, represented the
manufacturers first before Boston's Common Council, which refused
to repeal the law, and again when one manufacturer unsuccessfully
brought suit against the law. One of his daughters later stated that
it was this fight that awakened him to the dangers of monopoly. 19
Dealing with public bodies also showed Brandeis the corruption
that was rampant in many late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
state legislatures. In 1898 George Fred Williams, an attorney and
member of the Massachusetts legislature, asked Brandeis for help in
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exposing the routine bribery of state legislators. Brandeis agreed to
look at the liquor lobby, already chafing at a law that prohibited the
sale of liquor except with a meal and currently threatened with an
even more restrictive temperance bill. He went about the task in his
idiosyncratic, seemingly quixotic way. One of his clients was William
D. Ellis, the distillers' representative in Massachusetts. Brandeis called
Ellis in, handed him a list of all the members of the state legislature,
and asked him to check the names of those who could be bribed. When
Ellis finished the task, Brandeis asked, "Ellis, do you realize what you
are doing?" and, as Brandeis remembered it, lectured him about the
evils of bribery until "tears ran down the liquor agent's face." Then
Brandeis decided he would represent Ellis's group, the Massachusetts
Protective Liquor Dealers' Association, in its fight against the bill,
on condition that Ellis be named head of its Executive Committee
and that the association sperid no money on the battle unless it was
approved by Brandeis. 2o
He reasoned that the impetus for the liquor dealers' bribery was
the passage of laws that made their business impossible. The "antibar" or meal-only Massachusetts statute was largely ignored, but the
dealers had to resort to bribery to keep the law from being enforced
and to attempt to revoke it. Brandeis drew up a less restrictive proposal.
"You can remove liquor dealers from politics by a very simple device,"
Brandeis told the legislature; "make the liquor laws reasonable ." The
legislators followed his advice, the newspapers trumpeted his accomplishment, and he wrote to his fiancee, "I think I can accomplish much"
in what was then his "pet reform," the liquor trade, "by making the
dealers respectable." He felt he had proved the worth of his policy
of"dignified publicity, eliminating lobbyists and lobbyists' practices."
The association paid him $2,000 for his efforts . It was less than he
could have received, he said some years later, but he wanted to
demonstrate that by openly spending far less than they had spent
secretly in earlier years, the dealers could achieve at least as much. 21
A few years later Brandeis began his first long-term battle on behalf
of the public, against the Boston Elevated's attempted monopoly over
Boston's public transportation system . 22 His involvement stemmed
partly from his anger at a policy he saw as penalizing the people and
partly from his close association with merchants whose customers
depended upon cheap public transportation. The fight was long but
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ultimately successful, and he discovered that he was good at using
his legal and organizational talents on behalf of the public and that
doing so was immensely satisfying. His continued work as the people's
attorney led him to study a wide variety of fields and to question many
of his early assumptions. He became interested in the life insurance
business, for example, in 1905, when a group of Bostonians, learning
of corruption in the Equitable Assurance Company that insured them,
organized the New England Policy Holders' Protective Committee
and asked Brandeis to represent them. He agreed to do so on condition
that he be unpaid so that he could act in the interest of the public
as well as that of the committee. The study he undertook of the insurance industry led to his realization that industrial workers who
bought small life insurance policies from the three largest companies
selling such insurance were being routinely cheated. Convinced that
the companies' activity in this field was bad for the workers, he devised
the system of Massachusetts savings-bank life insurance that exists
to this day. He wrote in 1905 that although he considered the insurance
companies overly big, "I am well aware that it is not fashionable at
the present time to suggest that anything can be too large, and I am
disposed to think that in regard to most businesses, it would not be
wise to place any limit upon size." But his inclination not to interfere
with the size of business in general was one of the many elements
of his thinking that would be altered by his experiences. 23
The Boston Elevated fight enabled him to refine his ideas about
monopoly, which he came to oppose as much in the field of public utilities as he did in the area of private business. He rejected the proposal
that the Elevated be permitted a monopoly under governmental regulation for the same reasons he later argued against a merger of the New
York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company with the Boston
and Maine Railroad: "This would be like surrendering liberty and substituting despotism with safeguards. There is no way in which to safeguard people from despotism except to prevent despotism. There is
no way to safeguard the people from the evils of a private transportation monopoly except to prevent the monopoly. The objections to
despotism and to monopoly are fundamental in human nature. They
rest upon the innate and ineradicable selfishness of man. They rest upon
the fact that absolute power inevitably leads to abuse. They rest upon
the fact that progress flows only from struggle," i.e., from competition. 24
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He uncovered legislative corruption once again, reporting during
the transportation fight that the supposedly public service corporation
was buying legislators' votes with promises of jobs for the political
hacks to whom they owed favors. He told an ally that he had discovered
"from one to two hundred" such persons on the payroll of public corporations. He drafted two bills designed to eliminate such ties but
decided not to complicate the transportation fight by raising the issue. 25
He kept his drafts, however, and in 1903 he urged Gov.John L. Bates
to include mention of the proposed antibribery laws in his inaugural
speech. The governor did so, but the legislature took no action. 26
Unperturbed, Brandeis addressed the Boot and Shoe Club and the
Unitarian Club on the subject, citing specific instances oflegislative
larceny, bribery, and fraud. 27 He contrasted the secrecy by which
corruption flourished with the right to know, crucial in a democratic
society. The citizen's first obligation, he argued, was "to know," which
required "a diffusion of knowledge on all these [public] matters." It
was "dishonorable" and "a shameful breach of trust" to accept anything
else." 28 When a Massachusetts legislator demonstrated some interest
in the subject two years later, Brandeis sent him a copy of one of his
draft bills. 29 Finally, in 1906 one of the bills, supported by the Public
Franchise League, became law. 30
Another experience with public affairs that became important to
his political thought was his 1910-1911 involvement in the PinchotBallinger affair, which began with the decision of William Howard
Taft's secretary of the interior to sell government-owned lands in Alaska
to private commercial interests and continued with Taft's participation
in an attempted cover-up of the scheme, and resulted in congressional
hearings about both. Brandeis was asked to be present at the hearings
to represent Collier's J#ekry, the journal that had published an incriminating report by a Land Office field agent concerned about governmental improprieties and that had been threatened with a libel suit.
The immediate impact on Brandeis was total immersion in questions
ofland use, government ownership ofland and other natural resources,
and his formulation of a proposal for government ownership of land
that would be leased to individuals or groups 31 and that would be
under the general policy control of small-scale communal groups. 32
Brandeis's political thought was an amalgam of his background with
his experiences and the ideas they generated. His treatment of ideas
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as experimental plans of action, originating in a problem, is reminiscent ofJohn Dewey. 33 Whether he was immersing himself in workers'
life insurance, fighting corruption in the Massachusetts legislature,
or exposing the presidential cover-up in the Pinchot-Ballinger affair,
his values were being filtered through experience and emerging transformed. There was nothing in his upbringing, his formal education
in English and American law, or his partnership in a law firm most of
whose clients owned such small businesses as paper, shoe, and leather
manufacturing plants or retail establishments that would lead him
to doubt either the virtues of laissez-faire capitalism and a market
economy or its existence in the United States. Nonetheless, those
elements of his background later merged with experience to alter his
ideas .
A major part of his family's legacy was its high moral standards
and sense of public responsibility. He believed that public acclaim
was less important than acting properly and maintaining faith with
other human beings. In 1889, when Brandeis was thirty-two, his father
complimented him upon one of his successes . "I could not recall ever
having been proud of anything accomplished or to have deemed any
recognition an honor," Brandeis replied. "Indeed, I believe that the
little successes I may have had, were due wholly to the pressure from
within - proceeding from a deep sense of obligation and in no respect
to the allurement of a possible distinction." He wrote to his fiancee
that the value of "right living . . . is surely underestimated by even
the good people of the world." Character was crucial, whether or not
it produced results: "It is the effort-the attempt-that tells." So it
was not surprising that he became disgusted by the legislative corruption revealed by his work on matters such as the Boston subways,
and he fulminated against "the wickedness of people shielding wrongdoers and passing them off . . . as honest men." Legislators were too
interested in material things. Brandeis agreed with Matthew Arnold
that "life is not a having and a getting; but a being and a becoming."
His openness to "becoming," to learning and changing, to considering
new ideas was reflected in the emphasis on facts and their importance
so similar to his uncle Dembitz's insistent quest for knowledge . 34 It
was an emphasis on the lessons of experience that also paralleled the
developing school of pragmatism typified by William James and John
Dewey. 35
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Brandeis's thinking always included an emphasis on individualism
and equality of opportunity. The specifics of both goals, however,
developed over time. He began with the traditional capitalist's stress
on the individual as an economic entity best able to function without
governmental intervention, sharing the apparent belief of his class
and era in the minimalization of government. In fact, as he found,
hidden behind a formal assertion of laissez-faire individualism was
the use of the government's right of eminent domain to buy and turn
over valuable land to private entities, grants of public land to railroads,
the government-created doctrine that corporations must be treated
legally as individuals and accorded all the rights recognized by the
Constitution as belonging to people, 36 the use oflaw to "protect" employers from employees' attempts at unionization, or the creation of
policies that enhanced the growth of the trusts he came to abhor.
Many people-clergy, economists, reformers, philosophers, academicians, even state officials-shared Brandeis's discovery that laissezfaire capitalism, assuming it had ever existed in a pure form in the
United States, had become a facade; similarly, a chorus of voices,
however small initially, was calling for government regulation to undo
the concentrations of power and wealth.created by society. 37 Theorists
concerned with liberty and equality made up part of the chorus. John
Dewey, for example, had argued in 1888 that political democracy
requires economic democracy, had identified the social element in
the accumulation of wealth at least as early as 1889, and was soon
criticizing laissez-faire economics and calling for government regulation. 38 Brandeis, however, relied on experience as his teacher. His
individualism emphasized human dignity and educability. He agreed
with Jefferson that all people were equal in their possession of at least
a modicum of reason and the capacity to use it, however different
their levels of intelligence might be. Education was crucial not only
for citizenship but to enable people to live the well-rounded lives that
constituted human fulfillment. Brandeis relied upon experience to
educate him in political economy.
Thus nothing in Brandeis's early values necessarily doomed his faith
in capitalism; when his values were juxtaposed with circumstances,
however, that was the result. Yet the most important alteration in
his thought did not follow from his discovery of new phenomena: government corruption, public utilities, the insurance industry. He took
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for granted an understanding of the relationship between labor and
capital. It was only when he reexamined his basic assumptions about
relationships in the economic world that his thought was transformed
into a coherent, highly creative philosophy. A major element in the
process may have been the shocking discovery, to him, that some
"respectable" people did not share his regard for individualism, as he
defined it, or for the tenets he assumed were embodied in democracy.

2
FROM LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAPITALISM
TO WORKER-MANAGEMENT

Industrial democracy should ultimately attend political democracy. 1
In 1892 Brandeis was confronted with dramatic proof that capitalists
could be less than altruistic or even humane. He was preparing to
teach a course on business law at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The notes he had nearly finished writing for his lectures
were designed to demonstrate how the common law had evolved in
tandem with industry and commerce. The congruence between law
and society had become part of Brandeis's thought. He assumed that
law invariably reflected all relevant aspects of the community from
which it had emerged. Seen as organic, law could not but be good
in responding to the needs of the people.
One morning before the semester began, he picked up his newspaper
and learned of the violence that had erupted at the Carnegie steel
works in Homestead, Pennsylvania, when the company decided not to
renew its contract with the steelworkers and refused to deal with a
union. Brandeis had been friendly for some years with Mary Kenney,
a labor organizer, and the man she eventually married, John F. O'Sullivan, a union official. A few days earlier Kenney had told Brandeis
about her trip to Homestead during the contract's last weeks. The
company clearly expected violence when the contract ran out, for it
had erected walls with apertures for guns around the steel-mill grounds.
The violence started when the contract expired, wages were slashed,
and the workers went out on strike. Henry Clay Frick, Carnegie's
24
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manager, hired Pinkerton guards to protect strikebreakers and sailed
them up the Ohio River. The Pinkertons arrived at Homestead on
boats, realized that the strikers, dug in on the bank of the river, would
not permit them to land, and began to fire their Winchesters. The
steelworkers suffered most of the casualties in the ensuing battle .
Brandeis later remembered his reaction: "I saw at once that the
common law, built up under simpler conditions of living, gave an
inadequate basis for the adjustment of the complex relations of the
modern factory system . I threw away my notes and approached my
theme from new angles. Those talks at Tech marked an epoch in my
own career."2
Brandeis realized that nothing in the formal legal institutions
explained "human affairs in their manifold relations" as they existed
in Homestead. He was appalled at "that battle, where organized capital
hired a private army to shoot at organized labor for resisting an
arbitrary cut in wages" and began to think seriously for the first time
about "the relations of labor to industry." He set about revising his
notes to cover the "Legal Relation of Labor and Capital," convinced
that if law was both a dynamic entity that reflected changing social
conditions and an embodiment of morality, the law of the twentieth
century would have to keep pace with the new phenomenon of highly
concentrated capital. Brandeis quickly learned that the law was neither
necessarily moral nor egalitarian, there being no meaningful equality
between Carnegie and his workers. 3
Ten years later he faced directly the difficulties inherent in the
capital-labor relationship. His client William H. McElwain, a major
shoe manufacturer, called Brandeis in when the business began to
experience difficulties. The employees had refused to accept the pay
cut McElwain considered to be reasonable and necessary under the
circumstances . Brandeis went to the plant and found that the employees were paid well when they worked, but their work was seasonal
and they earned nothing out of season. He was amazed to learn that
McElwain had no idea how much his workers earned each year rather
than each working day. Seeking more information, Brandeis turned
to John Tobin, head of the International Boot and Shoe Workers'
Union, who was acting as the striking workers' representative, and
heard the same story of high but seasonal wages. McElwain sought to
end the impasse by suggesting that the workers be paid on a piecework
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basis; Tobin wanted wages calculated on the basis of hours. Brandeis
rejected both ideas and instead proposed a detailed system that would
enable labor to be spread out during the year to prevent irregularity
of employment. The two sides agreed, the system was put into effect,
and it worked. 4
Brandeis learned three major lessons from the McElwain experience.
First he saw that irregularity of employment was disastrous for
workers, so much so that thereafter he considered it the major problem
for labor and insisted, "Unemployment is as unnecessary as disease
epidemics. "5 He saw regularization as helpful to employers as well
as to employees because it would enable them to recoup their initial
investment in machinery quickly by running it throughout the year,
to increase volume and subsequently to lower prices with the result
of increasing volume even further, and to find employees who might
be willing to accept lower wages in return for guaranteed regular
employment. Second, he learned that, given sufficient information
about the facts of the situation, labor and capital could behave reasonably, as he believed McElwain and Tobin had done. He remained
in contact with Tobin, having discovered that union leaders - or at
least one of them -were as reasonable as employers and that he could
speak with the former as easily as with the latter. Although he had
socialized with labor-movement figures such as Kenney and O'Sullivan,
this was the first time he had negotiated with a labor leader in the
workplace. Brandeis was referring to the McElwain experience when
he said that "many things sanctioned by expert opinion and denounced
by popular opinion were wrong." In Brandeis's world, one opinion
ensconced in popular belief was that unionization was an evil. The
third and related lesson was, as he had earlier seen in the Homestead
strike, that inequality of power resulted in human misery; in the absence of unions, employees were at the mercy of employers. The
priority he placed on the dignity of individuals made that situation
unacceptable, for he was not so naive as to think that employers
automatically would interest themselves in the dignity of others rather
than in profits. 6
One of Brandeis's basic premises was that human beings had the
right to govern themselves in the economic as well as in the political
sphere. He had now learned that such self-government, or at least
something as basic as a modicum of control over their wages, was
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impossible for workers unless they were organized. Brandeis had
become convinced that unions were a necessity. John Stuart Mill had
asserted that in the public sphere, "the rights and interests of every
or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person
interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for
them." 7 Brandeis took this idea into the workplace, viewing unions
as enabling workers to stand up for their interests.
Speaking to an organization of employers in 1904 he said, "Some
way must be worked out by which employer and employee, each
recognizing the proper sphere of the other, will each be free to work
for his own and for the common good, and that the powers of the
individual employee may be developed to the utmost." An implicit
symmetry between the public sphere and the workplace was becoming
apparent in his thinking. He equated civic virtue with a citizen's involvement in public affairs; industrial virtue consisted of employing
one's powers "to the utmost" in the workplace. Neither employers nor
employees ought to dominate the relationship; the "sense of unrestricted power is just as demoralizing for the employer as it is for the
employee. Neither our intelligence nor our characters can long stand
the strain of unrestricted power"; that is, absolute power corrupts in
the economic as well as in the political sphere . For that reason, "The
employer needs the union 'to stay him from the fall of vanity,'" and
union leaders will be "reasonable and conservative" only if they
represent strong unions. 8
Brandeis had begun to speak of "industrial democracy," which he
equated with the checks and balances of the political sphere: putting
employers and employee unions on an "equal" basis by balancing the
financial power of employers with the power of the unions to keep
businesses from functioning unless they paid fair wages. He was certain
that the leaders of strong unions and the employers dealing with them
would act rationally as long as they talked together. Thinking along
the same lines, William James was soon to proclaim that the conflict
between capital and labor could be solved through mutual understanding. James chided the two sides for being "at cross-purposes all along
the line, regarding each other as they might regard a set of dangerously
gesticulating automata, or, if they seek to get at the inner motivation,
making the most terrible mistakes."9 The statement contains a quite possibly erroneous assumption of ~ltimate mutual interest that Brandeis
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shared. Brandeis's formulation was that "nine-tenths of the serious
controversies which arise in life result from misunderstanding, result
from one man not knowing the facts which to the other man seem
important, or otherwise failing to appreciate his point of view. A properly conducted conference involves a frank disclosure of such facts patient, careful argument, willingness to listen and to consider." 10
James did not normally enter the world of labor negotiations, but
Brandeis did. It is therefore not surprising that Samuel Gompers,
leader of the American Federation of Labor, and other leading union
organizers as well as many employers lost patience with Brandeis when
he in effect told workers who had been shot at by employers' armies
and employers whose buildings had been blown up by frustrated
workers that they had to "reason together" because their interest in
the success of the business was the same . 11
There was a contradiction in Brandeis's thought of which he was
seemingly unaware. He followed Madison in asserting that it was safer
to rely upon self-interest than on virtue or altruism and thus argued
for unionization rather than for benevolent employers. 12 Pitting one
self-interest against another, after all, assumes that the two sets of
interests are in opposition to each other. Yet, simultaneously, Brandeis
postulated an ultimate congruence of interest between employer and
employee, having seen that it was possible to devise solutions that
enhanced both the employer's profits and the circumstances under
which laborers worked, including their wages; and he assumed this
congruence applied to all labor-management situations. The Progressive movement, presupposing a perpetual divergence between the
interests of labor and those of management, adopted the idea of
balancing them by offsetting the greater power of the employers with
governmental intervention and regulation. Brandeis went beyond progressivism to end the duality by merging employer with employee
through worker-management, with a slight detour for the purpose
of exploring scientific management. But that evolution in his thinking
lay in the future.
During the first decade of the twentieth century, Brandeis's mistrust
of unbridled power resulted in further postulates that exasperated labor
and capital alike. He opposed the closed shop, arguing not only that
it was unacceptably coercive but that the presence of nonunion workers
would prevent labor from becoming as tyrannical as the employer. He
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antagonized much of the business community by insisting that
businesses had to be small enough so that employers would be in
sufficient contact with the workers to remember their humanity and
needs. He maintained that labor negotiations had to be conducted
by those people who actually owned or managed the business, presumably because they would best understand the relationship of the union's
demands to their own self-interest. And rationality necessitated one
person or a small group of people being fully familiar with all aspects
of the business: a situation attainable only if the business remained
small. Another reason for opposing overly large enterprises, including
the burgeoning trusts, was that they entailed such massive concentrations of power that countervailing power was impossible, and moral
corruption, defined in this context as a lack of care about employees,
was the inevitable result. 13
The negative reaction of many employers and unionists to his ideas
was of little interest to Brandeis, who interpreted the hostility as
reflecting their regrettable lack of understanding about where their
welfare lay. He equated rationality with a common-sense awareness
of the solutions that would prove best for all concerned and believed
that it eventually would triumph despite the threat presented to it by
unlimited power and myopic greed. He saw great possibilities for
developing "the powers of the individual employee . . . to the utmost"
when rational systems finally came into existence. He urged unions
to fight for reasonable hours as well as wages, for as members of a
democracy, workers need leisure, "among other reasons, because with
us every man is of the ruling class. Our education and condition of
life must be such as become a ruler. Our great beneficent experiment
in democracy will fail unless the people, our rulers, are developed
in character and intelligence." Education requires "freshness of mind
. . . and to the preservation of freshness of mind a short work day
is for most people essential. " 14
Brandeis's concern for most individuals nonetheless was still paternalistic and his approach to unionization conservative, designed to protect small capitalism. His faith was in union leaders rather than in the
rank-and-file worker. He said in 1905 that "democracy is only possible,
industrial democracy, among people who think; among people who are
above the average intelligence ." He mitigated his elitism slightly by
insisting on the right of everyone to education and acknowledging that
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"thinking is not a heaven-born thing .. .. It is a gift men and women
make for themselves ... it is earned by effort . . . . The brain is like
the hand. It grows with using." Yet he clearly did not perceive the
average worker as being on the same intellectual level as most employers, nor was he ready to give such workers, rather than their
presumably wiser leaders, power equal to that of employers. Could
one willingly turn power over to the less favored, the less educated,
the less intelligent? This question is of course central to democratic
political theory, and Brandeis was far from the first or last thinker
to wrestle with it. 15
For the moment, he had no answer. Nor had he come to terms
with the contradiction implicit in his belief that the assumption of
responsibility by workers would develop their powers of intellect and
character and his acknowledgment that "in the unskilled trades and
in many so-called skilled trades" within the industrial world, "the limits
of development" of responsibility "are soon reached." His unarticulated
goal was a method by which the Jeffersonian imperative of economic
independence could be achieved in the industrial age. He soon acknowledged that higher wages and an eight-hour workday were insufficient solutions. By 1907 he was telling the Boston Central Labor
Union, "Labor unions should strive to make labor share all the earnings
of a business except what is required for capital and management."
Shareholders should be given a fair return on their investment, but
after that and the needs of the business itself had been taken care of,
anything remaining belonged to the workers . The former advocate
of laissez-faire capitalism had begun to advocate profit sharing. But
this approach, however much it might increase worker income, would
not result in economic independence . And yet Brandeis could not think
of how to go further. 16
Then came the New York garment workers' strike of 1910, crucial
for Brandeis, which he was asked to mediate. Despite the disagreement
of mainstream labor with some of his ideas, it considered Brandeis
an ally, pointing to his support of unions, decent wages, an eighthour day, regularity of employment, and pension plans and his
opposition to the trusts and to judicial injunctions against strikes. In
1908, in the case of Muller v. Oregon, he had successfully argued for
a state law limiting working hours for women, basing his presentation
to the Supreme Court on the special social role of women, and in 1913
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he was to win an Oregon court ruling legitimizing a state law setting
minimum wages for women. 17
Brandeis had won the trust of small businessmen by representing
many of them and by disdaining the more radical labor positions.
He argued, for example, that a single fixed minimum wage for women
was uneconomic, believing that "the minimum wage in a department
store . . . ought to be higher than the minimum wage in a factory,
because the girl in the department store has to dress well all the time
and that costs money." 18 He had also demonstrated his integrity to
both business and labor. An unidentified typescript in the Felix Frankfurter Papers refers to a statement allegedly made by "Big Bill"
Haywood, leader of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.):
"This fellow Brandeis," he said, "is the most dangerous man in
the United States." He was asked to explain . "Brandeis is the
kind of man the I.W.W. has got to look out for. Brandeis knows
something about capital and labor. He isn't one of these highbrow
reformers who is sure to make a fool of himself. That's why I
say he is in our way. The workers trust him even when he goes
against them. Think of it . He tells them they're wrong here and
wrong there, he defends the manufacturers more than half the
time, and still they believe him. They even say he was right
sometimes when he decided against them ... . I think they'd
follow Brandeis to Kingdom Come because they say nobody can
buy him, that he's not in this for himself, and that he's the whitest
man who ever mixed up in the class struggle. That's what makes
him so damned dangerous. If he were a fool, if he didn't know
all about everything, if he were in it for Brandeis, if there were
only something the matter with him, he wouldn't be messing
things for the I.W.W. wherever he goes. 19
Haywood was right: Brandeis was not "in it for Brandeis" but was
genuinely concerned with the problem of industrial justice -which
meant, to him, justice for both employer and employee. And justice
was not an abstract conception; it had a human face. Brandeis had
many facets: He was a man of the law, a master of facts, a brilliant
political tactician, a gifted mediator, a concerned and involved citizen,
an educator, a believer in democracy. Above all, however, he was a
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humanist. He was offended by human suffering and appalled by the
waste of human potential. 20 Justice and democracy meant that people
would have better lives. His humanism illuminated his approach to
the world of employer and employee. He loathed irregularity of
employment because it hurt people, and he fought overly long working
hours and overly low wages for the same reason. He was closely tied
to the world of social reform, as indicated by his relationships with
people such asJane Addams, Florence Kelley,Josephine Goldmark,
Meyer Bloomfield, and Henry Moskowitz. 21 At the same time, he
viewed each of his business clients as individuals with a need as great
as their workers' for economic security and personal fulfillment. His
concern for all the people in any given situation, including contentious
labor disputes, coupled with his insistent independence, left him free
to pursue his own ideas without regard for the self-interested reactions
of others. He had a reputation as a fair mediator in labor disputes.
In short, both business and labor had reason to trust him. That led
to his acceptance as mediator in the New York garment workers' strike
by both the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, which
represented approximately 10,000 of the roughly 60,000 workers on
strike, and the Cloak, Suit & Skirt Manufacturers' Protective Association, which spoke for 1,500 enterprises, in Brandeis's estimate. 22
The "protocol" Brandeis worked out for the garment industry contained provisions for maximum hours, minimum wages, holidays,
a Joint Board of Sanitary Control to oversee and standardize working
conditions, a Board of Grievances and a Board of Arbitration to resolve
disputes and avert strikes, and Brandeis's cherished idea, a "preferential" rather than either an "open" or a "closed" shop, giving preference
to union workers if equally skilled union and nonunion workers applied
for jobs. Brandeis called it "an essay in industrial democracy," but
the essay ended in 1916. It failed because it did not bridge the divergent
interests of employer and employee at the heart oflabor unrest. The
experience nonetheless transformed Brandeis's attitude toward the
average laborer. 23
Most of the garment workers were Jewish immigrants from Eastern
Europe, as were their employers. Although Brandeis's Jewishness
undoubtedly contributed to the willingness of the two sides to have
him mediate, both workers and management belonged to a group of
Jews totally unknown to him. His family's background lay in the
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Austro-Hungarian Empire; his clients and colleagues in Boston were
mainly either Jews with origins similar to his or Boston Brahmins
or other non-Jews. 24 Suddenly he found himself meeting unskilled
laborers who astonished him with their intelligence, rationality, openness to democratic procedures, tolerance for each other's viewpoints,
sense of equality, and knowledge. These people were his ideal citizens
of a democracy, the workers who could quiet his remaining doubts
about the democratic potential of the working class. He was impressed
when he heard a disgruntled worker thundering at his employer the
words of Isaiah,

It is you who have devoured the vineyard,
the spoil of the poor is in your houses.
What do you mean by crushing M y people,
by grinding the face of the poor?
says the Lord God of hosts.
Here was no paucity of erudition, no lack of democratic precepts,
no inability to grasp economic truths. Brandeis was so enchanted that
he spent his evenings relaxing with the negotiating committee and,
even though he had supposedly given up alcohol years before as
unnecessary, drinking beer with them while he recounted stories of
the Pinchot-Ballinger hearings. 25
Perhaps his mental picture of workers from that time on was of
the literate, articulate Jews he found in the garment industry; perhaps
his theories of industrial relations were postulated on the assumption
that such workers would be the norm; perhaps his intellectual
sympathy for the worker was reinforced by the emotional tie that he,
who had placed no importance on his Jewishness, was surprised to
find himself feeling for these fellow Jews . It was easy for Brandeis
to envision them as participants in his ideal industrial democracy,
and the theory of labor relations he began to articulate reflected his
new attitude.
He had long since dismissed state socialism as an evil to be avoided
in political and industrial democracies because of the large bureaucracy
and concentration of power he thought it necessarily entailed. In 1913
he wrote to an attorney who thought social reform might stave off
socialism, "It seems to me that the prevailing discontent is due perhaps
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less to dissatisfaction with the material conditions, as to the denial
of participation in management, and that the only way to avoid
Socialism is to develop cooperation in its broadest sense. "26 "Cooperation," or worker-management, would be adopted by him both as a
liberating mechanism and as a way of preventing socialism. Oligopolistic and monopolistic capitalism were equally to be avoided because
they were too big to be efficient and because the power implicit in
their size permitted them to ignore the best interests of both workers
and consumers.
Brandeis gradually had altered his definition of democracy in the
economic sphere, changing it from small-scale laissez-faire capitalism
to a balancing of power between employer and employees and then
adding profit sharing to the formula. Because his interest lay in individual autonomy as well as injustice for employees, however, he had
to grapple with the fact that getting more money for their work did
not necessarily ensure workers' autonomy in the workplace. Shorter
hours and more money would bring them the leisure for involvement
in public affairs and self-fulfillment that he considered necessary to
a democratic state and to the individuals within it, but such working
conditions, although desirable, would not bring democracy to the
workplace. In 1911, testifying before a congressional committee
chaired by Sen. Moses Clapp, he expressed his approval of profit
sharing.27 In 1912 he wrote a letter to the editor of Human Engineering, saying that there had to be "two lines of development consistent
with industrial democracy." One was unionism; the other, cooperation,
by which he did not mean "mere profit sharing'' but "a share of the
responsibilities and management, and a utilization of the latent powers"
in the worker. 28 At that point, unable to follow the logic of his own
thinking, he backed away from any discussion of "cooperation." The
following year, however, he was writing that profit sharing was bound
to be a disappointment "unless it [could] be combined with a real labor
co-partnership." Industrial democracy would not be achieved unless
"we ... overcome the sense of injustice; and I doubt whether a sharing
of profit, without a sharing of responsibilities, - in other words, without
real cooperation, -will accomplish what we long for." 29
Brandeis had begun thinking in ways that would differentiate him
from most Progressives. He agreed with them that there was too great
a disparity between the incomes of the wealthy, particularly corporation
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executives , and the wages of the workers. The Progressive goal, and
that of the New Deal, was to divide the economic pie into a far greater
number of slices even if that meant reducing the size of some of the
larger pieces. The emphasis was on raising the workers' standard of
living; the assumption was that having done that, maintaining a
regulatory system would preclude a return to the earlier level of
inequality and exploitation. Brandeis, though agreeing with the absolute necessity to ensure workers an adequate standard of living, was
equally concerned about the quality of their lives and their role as
citizens of a democratic state. That was his reason for emphasizing
sufficient leisure for workers to develop their talents and to engage
in the pastimes they considered to be fulfilling while continuing to
educate themselves for intelligent participation in the political sphere.
He may best have summarized the differences he would have with
other Progressives and New Dealers years before he became identified
with either movement. "Mr. Gompers quoted some time ago the saying
of Heine that 'Bread is Freedom,'" Brandeis stated, referring to labor
leader Samuel Gompers. "The ancient Greeks, recognizing that 'Man
cannot live by bread alone ,' declared that 'Leisure is Freedom.' " He
added, again highlighting emphases that would be widely divergent,
"The American standard ofliving demands not only a high minimum
wage, but a high minimum of leisure, because we must meet also
needs other than material ones ."30
A number of goals converged in Brandeis's thinking about how to
reorganize the workplace: equitable distribution of earnings, the need
for a decent income level, provision of leisure time . Two additional
factors included the question of fairness , of who should benefit from
the toil of the workers , and the issue he referred to as responsibility;
a later generation would call it empowerment.
John Locke had insisted that land "belonged" to those people who
worked it. 31 Brandeis's ideas about profit sharing suggested that in
1911 and 1912 he felt the fruits of industry "belonged" in part to
shareholders and in part to the workers. He obviously continued to
ponder the question of responsibility as well as profit, however, and
three years later, in January 1915, his testimony before the Senate
Commission on Industrial Relations indicated that his ideas were
beginning to solidify. He lambasted large corporations as inefficient,
unable to deal with their problems intelligently, interfering with the
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growth of unions, permitting themselves to be dominated by financial
interests that had no personal involvement in their work, and relying
on wide-scale stockholding that constituted a form of irresponsible
absentee ownership. In the course of his testimony, he also sketched
his emerging vision of industrial democracy. 32
One of the commission's concerns was industrial unrest. Brandeis
was opposed to solutions that did no more than "improve . . . the
physical and material condition of the workingman" because they
would also "reduc[ e ]" the "manhood" of the workers. This was undesirable since a democracy required whole human beings: "Their mental
condition is certainly equally important." 33 The paternalism implied
in progressivism, which assumed workers' concerns would be satisfied
if a governmental elite assured them of a decent wage, might put more
food on the workers' tables but would do nothing for their sense of
self or for their participation in the democratic process. The goal of
the United States' polity, as he saw it, was not merely material improvement per se, but a democracy that would enable its citizens to
take control of their material conditions. Here economic and political
democracy came together:
The social justice for which we are striving is an incident of
our democracy, not the main end. It is rather the result of
democracy - perhaps its finest expression - but it rests upon
democracy, which implies the rule by the people. And therefore
the end for which we must strive is the attainment of rule by
the people, and that involves industrial democracy as well as
political democracy. 34
He had said elsewhere that "we cannot successfully grapple with the
problem of democracy if we confine our efforts to political democracy
. . . the ideals which we have can be attained, only if side by side
with political democracy comes industrial democracy."35 Industrial
democracy meant involvement of workers in the problems of the
enterprises that employed them. "The problems of his [the employer's]
business, and it is not the employer's business alone, are the problems
of all in it," he told the commission. This was more than profit sharing,
although Brandeis still favored it:
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There must be a division not only of profits, but a division also
of responsibilities . The employees must have the opportunity of
participating in the decisions as to what shall be their condition
and how the business shall be run. They must learn also in sharing
that responsibility that they must bear the suffering arising from
grave mistakes, just as the employer must. But the right to assist
in making the decisions, the right of making their own mistakes,
if mistakes there must be, is a privilege which should not be denied
to labor. We must insist upon labor sharing the responsibilities
for the result of the business. 36
His remarks reflected an element of confusion. Brandeis spoke about
"a division of responsibilities" and workers "participating in the decisions," which he specifically said meant not only wages and hours but
"how the business shall be run," and yet he also referred to "the right
to assist" in the decisionmaking process. It was no wonder that one
of the commissioners sought clarification by asking if Brandeis defined
industrial democracy as "a condition whereby the worker has a voice
in the management of the industry," and Brandeis replied that it did:
"not only a voice but a vote; not merely a right to be heard, but a
position through which labor may participate in management. "37
Conceivably, participation could consist of little more than one
representative oflabor sitting in on management decisions. This was
quite valid as an argument against paternalism but far less so as a
description of democracy, which presumably implies the right to effective participation by all rather than token representation. At another
point, he implied .greater employee-participation, describing the
protocol in the garment industry as creating a system in which employers and employees "come together to determine the problems of
the trade in precisely the same way that members of the legislatures
and the judges of the courts come together to decide the matters for
the Nation or of the State or of the city." He was asked if he had found
that the protocol resulted in "an earnest and sincere effort on both
sides to find equity." They had "gotten past the point" of merely seeking
equity, he replied. They had reached "a desire to solve industrial
problems, and the recognition that the problems of the employer can
not be solved by shifting them onto the employee, and that the
problems of the employee can not be solved by shifting onto the

CHAPTER

Two

38

employers; that some way must be found to arrive at the cause of
the difficulty, to remove that cause."38 The picture he painted had
begun to look like a collaborative effort rather than the stereotypical
labor-management relationship. The advocate of clashing ideas as
necessary to the healthy body politic viewed a peaceful sharing of
perceptions as more appropriate to the industrial sector. Truth might
be achieved when ideas were tested against each other, but industrial
strife was a wasteful indication that business and labor had misunderstood each other.
He added, referring to his belief that if employees understood an
employer's problems there would be fewer labor disputes, "Put a competent representative of labor on your board of directors, make him
grapple with the problems whether to do or not to do a specific thing,
and undertake to balance the advantages and disadvantages presented,
and he will get a realizing sense of how difficult it is to operate a
business successfully, and what the dangers are of the destruction of
the capital in the business."39 His language was misleading. Although
he appeared to be saying that the process would be complete if a
competent worker representative was put on the board of directors,
closer scrutiny suggests that he meant that arry competent worker put
on the board would understand the business' problems; i.e., workersor at least those whom their colleagues considered sufficiently competent to represent them - could match the employers' understanding
of the business.
His language was misleading, however, because his ideas were not
yet fully formed, although he was certain of the goal . This became
evident as he continued, extolling the unions' success in exercising
some control over wages, hours, and conditions and in eliminating
child labor from the coal industry. These achievements, Brandeis said,
"are all gains for manhood; and we recognize that manhood is what
we are striving for in America. We are striving for democracy; we
are striving for the development of men. It is absolutely essential in
order that men may develop that they be properly fed and properly
housed, and that they have proper opportunities of education and
recreation. We can not reach our goal without those things. But we
may have all those things and have a nation of slaves. "40 By speaking
of the inclusion of workers in profit sharing and the participation of
some in policy-making, Brandeis was in effect beginning to break down
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the differentiation between the role and status of employers and that
of employees. But if he was to move beyond progressivism, which
was in many ways a conservative movement aimed at protecting the
world of small business by such measures as trust-busting and reinvigorating small-scale competition, he had to go further in eliminating
the differentiation. 41
Brandeis's thinking had not solidified in part because of the paucity
of examples in the United States. Despite his constant and eclectic
reading, most-but not all-of his ideas were derived primarily from
experience, which was in keeping with his belief that experimentation
was the key to progress . One example he did have was the Filene
Co-operative Association, whose constitution he had helped write in
1903. The Filene brothers had decided to experiment with greater
worker involvement in their Boston department store. The 1903 constitution declared that all Filene employees were automatically members of the association and that the association's goal was "to give its
members a voice in their government, to increase their efficiency and
add to their social opportunities, to create and sustain a just and
equitable relation between employer and employe." The plan contemplated profit sharing, but this aspect was dropped in 1913 in favor
of an annual bonus. Another feature that failed was the provision of
the 1912 bylaws for the association's acquisition of the Filenes' common
stock, amounting to 48 percent of all stock, upon the brothers' retirement. A major reason the provision was dropped in practice was the
discouragement of the brothers over the unwillingness of the workers
to be actively involved in management. In 1930 a Russell Sage Foundation study concluded that the plan had been unworkable because
the idea of worker-management had been instituted from above . It
might also have noted that although the employees had the right to
decide all aspects of employment, their power did not extend to store
policy, merchandising techniques, selection of products to be sold,
and so on, and so the plan never called for complete worker-management. While the experiment was still young, however, and again
because of his emphasis on experience as a major source of knowledge,
Brandeis urged Edward Filene to publicize it, arguing that "the best
results of any form of industrial co-operation cannot be attained by
working out the problem in a single establishment." This goal would
be accomplished only "by having your work and ideas supplemented
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by the independent work and ideas of others that may be started under
different conditions and in different places on the same general lines. "42
At the time of his testimony before the commission in 1915, Brandeis
had just begun to learn about workers' cooperatives, particularly from
Beatrice Potter's Cooperative Movement in Great Britain. Potter described
factories and workshops that had "a brotherhood of workers controlling
the organization and retaining the profits of their own labour," mills
"owned and governed by the men and women who actually worked"
there, and fifty-four manufacturing associations and five agricultural
associations in existence when her book was written. She argued that
the worker-run enterprises that had failed had done so because of
insufficient democracy within the enterprise, lack of support from without, too little understanding of economics and market forces, and the
absence of a cooperative union that would not only constitute a network
of worker-managed enterprises but would also include consumer
cooperatives. 43
This book occasioned one of the relatively few times that Brandeis's
basic ideas were affected by something he read . Potter's impression
on him was clear in the interview Brandeis gave to the Sunday Boston
Post shortly after his appearance before the commission. Perhaps he
had been thinking about the inconsistencies in his testimony, for in
the interview he described the protocol system as "a large step toward
industrial democracy, but of course only a step." And, at last, he spoke
of the end of the employer-employee distinction, saying that "in a
democratic community we naturally long for that condition where
labor will hire capital, instead of capital hiring labor. "44
One way this could be accomplished, Brandeis told the interviewer,
was through "co-operative enterprises, private or public, by which
the community undertakes to provide itself with necessaries." He referred at length to England's Co-operative Wholesale Society, the
worldwide parts of which included flour mills, England's largest shoe
factory, apparel factories, manufacturers of prepared food and household articles, creameries, printing plants, coalfields, a Danish bacon
factory, an Australian tallow and oil factory, and a Ceylon tea plantation. The society's annual gross of$150 million made it bigger than
most American industries. And it not only sold for low prices but
operated democratically. Its leaders were selected not by "England's
leading bankers or other notables supposed to possess unusual wisdom,
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but . . . by all the people interested in the operations of the society,
and the number of such persons who have directly or indirectly a voice
in the selection of the directors of the English Co-operative Wholesale
Society is 2,750,000, for the directors of the wholesale society are
elected by vote of the delegates of the 1,899 retail societies, and the
delegates of the retail societies are in turn selected by the members
of the local societies, that is, by the consumers, on the principle of
one man, one vote, regardless of the amount of capital contributed."
Each of the thirty-two full-time directors elected in this manner was
paid about $1 ,500 in 1915, making their combined salaries less than
that of many individual American executives. And that, commented
Brandeis proudly, "shows what industrial democracy can do ."45
Brandeis went on to read The Consumer's Cooperative Movement and
The Decay of Capitalist Civilization by Potter and her husband Sidney
Webb and recommended them and their ideas to his economist
daughter Elizabeth and to his protege Felix Frankfurter.46 He became
an admirer of the consumers' cooperatives not only of England but
also of Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland and an advocate of producers' cooperatives, cooperative banks, and credit unions. Producers'
cooperatives would tend to merge into consumers' cooperatives, he
thought, and the creation of such institutions would distribute responsibility and thereby serve as a force for democracy and individual development .47 His interest in Denmark's cooperative factories and
consumers' cooperatives led him to encourage his wife and one of her
sisters to publish a volume entitled Democracy in Denmark. 48
Brandeis had been pleased to learn that the directors chosen by the
Co-operative Wholesale Society frequently were "men who have risen
from the ranks." He insisted that "we in America must come to the
co-operative idea" in both production and consumption . The profit
sharing that Brandeis had been advocating for years, enabling workers
to own stock in the companies for which they worked, could now be
combined with the society's democratic election procedure to result
in worker-management. He also had before him another example of
worker-ownership . In 1914 he had become head of the American
Zionist movement, and he was delighted to discover the Jewish kibbutzim in Palestine. All kibbutz land, equipment, and possessions
were owned jointly; all decisions were made in meetings of kibbutz
members; the kibbutz bore responsibility for filling its members' needs.
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Obviously, these small agricultural settlements in which the workers
lived communally, ate their meals together, put their children to sleep
in the children's quarters, and had no need of money could not become
direct models for industry in the United States. They did, however,
give Brandeis a concrete example of communal, nonbureaucratized,
democratic living, in which the distinction between management and
labor had disappeared. 49
Brandeis saw the future economy as based on some kind of workermanagement or worker-participation: workers owning a business and
voting democratically to elect management. He was not entirely clear
about ownership. Whether stock would be held by workers alone, or
by both workers and consumers, or even by the public in its collective
capacity, as suggested in his reference to public as opposed to private
cooperatives ( and in keeping with his belief that utilities and land
should be owned by the public), was not specified. In this connection
it must be noted that his comments about absentee ownership, made
before the 1911 Clapp hearings, appear to have reflected his discomfort
at the idea of receiving money that had been generated by the toil
of others. Both an echo of Puritanism and of Brandeis's growing
concern for equality can be heard here . Nonetheless, although he
would not own stocks, much of the three-million-dollar fortune he
amassed came from his investing the money he earned in corporate
bonds. He had written to his brother, early in the century, "I feel
very sure that unser eins ["people like us"] ought not to buy and sell
stocks ... treat investments as a necessary Evil, indulging in the
operation as rarely as possible . . . . And when you buy, buy the thing
which you think is safe, and will give you a fair return; but don't try
to make your money out of investments." 50 This advice initially may
have been a matter of safe investments rather than of virtue. He later
said that he invested money in bonds "where it will be so safe that
I will not have to take time off thinking about it."51 His letter to his
brother indicates that "unser eins" refers to people who "don't know
much about the business" and that he advised, "Don't try to make
your money out of investments . . . make it out of your business"
because "you understand [your business] as much as anybody." 52 He
later fulminated against stock ownership because businesses declared
large dividends in order to fool stock buyers "for the power conferred
to use other people's money. "53
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Brandeis took an initially puzzling bypath in his enthusiasm for
scientific management, which he learned about through a 1903 article
by Frederick W. Taylor, the movement's progenitor. Brandeis began
to read works by efficiency engineers Henry L. Gantt, Frank B.
Gilbreth, and Harrington Emerson. Soon he was corresponding and
meeting with them and with executives of businesses that had successfully introduced scientific management into their firms. The oddity,
as Richard P. Adelstein has argued, is that scientific management
might well be understood as diverging from the individual-centered
philosophy Brandeis espoused. 54
Scientific management, as Brandeis explained it, was based on the
assumption that the labor performed in modern businesses could be
analyzed and rationalized so as to maximize efficiency. "Efficiency
engineers" determined the maximum time needed to perform each
step of a business' work process; the business then trained employees
so that they could complete their jobs in the time allotted. The results
included the ability of a business to plan ahead, as it would know
how long specific jobs would take and what the costs would be;
reduction of inventory, as it would be able to identify the materials
needed on precise dates; the end of irregularity of employment, for
the plans would include continual and efficient use of machinery and
labor; and greater productivity and reduced costs, which benefited
management, labor, and consumers. 55
Brandeis described scientific management as "a revolution in industry comparable only to that effected in the transition from hand labor
to machinery." The system would encompass the labor "of the managers and high-salaried officials" as well as that of the workers: "Increased efficiency must begin with those higher up." It would alter
the relationship between employer and employee because an employer,
having invested in an employee's training, would have "a special incentive ... to retain his employee and to conserve his powers." 56
Brandeis used the examples of the Brighton Mills, which had cut
costs dramatically as a result of scientific management and had raised
wages by 45 to 75 percent; the Tabor Manufacturing Company, which
had reduced prices by 10 to 15 percent while raising wages by 25 to
30 percent; the Link Belt Company, where wages had gone up by
25 to 35 percent; and the Manhattan Press, which handed out bonuses
(for work performed faster than the norm) on nonpaydays so as to
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spread income throughout the week. The workers at the Tabor Manufacturing Company's Philadelphia plant liked the system so much that
they refused to join other workers in a general strike . 57
Organized labor was outraged. When Brandeis told a union group
that a "great opportunity is offered us" by scientific management and
asked, "Shall we seize it? ... Will organized labor seize it?" the answer
was a resounding no. 58 Unions were certain that greater production
per worker would result in a loss of jobs. Of equal importance,
however, was labor's view of the automatic "speed-up" inherent in
scientific management : The pace set by the fastest workers would
become the standard, those who did piecework would find their wages
reduced, and slower day laborers would be fired . Brandeis replied
that once the amount of time spent on a job was established, it would
remain fixed; laborers able to work faster would receive bonuses. The
unions were understandably skeptical. Having dealt with hostile
employers, they saw no reason to assume that introduction of scientific
management or anything else would transform management into
bastions of beneficence. Here Brandeis's sense of reasonable people
deliberating together to develop a system that would work in the best
interests of all was confronted by the unions' more realistic assessment
of management's mentality. Brandeis and the unions were speaking
different languages. If rationality prevailed, there was every reason
to believe that scientific management would indeed better the workers'
lot; and Brandeis was a devotee ofrationality. The workers, however,
had more experience of the workplace. Their reaction was summarized
by a union woman who shouted at him, "You can call it scientific
management if you want to, but I call it scientific driving. "59
Upon closer examination Brandeis's adherence to scientific management reflects a lack of realism rather than theoretical inconsistency.
He truly believed that scientific management was based on "conserving
human effort" and would result in "removing the obstacles which annoy
and exhaust the workman. . . . Relieved of every unnecessary effort,
of every unnecessary interruption and annoyance, the worker is enabled without greater strain to furnish much more in production. And
under the exhilaration of achievement he develops his capacity. . ..
He secures the development and rise in self-respect, the satisfaction
with his work, which in almost every line of human activity accompany
great accomplishment by the individual ."60

FROM CAPITALISM TO WORKER-MANAGEMENT

45

In addition, Brandeis assumed that the profits gained by increased
productivity would go in large part to the workers. Scientific management, as he saw it, would improve the lot of the worker. Individual
fulfillment was still his goal, however unrealistic this particular method
of achieving it may have been. His romance with scientific management constituted one of the few times he ignored the advice he gave
to others: "The logic of words should yield to the logic of realities. "61
When Brandeis was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1916, he
gained a national platform for the dissemination of many of his ideas
but lost both the time and the forums in which to continue developing
his theory of worker-participation. His general method, however, was
not to opt for any one possibility until experiments in all had been
made and data collected. He believed in evolution, not revolution,
and much as he might look forward to the disintegration of the dividing
line between labor and management, he would not give up the
vocabulary of "labor," "capital," and "management" until experimentation validated his ideas. But he quietly told Felix Frankfurter in
the 1920s that the "wage system is doomed" and that consumers ought
to go without goods if they could not buy them through cooperatives .62
By then he may have seen a source of hope in the experiment
undertaken by his friend Norman Hapgood and Hapgood's two
brothers in their Indianapolis manufacturing plant. A year after
Brandeis joined the Court, Hutchins Hapgood, who bore the major
responsibility for the brothers' Columbia Conserve Company, decided
to give labor a role in management and found the workers not only
enthusiastic but more conservative in their policies than he might have
been . When the cost of living rose one year, for example, he asked
if they might not like to give themselves a raise. They responded that
they still did not know whether the business could afford it; six months
later, convinced that it could, they voted themselves the suggested
increase . Hutchins, certain that efficiency grew along with the workers'
participation in management, started meeting with them to see if the
process could not be taken further by selling the business to them
outright . A price was set on each share of stock. It was agreed that
7 percent was a fair return for the Hapgoods and that profits beyond
that would be used to buy stock for the workers. The system worked;
by 1930 a trust established by the workers owned a majority of the stock,
dividing the proceeds among them . The initial hostility experienced
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by the brothers from other business people had faded, and although
many were still skeptical, the company's enlarged earnings resulted
in Hutchins being asked to give more talks about the experiment than
he could manage. 63
In 1922 Brandeis spoke informally to a group connected with the
Department of Research and Education of the Federal Council of
Churches in America. The most concise statement of his thinking
about worker-participation is in the letter summarizing his remarks
that he sent to the meeting's organizer, Robert Bruere. The letter reflects his emphasis on democracy, individual responsibility, human
dignity, experimentation, and the collection of facts:
Do not believe that you can find a universal remedy for evil
conditions or immoral practices in effecting a fundamental change
in society (as by State Socialism) . . . . And do not pin too much
faith in legislation. Remedial institutions are apt to fall under
the control of the enemy and to become instruments of oppression . . . . Seek for betterment within the broad lines of existing
institutions. Do so by attacking evil in situ; and proceed from
the individual to the general. Remember that progress is necessarily slow; that remedies are necessarily tentative; that, because
of varying conditions, there must be much and constant enquiry
into facts . . . and much experimentation; and that always and
everywhere the intellectual, moral and spiritual development of
those concerned will remain an essential - and the main factor
- in real betterment.
Having stated his belief in empiricism as a key element in the search
for truth, he went on to discuss the goal:
The development of the individual is, thus, both a necessary
means and the end sought. For our objective is the making of
men and women who shall be free - self-respecting members of
a democracy- and who shall be worthy of respect.
The great developer is responsibility. Hence, no remedy can be
hopeful which does not devolve upon the workers' participation in,
responsibility for the conduct of business; and their aim should be
the eventual assumption of full responsibility- as in cooperative

FROM CAPITALISM TO WORKER-MANAGEMENT

47
enterprises. This participation in and eventual control of industry
is likewise an essential of obtaining justice in distributing the fruits
of industry.
"Democracy in any sphere is a serious undertaking," Brandeis continued. "It substitutes self-restraint for external restraint. It is more
difficult to maintain than to achieve." Democracy is difficult to sustain
because it "demands continuous sacrifice by the individual and more
exigent obedience to the _moral law than any other form of government." Again, the emphasis is on the individual; democracy "is possible
only where the process of perfecting the individual is pursued." But
individualism went hand in hand with community, for the development of the individual "is attained mainly in the processes of common
living." 6 4- John Dewey commented upon the letter approvingly; he
saw its ideal as having to do "with the development, the making, of
individuals" and agreed that "workers must assume responsibility for
the conduct of business if they are to be free to develop."65
Although Brandeis supported minimum-wage and maximum-hour
laws, he hoped such laws ultimately would be unnecessary, for the
employers would be the workers themselves. That was his answer to
the question of how J effersonianism could be brought into the industrial era, and it was one of the few serious efforts at a response. True
liberty necessarily included economic independence, but participation in the twentieth-century American economy meant factory work
for great masses of citizens. A formula that would encompass both
liberty and the factory therefore had to be found. Brandeis thought
he had identified it in the liberty to participate in industrial decisionmaking.
Seen from the vantage point of the 1990s, it appears that one of
the failures of the New Deal was the lack of consideration it gave to
the problem of protecting economic liberty and independence as
opposed to increasing the economic well-being of workers. Whether
even such a charismatic leader as Franklin Roosevelt could have
convinced the American public that individual liberty necessitated
scaling down the size of businesses and beginning the introduction
of worker-management and whether, if he had done so, the political
influence of the giant corporations would have prevented Congress
from enacting the necessary legislation are yet other unanswerable
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questions. But no such attempt was made, and the possible solution
to the problem of protecting economic liberty and independence in
an industrial society received neither full-scale discussion nor meaningful experimentation during the period that may have been the one
"window of opportunity" for that attempt in American history.

3
LAW,LAWYER,ANDJUDGE
IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITY

Thou hast heard men scorn the city, call her wild
Of counsel, mad; thou hast seen the fire of morn
Flash from her eyes in answer to their scorn!
Come toil on toil, 'tis this that makes her grand.
Peril on peril! and common states that stand
In caution, twilight cities, dimly wise Ye know them; for no light is in their eyes!
Go forth, ~ son, and help. 1
This verse from Euripides' Suppliant Women was sent to Brandeis
by his partner Sam Warren in 1890. Brandeis took its advice so
seriously that within a few years he became known as "the people's
attorney. "2
It was 1897, and Boston's downtown congestion had become intolerable again. It had been bad enough in the early 1890s, when the city
had responded by building its first subway. Now, however, both
population and commerce had grown, and merchants, some of them
Brandeis's clients, were complaining about the difficulty consumers
had getting to their stores.
The Boston Elevated Railway was aware of the problem and eager
to take advantage of it. It secretly obtained a thirty-year franchise
from the state legislature, allowing it to operate on many of the city's
most important thoroughfares for the then exorbitant fare of five cents
a ride. Brandeis reacted to the announcement of the deal with the
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combination of moral outrage and organizational activity that would
typify him and that illuminates his ideal of the "good attorney." He
called for public action and was named chairman of the Transportation
Committee of the Municipal Transportation League, a group of Boston
businessmen opposed to the legislation. Their efforts proved futile.
The fight was renewed in 1901, however, when citizens petitioned
for an additional line on Washington Street. The Elevated promptly
sought the right to build and own the Washington Street line as well
as a connecting subway to Cambridge and to lease the already existing
subway, which would have given it control over Boston's transportation
system.
Brandeis swung into action, opposing the proposal on-behalf of the
Associated Board of Trade, a group of merchants and manufacturers
that included a number of his clients. The fight became complicated,
with its first phase lasting until 1902 and later developments continuing
until 1911 . Brandeis won, getting the legislature to accept the proposal
of the Public Franchise League and the Board of Trade for construction
of the Washington Street subway by the city, with a lease to the Elevated for no more than twenty-five years and a rental of 4.5 percent
of the construction cost. 3
He represented the Board of Trade pro bona. When Brandeis's
friend Edward Filene, speaking for the board, asked for his bill,
Brandeis told Filene that "he never made a charge for public service
of this kind; that it was his duty as it was mine to help protect the
public rights; and when I remonstrated, saying that he and his family
were dependent upon his income, he told me that he resolved early
in life to give at least one hour a day to public service, and later on
he hoped to give fully half his time."4 At what point "early in life"
Brandeis took his resolution is unclear, especially as until that time
he had accepted fees for public service but had donated them to charity.
In any event, he had now begun to feel that taking no fee might benefit
the public but it was unfair to his own law firm, which lost his services
and the income it could generate during the hours he spent on public
affairs . He also wanted to feel free to use the services of some of the
firm's younger attorneys, whom he had encouraged to develop expertise in particular areas of the law. He announced that he would
consider himself the firm's client whenever he became involved in
public matters and would reimburse the partnership accordingly.
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Under this arrangement he paid his firm $25,167.32 for the hours
he spent over six years while he was fighting the merger of the New
Haven Railroad and the Boston & Maine Railroad. 5 In another
instance he both reimbursed the firm for his hours and paid court
costs when he represented a consumer group. 6 He had become one
of the country's most successful lawyers and was depriving neither
himself nor his family by his action, and he frankly delighted in it .
"Some men buy diamonds and rare works of art," he told an interviewer; "others delight in automobiles and yachts. My luxury is to
invest my surplus effort, beyond that required for the proper support
of my family, to the pleasure of taking up a problem and solving,
or helping to solve it, for the people without receiving any compensation. Your yachtsman or automobilist would lose most of his enjoyment if he were obliged to do for pay what he is doing for the love
of the thing itself. So I should lose much of my satisfaction if I were
paid in connection with public services of this kind." His relish of public
affairs was perhaps partly responsible for his insistence that all good
citizens had to be involved in them. 7
Brandeis would spend the rest of his pre-Court years combining
private practice with representation of the public interest, earning the
soubriquet, "the people's attorney." 8 His years as the public's lawyer
would affect his view not only of the good attorney but of the role
oflaw in a democratic state and, eventually, of the nature of American
jurisprudence.
Brandeis occasionally made attorneys sound embarrassingly like
supermen . "The training of the practicing lawyer," he said in 1916,
"breeds a certain virile, compelling quality, which tends to make the
possessor proof against the influence of either fear or favor," and legal
practice "involves a happy combination of the intellectual with the
practical life." 9 A few years earlier he had admonished, "What the
lawyer needs to redeem himself is not more ability or physical courage
but the moral courage in the face of financial loss and personal illwill [sic] to stand for right and justice," 10 for to Brandeis, only just
laws could be legitimate. In keeping with this description of the lawyer,
Brandeis initially took the elitist position that attorneys, along with
the rest of the better-educated population, had a particular obligation
to make their talents available in the public arena. Later, he recognized
that all citizens, including those without professional training, had a
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role to play in a democratic society, a role that went well beyond the
simple act of voting. But whether because lawyers have always had
a peculiarly important position in American politics, or because
Brandeis as a lawyer continued to believe they had special gifts to
bring to the political process, or simply because he knew so many
talented and public-spirited attorneys, he continued to emphasize their
special contribution.
Horace Kallen has suggested that Brandeis's shock at the divergence
of the law from social need in the Homestead steel strike forced him
to choose between legalism and morality. 11 Kallen was mistaken: The
strike made Brandeis resolve to bridge the gap between the two, of
which he had suddenly become aware. One of his contributions to
the legal profession was to remind it of its ethical responsibilities at
a moment when new situations were tempting it to accept an amoral
role .

Brandeis became an attorney during a transitional period in American
legal history. As he noted in 1905, many lawyers in the country's early
days were also statesmen who could be relied upon for their awareness
of the social good. Alexis de Tocqueville had commented in 1835,
"If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply
without hesitation . . . that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar. "12
The lawyers who more or less gave up practice to serve in official public
capacities, however, were never the model for the average attorney.
Attorneys throughout the mid-nineteenth century had little opportunity to affect many people beyond their own clients because the
largely agrarian society, composed primarily of small economic units,
gave almost no one large-scale power.
That of course changed with the Civil War, the completion of the
transcontinental railroad link, and the burgeoning of industrialization
and urbanization. Suddenly there were large corporations, demanding
skills and knowledge about the commercial arena that earlier generations of lawyers did not have or need . A schism developed between
lawyers working on the local level and those who were employed by
the large commercial entities that sprawled across the country. By
the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of federal governmental regulation of business, corporate attorneys had to know
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not only the intricacies of commercial law but of regulatory law as
well. The sheer volume of work that any one corporation could provide
for a substantial number of attorneys made it possible for many lawyers
to receive their income largely or solely from one source. Instead of
representing a variety of clients in situations that frequently were
adversarial, many lawyers became advisers to individual corporations
or to combinations of similar big businesses. It was not their courtroom
skills or their ability to write legal documents for individuals that was
important; now the emphasis fell on advising large corporations how
legally to do the things that would maximize their profits and keep
them out of court.
This development had two consequences. First, the lawyer who
wanted to succeed financially had to be more of a specialist than a
generalist, confining himself not only to commercial law but to subsets
within it. Specializations developed in areas such as trusts, stock issues,
and receiverships. Attorneys became economic advisers, aiding businesses in their attempts to peer into the future and predict which
courses would prove most financially profitable and least legally
contentious.
The second consequence stemmed from the simple fact that maximization of profits and human considerations were not necessarily
compatible; indeed, they were frequently diametric opposites. The
question of whether the lawyer had a responsibility to the public that
preempted or at least had to be balanced against his obligation to his
client was implicit in the situation, a question most corporate lawyers
preferred to ignore. Even if they had chosen to face it, however, they
might have been unable to provide answers, for their immersion in
their area of specialization made it extremely difficult for them to see
their responsibilities in a larger social and moral scheme . 13
The model for most young urban lawyers quickly became the
corporate lawyer, who could not have been further removed either
from de Tocqueville's vision of citizen-lawyers dedicating themselves
to the body politic or from the small town practitioner who had grown
up with his clients and was an integral part of his society. The new
prototype was the corporate attorney whose concern was to help
industrial giants make as much money as possible, who neither litigated
nor sought a variety of clients and who did not permit ethical
considerations to complicate the work at hand. The profitable was

CHAPTER THREE

54

transformed into the moral by both bar and bench, with the Supreme
Court leading the federal and state judicial systems in handing down
a series of decisions extolling the virtues of private property and the
obligation of the courts to interpret the Constitution so as to protect
it . Property rights became the new official religion; lawyers prided
themselves on serving as somewhat tarnished handmaidens to the
triumphant deity . 14
The changed notion of law and of the lawyer's role had a major
impact on the American polity. Morton J. Horwitz has described how
judges in the period between the ratification of the Constitution and
the beginning of the Civil War made a conscious attempt to turn law
into an instrument of social policy . 15 As law became more businessoriented, so, logically, did social policy. The Supreme Court, however,
consistently denied that it was in the policymaking business, maintaining instead that the new truths it established merely reflected the
intentions of the Founding Fathers. 16 Brandeis opened his Boston law
office in 1879, when the legal profession and the courts were beginning
to experience these changes. During the next two decades, legal discourse was largely transformed into a discussion of mechanisms for
protecting property, the courts demonstrated their approval of this
goal, the country's most successful lawyers became specialized hired
guns for concentrated wealth, and political colloquy was dominated
by those individuals who spoke either in legal terms or as social Darwinists on behalf of the intrinsic social utility of large-scale wealth.
Brandeis gradually challenged all the new truths, in part because
they embodied a view of the attorney's role that did not comport
with his preferred style. In one sense, Brandeis was a lawyer of his
times; his emphasis on facts meant that he grasped fully the complicated economics of his era. As Oliver Wendell Holmes was to comment, the successful lawyer was "the man of statistics and the master
of economics," and Brandeis qualified as both. 17 A memorandum
in his handwriting, written early in his practice and entitled "The
Practice of Law," says in part, "Know not only specific cases. But whole
subject . . . know thoroughly Each fact . Don't believe client witness Examine Documents . Reason . . . . Know the whole Subject. Know
bookkeeping the universal language of business . . .. Know not only
those facts which bear on direct controversy, but know all facts that
Surround. " 18
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He would not concentrate only on the facts involved in a case,
however; his vision of the good lawyer also encompassed an understanding of human nature in general and, in particular, knowledge
of the people with whom he was dealing. "Cultivate the society of
men-particularly men of affairs," he wrote to William Dunbar, a
young lawyer in his firm who was not doing well. "The man who does
not know intimately human affairs is apt to make of the law a bed
of Procrustes . . . the law bears to [the lawyers'] profession a relation
very similar to that which medicine does to that of the physicians. . . .
The great physicians are those who in addition to that knowledge of
therapeutics which is open to all, know not merely the human body
but the human mind and emotions, so as to make themselves the
proper diagnoses - to know the truth which their patients fail to disclose
and who add to this an influence over the patient which is apt to spring
from a real understanding of him." Brandeis advised Dunbar that "the
duty of a lawyer today is not that of a solver of legal conundrums:
he is indeed a counsellor at law" - precisely the opposite of the kind
of lawyer the corporations wanted. 19 Brandeis used "corporation
lawyer" as a term of contempt, contrasting it with "the 'people's lawyer'"
who stood "ready to protect" the citizenry. He fulminated against attorneys with specialization "not only in the nature and class of questions"
with which they dealt "but also specialization in the character of
clientage," i.e . , corporations. The "growing intensity" of corporation
lawyers' work precluded their participation in public affairs and their
gaining the benefit of its "broadening of view," and their highly particularized knowledge resulted in "vast areas of ignorance and grave
danger of resultant distortion of judgment."20 Three years later
Brandeis acknowledged the need for law firms to become "more and
more a business" with each attorney in it "com[ ing] to do those things
that on the whole he does most effectively."21 His contempt for lawyers
who were only specialists did not preclude his wanting the young
associates in his firm to master discrete areas of the law. In this letter
he emphasized his simultaneous insistence that they be able to function
as generalists, able to give intelligent advice to clients and to persuade
the clients to take it . He added:
perhaps most important of all is the impressing of clients and
satisfying them. Your law may be perfect, your ability to apply it

CHAPTER THREE

56

great, and yet you cannot be a successful adviser unless your
advice is followed; it will not be followed unless . . . you impress
[clients] with your superior knowledge, and that you cannot do
unless you know their affairs better than they do because you
see them from a fullness of knowledge. The ability to impress
them grows with your success in advising others, with the confidence which you yourselffeel in your powers. That confidence
can never come from books: it is gained by human intercourse. 22

It should at least be noted, in an analysis of Brandeis's impressive
contributions to the definition of the attorney's function, that he did
not address the situation in which the client insisted on a course of
behavior the lawyer found distasteful. He proclaimed that he would
"rather have clients than be somebody's lawyer," and he turned away
prospective clients if he thought them wrong and they refused to accept
his advice . 23 He did not suggest, however, what resort they would
have in an adversarial legal system if all lawyers shared his approach
and his beliefs. And he could literally afford to urge upon other lawyers
the "moral courage" to "stand for right and justice" even at the cost
of"financial loss and personal ill-will," for the combination of his creative brilliance, his outstanding reputation, his ability to work quickly
and well, his frugality, and his investment in relatively secure bonds
had made him a millionaire by 1907 . 24 He took his own advice, however. When some of the Boston Brahmins who had been important
to him, realizing that he was serious about attacking their institutions
and beliefs, turned their backs, he quietly ignored them and went
on doing what he thought was right. 25
A break with the Brahmins was inevitable once Brandeis became
uncomfortable with the emphasis the law placed on the protection
of property and the limited role this left for the lawyer, as well as with
the assumption that answers to all political-legal problems could be
found in the intentions of the Constitution's authors. To him, law made
no sense unless it reflected social necessities. As Harold Laski commented to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Brandeis's "method of analysis
does magnificently relate law to the life of which it is the expression. "26
Brandeis wanted to reform the lawyers and the courts not only
because they were morally unacceptable but also because their distance
from the realities of social need threatened the rule of law. He argued
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for a radical rethinking in order to conserve a democratic system he
believed could work but that he feared was being jeopardized by the
law's partiality to the wealthy elite . He noted that in other "periods
of rapid transformation, challenge of existing law, instead of being
sporadic," had become general. "Such was the case in Athens, twentyfour centuries ago," he reminded the Chicago Bar Association, "when
Euripides burst out in flaming words against 'the trammelings oflaw
which are not of the right.' " It had been the case during the German
Reformation and after the French Revolution, and it would continue
to be the case in the United States until courts stopped relying on
"early nineteenth-century scientific half-truths like 'The survival of
the fittest,' which, translated into practice, meant 'The devil take the
hindmost .' "27
Ironically, Brandeis, who scorned social Darwinism, was greatly
influenced by Holmes, a social Darwinist. Holmes's seminal Common
Law broke new ground by declaring, "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience." That assertion, according to Holmes,
suggested that instead of basing its decisions on what today would
be called the "original intent" of the Constitution's writers as reflected
in their specific words, the judiciary was obligated to refashioning of
legislation according to new perceptions of social needs or the "felt
necessities" of the time . 28 Holmes's view fit well with Brandeis's boyhood belief that the law had to be altered because it permitted slavery
and that the best people to ensure congruence between law and
morality were lawyers like his uncle Dembitz . One of the differences
between the jurisprudence of Holmes and Brandeis was the latter's
assumption that social necessities included morality. Holmes, the
skeptic who numbered survival of the fittest among his few acknowledged beliefs, doubted that morality made any difference. Writing
to Frederick Pollock, Holmes declared, "I am so skeptical as to our
knowledge about the goodness and badness of laws that I have no
practical criterion except what the crowd wants. Personally I bet that
the crowd if it knew more wouldn't want what it does - but that is
immaterial. "29
Holmes and Roscoe Pound were the major American exponents
of sociological jurisprudence, which is an analysis of the law that describes it not as a collection of legal tenets but as a reflection of social
needs in differing historical eras. 30 Their jurisprudence illuminated
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the approach that Brandeis and others believed was proper to constitutional litigation. The Constitution, as John Marshall had said,
was "framed for ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality
as nearly as human institutions can approach it."31 This view implied
that the Constitution was expected not only to remain in existence
long after the historical facts reflected in it had changed but that it
was written with an awareness that the precise meaning of the clauses
it included would undergo similar transformations. 32 It was the function of judges to understand society sufficiently to permit the Constitution to be adapted to "felt necessities." If a law was passed because
people considered it useful in light of current circumstances, the courts
could not strike it down unless it clearly violated a constitutional provision. In Holmes's formulation, the courts had to interpret the
Constitution as permitting any law unless "a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law. "33 Holmes recognized that the clauses of
the Constitution are relatively vague; the implication was that the
courts would have little reason to strike down many laws as being
inconsistent with them . Holmes neglected , however, to answer the
questions of how "reasonableness" was to be ascertained or of what
criteria the judges would employ to differentiate "a rational and fair
man" from one less able to reason.
His acceptance of Holmes's analysis did not mean Brandeis saw
courts as having little or no function. Holmes may have seen the judges
as merely looking at a statute, asking whether it clearly violated the
Constitution, and, if it did not, upholding it as valid. This was not
quite Brandeis's view.
If the logic of Holmes and Pound is followed, it is not sufficient
simply to adopt a stance of judicial restraint, the term used to describe
the disposition of judges to minimize their interference with legislative
policymaking. Holmes's and Pound's starting point, after all, was the
congruence oflaw and social conditions. The unspoken and therefore
unaddressed element of their jurisprudence is the question of what
happens when a legislature misperceives social need. Holmes's cynicism about the ability of human beings rather than natural forces to
affect their fate illuminated his devotion to judicial restraint. He would
no doubt have answered that as long as a law did not conflict with the
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Constitution the judicial function was to uphold it; and if it was based
on a misperception, the electorate had an obligation to make its
dissatisfaction clear to the enacting body. 34 It was a jurisprudence
that would later be enunciated, without the element of social Darwinism, by Felix Frankfurter. 35 Again, this view would not have satisfied
Brandeis because it denied the logical underpinnings of sociological
jurisprudence; unlike Holmes, he did believe in the necessity for the
law to be moral, and as a reformer, he had all too close a view of
the corrupt legislatures of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries .
Brandeis had the additional burden, unshared by Holmes and
Pound, of being a practicing attorney attempting to convince the courts
of his time that sociological jurisprudence was proper. The approach
to judging and particularly to constitutional litigation that was taken
by most courts was either historical, based on what judges thought
the clauses' writers meant, or mechanistic, relying on what judges
believed to be the plain meaning of the words. Brandeis and the
attorneys who shared his views had to cope with judges who regarded
the Constitution as a static document and who interpreted it as
delineating retention of property as the highest good. "Original intent"
and mechanical jurisprudence are not approaches sprung full-blown
from late twentieth-century jurisprudents; 36 their genesis can be found
in the earliest days of constitutional interpretation. More important
for Brandeis, they were being enunciated by the judges before whom
he had to appear and with whom he would later sit on the Supreme
Court.Justice Owen]. Roberts declared, in 1936, that "All the court
does" when a statute is challenged as unconstitutional is to "lay the
article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which
is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. "37 Brandeis would have denied that such a process was either
possible or desirable.
Brandeis the litigator recognized that although the judges did not
accept the doctrine of sociological jurisprudence, they might be
persuaded to accept its application in specific instances. He had an
opportunity to test his theory in 1908.
Oregon had passed a statute limiting women's work in manufacturing and mechanical establishments and laundries to no more than
ten hours a day. Kurt Muller's Grand Laundry in Portland was held by
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the Oregon courts to have broken the law when one woman was
required to work more than ten hours. Muller appealed his misdemeanor conviction to the Supreme Court on the grounds that it
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to the "liberty of contract,"
which the Court proclaimed it had unearthed in the depths of the due
process clause. 38 Brandeis's sister-in-law Josephine Goldmark, who
worked with the National Consumers' League, and Florence Kelley,
the league's secretary general, asked him to defend the statute. The
result was the famous "Brandeis brief."39
Although he would have preferred workers' hours to be decided
jointly by employers and unions, Brandeis considered state regulation
of hours legitimate because unions were not yet sufficiently strong
to demand such working conditions successfully. He thought it only
logical for both men's and women's work hours to be limited. He had
good reason to believe, however, that the Court would ignore the
argument that overly long hours were bad for all workers. It had
recently struck down a New York maximum-hours law with an opinion
that made clear its hostility to "interference on the part of the legislatures of the several States with the ordinary trades and occupations
of the people," particularly when the "interference" took the form of
labor legislation. 40 Brandeis was aware that the Supreme Court and
lower courts had said that maximum-hours statutes might be constitutional where the state demonstrated that specific injury to the workers
could result from long hours . 41 He decided the best tactic would be
to focus on women, emphasizing the particular health problems caused
for them and their families by long hours. 42 By far the largest share
of the work on the brief was done by Goldmark, who turned up substantial data demonstrating the negative effect oflong hours on women.
She was also prepared with material showing that long hours were
bad for all workers and that the sex of the worker was irrelevant.
Brandeis deliberately left the second part of the data out of the brief
but considered it so important a tool in the fight for maximum-hours
laws that he applauded the Russell Sage Foundation's decision to
publish it. 43
The brief resulted from a conscious decision to take a risk and
departed from recognized style in devoting only two pages to the
traditional legal arguments and citations. Then came fifteen pages
of state and foreign laws that limited women's hours, followed by a
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ninety-five-page section entitled "The World's Experience upon which
the Legislation Limiting the Hours of Labor for Women is Based."
The numerous subtitles, covering every aspect of the issue from "The
Dangers of Long Hours" and "Laundries" to "The Reasonableness
of the Ten-Hour Day," introduced copious quotations from reports
by American and English commissions, bureaus, committees, and
authors. Almost all of the ninety-five pages, in fact, consisted of quotations, designed to demonstrate both the social utility of maximumhours legislation for women and the general acceptance of the idea.
The gamble paid off; the Court upheld the law. 44 Brandeis had not
only won a case, however, nor had he only set a precedent for sustaining other maximum-hour laws for women. He had also persuaded
the Court to depart from its usual posture that the Constitution was
an unchanging entity, and he had set a precedent for bringing into
the courtroom the kind of information that reflected what was really
going on in the world outside. The Court could scarcely admit that
it had abandoned its static jurisprudence, however briefly, but it
praised Brandeis by name in its opinion and took note of "the course
of legislation as well as expressions of opinion from other than judicial
sources." The Court appended to its opinion a list of the laws he had
cited. Justice Brewer, writing for the majority, denied that constitutional questions could be settled "by . . . a consensus of present public
opinion" but admitted that "a widespread and long continued belief'
about a question of fact "is worthy of consideration" - or, to put it differently, the Court would use sociological jurisprudence if the facts
were sufficiently persuasive and if it did not have to acknowledge doing
so.45
The legal profession and labor experts were electrified. Requests
for copies of the brief poured in from lawyers, unions, and universities
around the country. Illinois reenacted a women's maximum-hours
law that had been struck down by the Court in 1895, and the league
asked Brandeis to defend it. Doing so, and winning, he acknowledged
the centrality of Goldmark's endeavors to the cases by naming her
on the title page of the brief as his assistant, in spite of her lack of
a law degree. Brandeis and Goldmark went on to defend similar
statutes as well as laws setting minimum wages for women46 until
Brandeis was named to the Court in 1916 and Felix Frankfurter took
on the League's cases. 47
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One reason for the success of the Brandeis approach, and for its
subsequent emergence as the basis for the dominant jurisprudence
and of most modern constitutional litigation, was the brilliance of
Brandeis himself. After hearing Brandeis argue one of the league's
cases before the Supreme Court, a friend wrote to Felix Frankfurter,
"I have just heard Mr. Brandeis make one of the greatest arguments
I have ever listened to, and I have heard many great arguments . . . .
When Brandeis began to speak, the Court showed all the inertia and
elemental hostility which Courts cherish for a new thought, or a new
right, or even a new remedy for an old wrong, but he visibly lifted
all this burden, and without orationizing or chewing of the rag he
reached them all. . . . He not only reached the Court, but he dwarfed
the Court. "48 This was typical of Brandeis. An attorney commented
about another one of his oral arguments, "It had not gone far before,
as usual, Brandeis was in full command by common consent." 49 One
of his former law partners considered "the prime source" of Brandeis's
power to be his "intense belief in the truth of what he was saying, "50
and he clearly had the ability to convey that belief to the judges.
Brandeis had strengths in addition to his mastery of oral argument.
One of his opponents on the Supreme Court, Justice George Sutherland, was to remark ruefully, "My, how I detest that man's ideas.
But he is one of the greatest technical lawyers I have ever known. "51
Roscoe Pound added, writing about the Muller brief, "The real point
here is not so much his advocacy of these statutes as the breadth of
perception and the remarkable legal insight which enable him to
perceive the proper mode of presenting such a question. "52
Creation of the Brandeis brief is sufficient evidence of Brandeis's
"remarkable legal insight," but he would have disagreed with Pound
that the "real point" was "not ... his advocacy of these statutes." That
was adeast part of the main point, Brandeis might have said, because
he could not draw a line between substance and methodology. Had
he not possessed an "intense belief' in the cause he was espousing,
he would not have bothered himself with the case. 53 It was, after all,
one of the many he took without fee. When Brandeis was on the
Supreme Court, Harold Laski described him to Holmes as "a prophet,
I suspect, rather than a judge; a grand player for a side in which he
believes both disinterestedly and with all his might. "54
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The "side" in which Brandeis believed was the side of socially responsive law. In Muller, form followed substance: Brandeis invented
the new kind of brief because he wanted to win a particular case.
Nonetheless, the particular configuration of the briefreflected Brandeis's larger approach to the law in a democratic political system.
If the premise of democracy is that the people know best what is
good for them, then it is logical for that premise to be reflected in
the laws that are a major component of public policy. Legislators thus
had an obligation to produce laws based on "felt necessities," and judges
had a concurrent obligation to interpret laws-including the Constitution - according to the same criterion. The kind of judicial restraint
implicit in sociological jurisprudence puts a substantial burden on all
judges in its assumption that they will recognize social needs and be
prepared to legitimize their expression in statutes. But judges were
meant to be removed from the popular will as well as from the popular
whim, and this distancing was particularly true of federal judges,
appointed by the president and the Senate for life. How were they
to assess a statute in the light of "felt necessities?"
Here Brandeis the attorney added a crucial element to Holmes's
and Pound's thought, and his answer was plain; it was the attorney's
duty to bring courts the facts available to the legislature, which was
the social information judges had to have if they were to make the
right decision, "right" meaning accepting the statute if it was a rational
response to a social problem and not one specifically forbidden by
the Constitution. Although Brandeis did not address the problem
directly, he presumably would have followed his own logic and said
that if the legislature failed to amass factual data before enacting the
statute and its lawyers could not themselves demonstrate its social
rationality, the law should be struck down. Brandeis's contribution
to sociological jurisprudence was to spell out the way it would work
in practice by informing lawyers and judges how to ascertain felt
necessities. A judge, he asserted, "rarely performs his functions adequately unless the case before him is adequately presented." 55 With
one brief, Brandeis heralded a major change in the function of constitutional lawyers in a democratic system. Their job was to explain the
policies desired by the sovereign people, bridging the gap between
the people and the judges who presided over the people's courtrooms.
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The mechanism they would use, so natural to "the man of statistics
and the master of economics,"56 would be facts: facts that would show
the judges why it was reasonable for legislatures to respond to social
problems with the statutes at issue. Brandeis had told the Massachusetts legislature as early as 1891, "No law can be effective which does
not take into consideration the conditions of the community for which
it is designed."57 Laws had to be firmly based in social realities; by
extension, laws that ignored social needs were bad. Brandeis assumed
that unarguable facts were obtainable and that they were the basis
for all intelligent decisions; surely judges should understand that. He
was not so naive as to assume they necessarily would understand. "A
judge is presumed to know the elements of law, but there is no
presumption that he knows the facts," he had jotted in one of his
notebooks while he was still a law student. 58 He added, in 1911, "In
the past the courts have reached their conclusions largely deductively
from preconceived notions and precedents. The method I have tried
to employ in arguing cases before them has been inductive, reasoning
from the facts ."59 The twentieth century was the age of science, and
science was dependent upon facts. John Dewey's instrumentalism was
an attempt to adapt the techniques of scientific experimentation to social
problems. 60 Brandeis's goal was to bring science into the courtroom .
Brandeis's assumption that the ties binding law and morality had
to be seamless, his strong desire for legislation protective of labor,
and his belief that workers could neither experience the liberty necessary to their own fulfillment nor perform their responsibility to participate in the political process without sufficient leisure came together
in the creation and articulation of a jurisprudence that was quintessentially democratic. The courts existed to facilitate the enactment of the
popular will. The sole exceptions to this general principle were those
troubling occasions when to do so would be to violate both the word
and the spirit of the Constitution. Among those occasions might well
be the misguided desire of the majority to infringe the civil liberties
of others. (The posture he considered appropriate for the courts in
such circumstances is discussed in chapter 6.)
After Brandeis joined the Supreme Court in 1916, he acknowledged
that his prescription for lawyers was not being followed. Eager though
he was to accept the social facts he expected to be given by statisticsconscious attorneys, he encountered what he considered too little
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factual information in the briefs presented to the Court. His theory
of attorney responsibility therefore was broadened to include a theory
of judicial responsibility.
Clearly, Brandeis saw law as anything but static. He recognized
that major cases brought before the Court reflected not merely differences about legal doctrine but disputes about alternative social
policies. Thus, the Court had not only to collect facts but to discipline
itself not to substitute its own preferences for that of other equally
capable bodies such as legislatures and administrative commissions.
The Constitution provided the country with the power to handle all
situations but divided that power between the states and the federal
government and among branches of the federal government . The
Court, he warned, should not elevate "the performance of the constitutional function of judicial review" into "an exercise of the powers
of a super-legislature." Nor should it insist on doctrines simply because
it had created them. "Stare decisis ["reliance upon precedent"] is
ordinarily a wise rule of action," he commented, but it "does not command that we err again when we pass upon a different statute ."61 This
was particularly true when it came to the corporation and its constitutional "rights." Both corporations and their "rights" were artificial
constructs, legitimated by government; both could be undone if government and the people it served found that action proper. Mill had
urged, "Let us remember . . . that political institutions . . . are the
work of men. . . . Men did not wake on a summer morning and find
them sprung up. "62 Mill argued that a legitimate government had to
reflect social circumstances; 63 Brandeis's approach implicitly brought
Mill's thought into the economic sphere . The "rights of property and
the liberty of the individual must be remolded, from time to time,
to meet the changing needs of society." Facts were needed so that the
Court could know whether its doctrines had become outmoded. 64
In 1929 the Court heard a case challenging an Oklahoma statute
that required new ice companies to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the state. The law's purpose was to avoid
the kind of duplication of plants and delivery service that resulted
in higher costs for consumers. Given his emphasis on competition,
Brandeis might well have been expected to applaud the Court action
striking the law down. But substitution of judicial beliefs for the will
of the majority in economic policy ran counter to his thinking about the
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nature of democracy, and he dissented. He did not consider the briefs
before him sufficient to bolster his point that the social problems'that
prompted the Oklahoma law could lead reasonable people to believe
that the statute embodied an appropriate solution . He was certain
that the reasonableness of state regulations "can ordinarily be determined only by a consideration of the contemporary conditions, social,
industrial and political, of the community to be affected thereby.
Resort to such facts is necessary, among other things, in order to
appreciate the evils sought to be remedied and the possible effects of
the remedy proposed." His clerks therefore found themselves spending
as much time in the Library of Congress gathering sociological and
economic material as they did in the law library, and that now became
the lot of his current clerk. 65
Brandeis used much of the extralegal material when he wrote
fourteen heavily footnoted pages to demonstrate the Oklahoma statute's
rationality. He did not agree that it was the right answer. He stated
that "whether that view [embodied in the statute] is sound nobody
knows," pointing out that among the dangers of the law were the
demands it placed on human intelligence and character, and reminded
the Court, "Man is weak and his judgment is at best fallible." But
that was not his- or the Court's- business. Calling the depression
"an emergency more serious than war," he noted, "Economists are
searching for the causes of this disorder and are re-examining the basis
of our industrial structure." He slipped in a hint about his preferred
remedy. "Most of them realize that failure to distribute widely the
profits of industry has been a prime cause of our present plight." Many
people disagreed, however, and "rightly or wrongly, many persons
think that one of the major contributing causes has been unbridled
competition." Since they thought so, they had a right to experiment
with a limit upon competition. 66
He was concerned that in stifling such experimentation, the Court
was interfering with the search for solutions, and he chided his colleagues, "Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part,
to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of
social and economic science . . . . To stay experimentation in things
social and economic is a grave responsibility" that might be "fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. . . . This Court has the power
to prevent an experiment. . . . But in the exercise of this high power,
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we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal
principles." Experimentation was crucial to progress, and the best place
for experimentation was the states, which were still the small laboratories suitable to experimentation that Jefferson had envisaged. Experiments could be dangerous, precisely because "man is weak and his
judgment is at best fallible." But human fallibility was everywhere,
even on the Supreme Court, and so the wisest and most democratic
approach was to minimize judicial limitations on reasonable experimentation: "If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let
our minds be bold."67
Brandeis's approval of competition and his support for experimentation by the states came together in his dissent from the Court's
overturning of a Florida law that imposed heavier license fees on stores
that were part of multicounty chains than on independent shops. The
majority of the Court found the law to be an unconstitutional violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process
clauses, holding that the state had no reasonable basis for placing stores
into the categories of "independent," "part of an intracounty chain,"
or "part of an intercounty chain." Brandeis's dissent was a parade of
facts designed to demonstrate not only that there was a rational relationship between the problem identified by the state and the statute
designed to solve it but that the state was correct in perceiving bigness
as antisocial. He traced the history of corporations in the United States
and the states' early policy of denying the right to incorporate to businesses, as opposed to religious, educational, and charitable organizations. "It was denied because of fear. Fear of encroachment upon the
liberties and opportunities of the individual. Fear of the subjection
of labor to capital. Fear of monopoly." 68
To demonstrate that the fears were legitimate, Brandeis drew on
studies such as Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner Means's The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, Thorstein Veblen's Absentee Ownership
and Business Enterprise, on works by Stuart Chase, J. A. Hobson, and
Arthur Dahlberg, on articles in journals such as Editorial Research, Labor,
American Economic Review, Annals of The American Academy of Political
and Social Science, and Retail Ledger, and on numerous congressional
hearings, speeches, and government reports. They showed, he argued,
that after "the desire for business expansion created an irresistible
demand" for corporate charters and the states capitulated, corporations
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had grown to fearsome size: "Through size, corporations, once merely
an efficient tool employed by individuals in the conduct of private
business, have ... brought such concentration of economic power
that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to dominate
the State . . . the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of employees
and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are
subjected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few
men." This power brought about a "negation of industrial democracy"
and its replacement with "the rule of a plutocracy." "Such is the
Frankenstein monster," Brandeis wrote, "which States have created
by their corporation laws. "69
He continued to marshal facts. Two hundred nonbanking corporations controlled more than one quarter of the country's wealth. Five
of the twelve plaintiffs in the case, each with assets of more than $90
million, were among those corporations; their collective assets were
$820 million. One of the corporations operated over 15,000 stores;
together, they owned 19, 718 throughout the country. How, in the
light of such facts, could the Court maintain that concentration of
wealth was not a problem or that the Florida law was an unreasonable
solution to it? 70 Judges had a responsibility to know their facts and
to decide accordingly.
Perhaps the best example of Brandeis's use of factual evidence
occurred when the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality
of a Nebraska consumer-protection law that set weight standards,
including maximum-weight limits, for commercially sold loaves of
bread. The majority of the Court, much opposed to state regulation
of commercial entities, held that the law took bakers' and dealers'
property without due process oflaw. Brandeis disagreed and chastised
his brethren for not examining the relevant facts. "Unless we know
the facts on which the legislators may have acted," he declared in
dissent, "we cannot properly decide whether they were ... unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." And to know those facts, the justices
had "merely to acquaint ourselves with the art of breadmaking and
the usages of the trade; with the devices by which buyers of bread
are imposed upon and honest bakers or dealers are subjected by their
dishonest fellows to unfair competition; with the problems which have
confronted public officials charged with the enforcement of the laws
prohibiting short weights, and with their experience in administering
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those laws." 71 Brandeis fulfilled this "mere" task by presenting the Court
with fifteen pages of information about the baking industry, most of
it in lengthy and forbidding footnotes. 72
Brandeis insisted on ferreting out facts to support social experimentation because of his belief that experimentation was one of the keys
to human progress. As Frankfurter described his approach, "Problems,
for him, are never solved. Civilization is a sequence of new tasks. "73
But his friend and colleague Holmes was more skeptical about the possibility of progress. "Generally speaking, I agree with you in liking to
see social experiments tried," he wrote to Brandeis, "but I do so without
enthusiasm because I believe it is merely shifting the pressure and that
so long as we have free propagation Malthus is right in his general
view." He saw democracy as giving the majority the right to have the
laws it wanted, but, a true social Darwinist, 74 he did not much care
what the experiments were about or what effects they would have. His
disdain for the futile efforts of mortals was expressed to Frederick Pollock when he wrote, "Long ago I decided that I was not God. When a
state came here and wanted to build a slaughter house, I looked at the
Constitution and if I couldn't find anything in there that said a state
couldn't build a slaughter house I said to myself, if they want to build
a slaughter house, God-dammit, let them build it." He therefore saw
no need for an accumulation of factual material. Complaining to
Pollock that Brandeis was pushing him to put his interest in philosophy
aside temporarily and immerse himself in the facts of his society,
Holmes grumbled, "I hate facts. I always say the chief end of man is to
form general propositions - adding that no general proposition is worth
a damn. . . . I have little doubt that it would be good for my immortal
soul to plunge into them [facts] .. . but I shrink from the bore." 75
Brandeis, far from finding facts boring, thrived on them and
believed, given the educability of human beings, that experimentation
was a precondition and harbinger of human progress. He was far more
pragmatic and optimistic than Holmes about both the possibility of
social improvement and the role to be played in it by law, lawyers,
judges, and government. David Riesman, who clerked for Brandeis
after graduating from Harvard Law School, wrote to his former professor Felix Frankfurter, "Holmes was skeptical of action and thought
but seemed to have faith in the inevitable, - Brandeis is skeptical of
power and of human abilities but he does not believe that things are
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inevitable." Holmes, he added, saw "the actions of others" as "merely the
inevitable coming to pass," but "Brandeis is not so absolute, - he does
not believe that human beings are the prey to unconquerable forces. As
you say, he puts his trust in reason." 76 Even more, he put his trust in
the democratic process and argued that law had to be a part of it.
His trust in the democratic process led him to treat the Court as
an educational institution. It was as much the Court's function to
explain its decisions as to make them, to use its opinions so the electorate could understand why the Court's actions were both wise and
correct. Progress was possible only if people with ideas made them
available to whatever segment of the electorate was willing to listen.
Brandeis viewed public officials, including judges, as teachers with
the obligation to make their lessons accessible. One of the functions
of a justice was to write opinions that would educate the legal profession
and other members of the intelligentsia; public education was an
important element of judicial civic virtue.
Paul Freund remembered his early clerkship for Brandeis when,
after working on one revision after another of Brandeis's opinion for
the Court in National Surety Company v. Corielli, he then heard the justice
ask, "Now I think the opinion is persuasive, but what can we do to
make it more instructive?" Brandeis told Dean Acheson, when the
latter was clerking for him, "The whole purpose, and the only one,
is to educate the country." His other clerks recalled similar sentiments;
one was astonished at, and presumably educated by, the sixty changes
Brandeis made in a draft opinion of ten pages. 77
Similarly, when the Court erred, it was the duty of a dissenting
justice to explain to both the justices and the public where the error
lay. He dissented frequently when the Court upheld governmental
suppression or punishment of speech and became so disheartened at
his colleagues' unwillingness to adopt his position that he told Dean
Acheson, "We may be able to fill the people with shame, after the
passion cools, by preserving some of it on the record. The only hope
is the people; you cannot educate the Court. "78 Although all of
Brandeis's opinions laid out his reasoning in detail, his dissents clearly
were designed as lessons for the public or at least that part of it that
reads Supreme Court opinions. It is therefore in Brandeis's dissents
that one finds not only the meticulous workmanship that is a hallmark
of his opinions but, in addition, clear statements of political thought. 79
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Brandeis's approach to law reviews also reflected his omnipresent
interest in education. His 1917 dissent in Adams v. Tanner was the first
instance of a justice citing law review articles in an opinion. 80 He
frequently referred to articles that neither party to a case had mentioned, considering it a part of the responsibility of the justice (or his
clerk) to ferret out relevant information. 81 He was particularly wont
to turn to law reviews when he was writing an opinion that altered
the law significantly. The articles provided factual information and
helped bolster Brandeis's arguments. His references to them, a practice
gradually adopted by other justices, undoubtedly encouraged more
articles to be written in part for judicial perusal . They were of course
also read by lawyers and scholars, presumably furthering the debate
among them and thereby enhancing the educational process . 82
His use of law reviews was simply one of the many corollaries of
Brandeis's revolutionary thinking about the nature of law and the
judicial process. He argued that the good society had to be based on
morality and that its laws could be neither moral nor useful unless
they reflected changing social circumstances. As a pragmatic matter,
if legislators and the judges who assessed the constitutionality of laws
distanced themselves from the realities of felt necessities, the rule of
law itself would be threatened. He assumed that the Founding Fathers
must have shared his views and insisted not only that the Constitution
could be used to respond to altered social needs but that it had been
designed to do so. Lawyers and judges shared the legislators' responsibility to educate themselves about social facts and to base their
arguments and judgments upon them. Democracy required no less.
Judges were obligated to hand down socially responsive judgments
and then to explain and justify their decisions to the public, educating
them in the process.
Frankfurter called Brandeis's sociological jurisprudence "an organic
constitutional philosophy, which expresses his response to the deepest
issues of society. "83 It reflected a view of law as both growing out of
and affecting an endlessly evolving social reality. A jurisprudence that
anchors law in the public will while limiting the public's power to
abridge individual rights is quintessentially democratic. 84 By translating his perception into lawyers' briefs and judicial opinions, Brandeis
helped democratize the judicial process and permanently altered both
American jurisprudence and American political thought .

4
THE CURSE OF BIGNESS

If the Lord had intended things to be big, he would have made
man bigger - in brains and character. 1
Neither our intelligence nor our characters can long stand the
strain of unrestricted power. 2
President Franklin Roosevelt was incredulous. The Supreme Court
had just struck down the cornerpiece of his New Deal legislation, a
statute giving industries the right to adopt federally approved codes
regulating wages, hours, conditions of employment, and prices. The
National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA), one of Roosevelt's attempts
to deal with the depression, he saw as a way to help labor while enabling businesses to charge fair prices. But the Court, including
Brandeis, had voted unanimously to overturn it. Referring to Brandeis
by the nickname commonly used by many New Dealers, Roosevelt
asked, unbelievingly, "What about old Isaiah?" 3
"Isaiah," for his part, was busy lecturing Thomas Corcoran, a former
clerk of Oliver Wendell Holmes and now one of Roosevelt's chief aides.
"This is the end of this business of centralization," Brandeis told
Corcoran. "I want you to go back and tell the President that we're
not going to let this government centralize everything. It's come to
an end. As for your young men (from all over the country, many
of them recent Harvard Law School graduates recruited for the New
Deal by Felix Frankfurter], you call them together and tell them to
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get out of Washington-tell them to go home, back to the states. That
is where they must do their work."4
His vote against the NRA made perfect sense to Brandeis. The
act neither specified wages, hours, and other standards, nor included
guidelines for determining them, leaving the president completely free
to decide whether proposed codes were acceptable. Brandeis liked
Roosevelt enormously, but no human being should have that kind
of concentrated power, nor did the road to democracy lie through
creation of a mammoth bureaucracy in Washington. Pulling together
bright young people from all over the country and giving them the
power to run things might seem to the New Dealers like a good way
to revive and rationalize the national economy quickly, but Brandeis
disagreed. It was an easy "fix," undertaken without considering the
consequences that would follow when power was overcentralized and
the states had been deprived of any meaningful ability to experiment. 5
"Human nature, like the inanimate, seeks the path ofleast resistance,"
he had said long before . "To think hard and persistently is painful."6
Now he sent the pained New Dealers back to do some more hard
thinking. Creating a big government to regulate big business was not
the answer; bigness in any form, however beneficent its purpose, was
bad. Brandeis thought the second Roosevelt was making the same
mistake his cousin Theodore had, assuming that big business was
inevitable and attempting to regulate it instead of cutting it down to
size . The conviction that Theodore Roosevelt was wrong had led
Brandeis to throw himself into Woodrow Wilson's successful campaign
for the presidency. Now he was using his vote on the Court, and Corcoran as his messenger, to warn Franklin Roosevelt against falling
into similar error.
One of the themes most important to Brandeis's thought was
summed up by the title "The Curse of Bigness," given, with his permission, to an edited collection of his speeches, articles, and judicial
opinions . 7 The four other volumes of collected works published during
his lifetime under different titles expressed essentially the same views. 8
Brandeis did not initially tie together bigness, corruption, misuse
of power, and monopoly or oligopoly although he eventually would
do so . He was exposed to government corruption almost as soon as
he became involved in public life. The fights over the Massachusetts
liquor laws and the Boston transportation system made him aware
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that legislators' votes were being bought by public service corporations
that guaranteed their minions jobs. It was easy enough to see that
the larger the corporation, the greater its ability to use its revenues
to enact legislation that ran counter to the public interest .
While he was unearthing and battling public corruption, he was
also learning about bigness and concentration of power in the private
sphere. He was awakened to the dangers of monopoly by his 1886
fight against Boston's paper monopoly. That particular monopoly was
not terribly large, but its nature gave it unrestricted power in its sphere,
and neither Boston's Common Council nor the local courts would take
action against it. 9 He was speaking out against the concentrated power
of trusts at least as early as 1892, when he included criticism of them
in his business law lectures at MIT, arguing that price-fixing agreements among companies contain the seeds of monopolistic trusts, in
which all the companies are merged into one huge monopoly. He
pointed specifically to the Diamond Match Company, the sugar
trust, and the Standard Oil trust, lamenting the effect of trusts on
consumers. 10
Recognition of the harm that could be done by those people with
governmental power and those in private industry who combined to
form trusts was an early element in his thinking; the notion that bigness
as such was evil was not. His fight in the first decade of the century
against the large life insurance companies that were victimizing
workers convinced him that the sheer size of the insurance companies
had made them overly powerful. He thought they should be made
smaller, but he was not ready to extend the prohibition to all
businesses. 11 One of the many lessons he learned in his years-long
war with the New Haven Railroad, however, was that size meant
unaccountable power. The fight began for him in 1902, while he was
battling against the attempts of the Boston and Maine Railroad (B&M)
to own trolley as well as railroad lines. Brandeis was startled when
the B&M protested that it was only trying to do legally what the New
Haven was already doing illegally, for the New Haven had bought
up about a third of Massachusetts's trolley mileage through holding
companies. When it was discovered that the New Haven was quietly
buying enough stock in the B&M to give it control, an investor hired
Brandeis to fight the takeover. Brandeis agreed but then decided that
the merger was "a matter of public interest in which I am undertaking
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to influence the opm10n of others" and refused to accept any
compensation or to act as the attorney for anyone but the public. 12
His war against the New Haven continued for nine years, during
which the railroad aimed some fairly big guns at him. It already had
bought votes in the Massachusetts legislature; next it commissioned
anti-Brandeis articles and magazines and hired a Harvard Law School
professor to deliver "scholarly" lectures on the virtues of the New
Haven . Brandeis, convinced that more was at issue than a monopoly,
countered by becoming an expert on the financial details of the New
Haven and other railroads . He discovered that the New Haven was
not an economically viable entity but was being kept alive as a
mechanism that could be used for stock watering and high dividends.
The consumers were losing; labor, which was not getting a fair wage
from the company, was losing; the railroad's passengers were losing;
the only people who were winning, and whom he began to see as the
villains of the piece, were financiers such as J. P. Morgan, who
manipulated the New Haven and other companies for the benefit of
their banking houses. This was the "money trust" that Brandeis began
to consider a dangerous evil. 13
Brandeis's education about bigness and corruption continued when
he came into conflict with another huge economic entity, the MorganGuggenheim syndicate, during the Pinchot-Ballinger affair of 19101911. The genesis of the scandal was the syndicate's attempts to gain
control of 5,000 acres of government-owned coal and timber land in
Alaska, but the congressional hearings that followed also uncovered
dishonesty on the part of President William Howard Taft. Brandeis
was convinced once again that the trusts and other big monied interests
were not only inefficient but, worse, concentrations of power not
susceptible to democratic control; they could reach as high as presidents. Thus both political and economic factors led Brandeis to oppose
the trusts and to outline the remedial action that would later become
central to Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom.
His opposition was due also to his perception of human limitations.
"Many men are all wool, but none is more than a yard wide," he liked
to say, occasionally adding of man that "nature sets a limit to his
possible achievement. As the Germans say: 'Care is taken that the
trees do not scrape the skies.'" He concluded that human beings
therefore had to "adjust our institutions to the wee size of man.'' He
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assumed that if an institution was so big that no one person knew
what was going on in it, it was out of control. "No matter how good
the organization," he believed, "the capacity of an individual man
usually determines the success or failure of a particular enterprise ."
He approved of delegation of power and a degree of specialization,
agreeing that "organization can do much to make concerns more
efficient [and] larger units possible ... . But . .. organization can
never supply the combined judgment, initiative, enterprise and
authority which must come from the chief executive officer." 14 Organizations, after all, were created and run by human beings . Without
individual leadership, no institution would function as intended, nor
was there any reason to assume that it was operating well.
Brandeis's definition of "well" for economic institutions was efficiency, which meant operating at the lowest possible cost so as to pay
workers an adequate salary and owners a fair profit while making
goods and services available to consumers cheaply. Lack of control
would result in waste and costliness. For their part, political institutions
worked "well" in a democratic state when they were responsive to the
will of the people. Again, if no one was in control, the door would
be open for the kind of corruption, both financial and moral, that
he had seen in the Massachusetts legislature and during the PinchotBallinger affair. The people's will would be negated; democracy would
be damaged or even lost.
The more he investigated, the more certain he became that huge
corporations and democracy could not coexist because of the corporations' power to corrupt. The belief made him unfashionable with many
people, as the current orthodoxy treated these enterprises as almost
God-given natural entities. Brandeis rejected the claim that corporations emerged organically from the society and were by definition
desirable . Far from being natural, Brandeis replied, the trusts were
artificial constructs: the Supreme Court had fostered them by giving
them the rights of"persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment; state
governments had aided them by permitting them to incorporate;
federal laws had contributed to their growth by protecting them with
tariffs and by enforcing contracts destructive of competition. 15
Robert La Follette, the Progressive senator from Wisconsin, was
one of Brandeis's allies during the Pinchot-Ballinger hearings. In December 1910 La Follette asked Brandeis to join a still secret group, the
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National Progressive Republican League, which was being founded
for "the promotion of popular government and progressive legislation."
Its Declaration of Principles listed the enemies and the goals that had
become Brandeis's:
Popular government in America has been thwarted, and progressive legislation strangled by the Special Interests . .. . Under
existing conditions legislation in the public interest has been
baffled and defeated. This is evidenced by the long struggle to
secure laws, but partially effective, for the control of railways
lines and services, the revision of the tariff in the interest of the
producer and consumer, statutes dealing with trusts and combinations, based on sound economic principles . . . a wise,
comprehensive and impartial reconstruction of banking and
monetary laws, a non-subsidized merchant marine, the conservation of coal, oil, gas, timber, waterpowers and other natural
resources belonging to the people, and for the enactment of all
legislation solely for the common good . 16
Brandeis disagreed with other goals, such as popular initiatives , referenda, judicial recall, direct nomination of officials, and direct election
of senators and delegates to party conventions, espoused by La Follette
Progressives. Still profoundly conservative in his desire to protect small
capitalism and in his preference for the existing representative governmental system rather than for direct democracy, 17 he nonetheless put
aside his differences to make common cause with the larger Progressive
aims he shared and joined the group .
Brandeis's major economic goal had become the elimination of bigness, an achievement he viewed as central to industrial liberty. Unions,
however big, would never be able to match the power of great economic combinations supported by the money trust. Even if the trusts
failed in their endeavors to keep unions outlawed, their power would
be so great that unions would have no chance of negotiating fair
treatment for their workers. His opposition to trusts stemmed from
a variety of strands in his thinking: his desire to protect small businesses
and consumers, his fears for political democracy, the belief first in
fair treatment for workers and then democracy in the workplace that
lay behind his opposition to the trusts.
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He enlarged his argument to encompass the assertion that bigness
produced the additional evil of inefficiency. Subsequent events have
shown that though he was largely correct, there are sectors of the
economy in which bigness can be extremely efficient, 18 and the attack
on Brandeis's economics has concentrated on this argument. 19 The
critics, however, fail to understand two important points. First, Brandeis was largely right; growth beyond a certain stage in most industries
did and does make for economic inefficiency. 20 Second, even in those
sectors where bigness may be an economic boon, it is inherently antidemocratic. This point was summed up by Brandeis's friend Norman
Hapgood in his foreword to the 1933 edition of Other People's Money:
When, exploring the principles of Justice Brandeis, we say that
every business, every institution, has a unit of greatest efficiency,
we are not using the word efficiency as if the business existed
in a vacuum . We are talking about it ... as part of a social
organism; and it is inefficient, socially considered, if it injures
the whole. Even, therefore , ifit makes for itself more money than
a small unit, it may be a social liability where the smaller business
or institution is a social asset ... . Frequently size gives power
. .. that no business ought, for the general welfare to have . 21
That was the point: the negative effect of size on the "general welfare," including the citizen-laborer, the small competitor, and the consumer. In the early 1900s, however, his theory of worker-participation
not having solidified, Brandeis concentrated on the argument against
trusts of which he was certain, the decline of efficiency in overly large
corporations and their inability to produce affordable products.
A few months after Brandeis joined La Follette's Progressives, the
Supreme Court held that only those trusts engaged in "unreasonable"
restraints of trade could be considered in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Although the Court found the restraint of trade by the
plaintiff, Standard Oil Company, sufficiently unreasonable for it to
be liable under the act, Progressive members of Congress , who had
thought the act made all combinations in restraint of trade illegal,
recognized that the definition of "unreasonable" now lay completely
in the hands of whoever happened to be sitting on the Supreme Court
when the government decided to prosecute a particular company or
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trust. Aided by La Follette and a number of other Progressives,
Brandeis began to draft legislation to restore the Sherman Act's intent
according to their understanding. Simultaneously, Sen. Moses Clapp,
chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, wrote
to Brandeis, urging him to suggest amendments to the Sherman Act
before weaker measures could be introduced and passed. Upon
receiving Brandeis's reply about the bill he was already working on
with La Follette, Clapp arranged an investigation into trusts and the
federal policy toward them, largely so that Brandeis would have a
public forum for his ideas. 22
When the Clapp Committee hearings opened, however, Brandeis
was preceded by George W. Perkins, a partner inJ. P . Morgan and
Company and the representative of the Morgan interests and Big Steel.
His presentation was a useful summary of precisely the widely held
beliefs about trusts and efficiency that Brandeis challenged. Perkins
argued that trusts were good, that they had grown because they were
efficient, that it was inevitable for the most efficient businesses to drive
out competitors and seek to gain control over their share of the market,
that the efficiencies made possible by trusts would provide improved
products at lower costs, and that since trusts were both good and
inevitable the government should attempt to regulate rather than to
destroy them. 23
Brandeis's rebuttal took three days. He maintained flatly that "there
are no natural monopolies in the industrial world." Artificial manipulation of credit rather than efficiency or fair competition had created
trusts. The laws of the United States had been skewed to nurture them;
the law should now be used to undo what it had helped create. The
law had permitted seemingly unconnected businesses to agree among
themselves on high prices; law could now forbid price fixing. Brandeis
denied that trusts resulted in lower prices. Such prices existed only
temporarily; once competitors had been driven out, prices rose . 24
Brandeis insisted that trusts were not efficient and that many had
failed. He named them: the Newspaper Trust, the Writing Paper Trust,
the Upper Leather Trust, the Sole Leather Trust, the Wool Trust, the
Paper Bag Trust, the International Mercantile Marine Trust, the
Cordage Trust, the Mucilage Trust, and the Flour Trust. Trusts that
were still in existence remained so only because they had acquired
virtual monopolies over their market areas and were able to raise prices
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high enough to cover their costs. Efficiency in the absence of factual
information was impossible, Brandeis argued, and the huge size of
trusts prevented their nominal leaders from knowing enough about
the business to exercise informed judgment. Then Brandeis turned
to the human component. Human limitations made trusts inefficient:
"Nature sets a limit to their [human beings'] possible accomplishment. . . . Whatever the business or organization there is a point
where it would become too large for efficient and economic management. . . . Organization can do much to make larger units possible
and profitable. But the efficiency even of organization has its bounds;
and organization can never supply the combined judgement, initiative,
enterprise, and authority which must come from the chief executive
officers." Brandeis was not arguing for horse-and-buggy-sized businesses but for businesses large enough to be efficient and small enough
to remain susceptible to human control. One could not design a
formula for the optimal size of all businesses any more than one could
say trusts were good; the desired size of each business would have
to be ascertained through trial and error. 25
Brandeis placed much of the blame for existing trusts on the money
trust; the trusts' ability to manipulate capital to put competitors out
of business enabled them to thrive. Deprived of the help of the money
trust they would collapse, for in fact they lost money. In a litany whose
echoes are uncannily familiar in the 1990s, Brandeis pointed to the
many failures of the American way of business. He cited the Department of Agriculture's findings about the poor quality of fence wire
made for farms, the declining percentage of the market held by the
supposedly efficient steel trust, and the turning of foreign purchasers
to non-American sources of steel. Ten years after the steel trust completed its takeover of the steel industry by absorbing the Carnegie
Company, the United States had fallen five years behind Germany
in iron and steel metallurgy, creation of updated machinery, and
methods of production. The number of deaths and injuries due to
derailments of trains had led to an investigation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which found that derailments due to broken
rails had increased dramatically to 2,059 and had resulted in the death
or injury of 106 people during the decade since the steel trust had
taken over. Similarly, when confronted with a more efficient system
of shoe manufacturing, the shoe machinery trust bought out the system
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and killed it. The lesson, to Brandeis, was obvious. Trusts were incapable of operating properly because they were too big, and they became
lazy. They discouraged invention, or the process a later generation
would call research and development; they made little attempt to
reduce costs because as monopolistic industries they knew their profits
to be secure . The result was neither efficiency nor rapid progress but
poor consumer products, and the United States economy was losing
ground to other producers that operated more efficiently. 26
Although asserting that the giantism that destroyed competition
necessarily would result in inefficiency, Brandeis did not argue that
competition inevitably would be efficient. On the contrary, it would
involve waste: "What human activity does not?" But to Brandeis, who
believed himself to be echoing the Founding Fathers, efficiency was
a means , not a goal, and on this point his critics ignore a vital part
of his thinking. Competition brought compensatory benefits: "The
margin between that which men naturally do and which they can do
is so great that a system which urges men on to action, enterprise,
and initiative is preferable in spite of the wastes that necessarily attend
that process." If efficiency was lost in pursuit of a higher goal, the
loss was worth absorbing. The writers of the Constitution thought
that the inefficiencies of a democratic republic were more than compensated for by other advantages. Implicit in Brandeis's advocacy of
free speech was acceptance of inefficiency because it is inefficient, in
the search for the best policies, to have the same idea expressed repeatedly by the same or even by different people. The educated choices
that would result from exposure to all ideas, however, could only be
attained at the cost of preventing the government from interfering
with speech, however repetitive. Brandeis brought that calculation
into the economic field by asserting that the inefficiencies attendant
upon competition would be more than offset by the incentives and
progress fostered by competition. 27
Brandeis rejected the claim that a higher level of general economic
well-being and affordable consumer goods would be attained, albeit at
the price of temporary dislocation of workers, as the economy moved
from a small to a larger scale. He would have denied that a choice had
to be made between economic efficiency and a system detrimental to
human beings. But if he had to choose, his choice would have been easy;
his major indictment against the trusts was that they hurt human beings.
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Brandeis reminded the Clapp Committee about James andJoseph
McNamara. In 1910 they had dynamited the Los Angeles Times building, killing twenty-one workers, because of the antiunion stance of
the Times' publisher. Brandeis told the committee that as long as men
like the McNamaras believed that their only recourse was to dynamite,
there would be violence instead of industrial liberty:
You cannot have true American citizenship, you cannot preserve
political liberty, you cannot secure American standards of living
unless some degree of industrial liberty accompanies it. And the
United States Steel Corporation and these other trusts have
stabbed industrial liberty in the back. . . . This social unrest is
what is really the matter with business. Well-founded unrest;
reasoned unrest; but the manifestations of which are often unintelligent and sometimes criminal . . . . Until we had these great
trusts, or the great corporations which preceded them, workers
could secure justice through unions. 28
Bigness destroyed liberty, and so Brandeis condemned it . He frequently spoke about consumer costs, and he cared about owners of
small businesses driven out by large corporations, but his primary
concern was for the workers. First industrialization and then the giant
trusts made possible by it had amassed so much economic power that
most Americans would spend their lives working for faceless employers
in huge enterprises to which they felt no personal connection beyond
that symbolized and encompassed by their weekly pay check. Brandeis
was angered not only because workers were being exploited, having
no leisure with which to fulfill and educate themselves, but also because
they were being turned into automatons unable to learn about and
participate in the political process, with the result that the country
was becoming far less democratic.
Brandeis's concern for democracy led him to conclude that government had to involve itself to rectify the wrongs being committed in
the industrial sector. By 1912 he was convinced that the trusts had
become so politically potent that even if workers had sufficient leisure
to involve themselves in the political process, the trusts would prevent
the votes of workers and other citizens from really counting. He was
anxious to help elect a president who shared his views. In June 1912 the
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Democratic party adopted William Jennings Bryan's resolution denouncing "the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class." It then
nominated Woodrow Wilson for president, and Wilson endorsed the
program aimed at the financiers Brandeis had been fighting for years.
Brandeis promptly issued a statement calling Wilson's nomination
"among the most encouraging events in American History. "29 Within
weeks, the two men met for lunch and a three-hour discussion, and
Brandeis began fashioning the program that became known as Wilson's
"New Freedom. "30
Wilson declared after the meeting that their joint goal was not regulation of the trusts but destruction of them through regulation of
competition. The basis for Wilson's proposals was laid down in a
lengthy summary Brandeis sent him of the problems with the existing
Sherman Act and the virtues of the La Follette-Brandeis proposed
amendments. Wilson's biographer Arthur Link credits Brandeis's
memorandum with being the source of "all of [the] ideas that [Wilson]
expressed during the presidential campaign."31
The difference between Theodore Roosevelt's platform and the
Brandeis-Wilson approach went beyond the farmer's assumption that
trusts could be controlled. Brandeis, with his experience of illegal ties
between governments and corporations, did not believe that trusts
were manageable by government. Even if they were, however, the
entity regulating them would itself have to be so large that the problems
of bigness would be repeated. The regulators would grow to be as
big as the businesses; bureaucracies would develop; it would be impossible for anyone to be in charge. Again, Brandeis returned to human
limitations. The citizen had to be as wary of the evil of bigness in
government as in business. With their complex combination of creativity and limited intellect, human beings could create institutions that
were too big to monitor for efficiency and effectiveness, too big to
assess for value or liability to society, too big to control, too big to
care about the policies necessary to protect individual liberties. Such
were the trusts; such, without care, could be the federal government.
In spite of Brandeis's experience with state legislatures, he preferred
that power be lodged with them rather than with the federal government . Again, the problem was bigness and centralization of power.
It was not merely that corruption followed bigness all too easily; it
was also important to remember that experimentation was crucial if
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progress was to be made. Here Brandeis followed Jefferson in extolling the wisdom of the system that enabled a relatively small entity,
a state, to begin an experiment that, if promising, could be picked
up and perfected by other states. If the experiment failed, its limitation to one state meant that relatively little had been lost. Ideas were
exciting but they were not to be put into effect before they had been
adequately tried. Brandeis was so insistent on thorough experimentation that even though he had invented savings-bank life insurance
and worked hard to establish it in Massachusetts , he warned twenty
years after its inception that it had not been sufficiently tested to be
introduced in other states. 32
By the time Brandeis met Wilson, then, his ideas about human
limitations, his fear of bigness in both government and business, his
detestation of the trusts, his faith in democracy, and his assumption
that the government had to undo the privileged position it had given
the trusts and regulate competition, coupled with an understanding
of the economics of the trusts, had come together in proposed policies
that would destroy the trusts while keeping the federal government
down to a manageable size .
For his part, Wilson sounded much like Roosevelt until he met
Brandeis. He worried about the control over economic life that the
trusts might give to a few people, but he considered trusts inevitable
and could find no solution to the problem of concentrated economic
power. In 1905 the aristocratic Calvinist had stated, "We can't abolish
the trusts. We must moralize them," but he had little in the way of concrete ideas about how to do so. In 1912 he was still talking about
nothing more than lowering the tariff and applying the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act . 33 His understanding of the relationship between political and economic forces in the state went little beyond
his certainty that socialism and government ownership of the means
of production were wrong. Norman Thomas, a former student of Wilson's at Princeton, reported about him that "if he had ever heard Harrington's dictum that the distribution of power follows the distribution
of property, he never discussed it with his students in the classroom."34
Earlier in his scholarly career, Wilson had described Congress as
the dominant if unorganized and inefficient branch of the national
government. 35 By 1908, however, he had moved so far as to see the
Senate as the bastion of economic interests and the president as the
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desired "political leader of the nation." He had also realized that many
state legislatures were corrupt but nonetheless advocated reforming
them rather than transferring their powers to the national government. 36 He thus shared Brandeis's emphasis on federalism and was
ready to be tutored by him about modern American economics.
The two major actions Brandeis urged upon Wilson were stronger
antitrust laws and the kind of currency reform that would negate the
use and abuse by the money trust of "other people's money," and
Wilson stressed these themes in his campaign speeches . After Wilson
won the election, Brandeis continued his tutoring as a key unofficial
adviser on economic matters. InJune 1913 Brandeis was summoned
to the White House to help Wilson choose between two competing
proposals for a Federal Reserve Board. Brandeis dismissed the plan
for a privately controlled and decentralized reserve system supervised by a Federal Reserve Board that would be elected by bankers. He
threw the weight of his approval behind the second proposal , which
sought to establish a reserve system that would issue notes, to be considered government obligations, and that would be supervised by a
board appointed by the government. 37 He told Wilson that "the power
to issue currency should be vested exclusively in Government officials,"
with the bankers limited to a strictly advisory role. He added that
businesses other than the money trust would applaud such a move
because they would know that "whatever money is available, will be
available for business generally, and not be subject to the control of
a favored few." Wilson was convinced and asked Brandeis to put his
arguments in writing. The resultant bill was passed by Congress and
signed by Wilson on December 23, 1913. 38
Brandeis then began to push Wilson on general antitrust legislation. He advocated establishment of an Interstate Trade Commission with the power to investigate agreements in restraint of trade,
use of information to aid the Justice Department in litigation against
the trusts, and action to secure compliance with the law at the request of injured parties. He also called for creation of "industrial
experiment stations and other bureaus for research and for the dissemination of education in industry." These were necessary if smaller
businesses were to have the kind of access to research currently
available only to large corporations with their own research laboratories . In addition, he advocated repeal of the law prohibiting price
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fixing of trademarked merchandise by its producer or distributor. He
differentiated price maintenance by a producer, who had a stake in
the quality and reputation of his product, from price cutting and price
fixing. Price maintenance would promote competition, he believed,
but price cutting was "the most potent weapon of monopoly- a means
of killing the small rival to which the great trusts have resorted most
frequently," and price fixing was used by monopolies to force consumers to pay high prices. Presumably, he distinguished legitimate
independent producers from trusts by the over-40 percent of the market
criterion that he had suggested to La Follette when they were devising antitrust proposals. 39
Then Brandeis turned to a particular bete noire: interlocking directorates. He was convinced that no one could serve two masters, as
was required by these directorates, because people could not act in
one capacity without considering an action's effects on their other interests and because to sit on numerous boards of directors strained
the resources and abilities of any one individual beyond human limitations. An executive of one company sitting on the board of directors
of others could not possibly possess enough facts to make intelligent
decisions about all of them. Brandeis sent Secretary of the Interior
Franklin K. Lane an example of the dishonesty inherent in interlocking
directorates:
J .P . Morgan (or a partner), a director of the New York, New
Haven, & Hartford Railroad, causes that company to sell to J .P.
Morgan & Co. an issue of bonds. J .P . Morgan & Co. borrow
the money with which to pay for the bonds from the Guaranty
Trust Company, of which Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a director. J .P. Morgan & Co . sell the bonds to the Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Company, of which Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a
director. The New Haven spends the proceeds of the bonds in
purchasing steel rails from the United States Steel Corporation,
of which Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a director. The United
States Steel Corporation spends the proceeds of the rails in purchasing electrical supplies from the General Electric Company, of
which Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a director. The General Electric sells supplies to the Western Union Telegraph Company; and
in both Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a director. The Telegraph
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Company has an exclusive wire contract with the Reading . . . .
The Reading buys its passenger cars from the Pullman Company . . . . The Pullman Company buys . . . locomotives from
the Baldwin Locomotive Company . . . . The Reading, the General Electric, the Steel Corporation and the New Haven [also]
buy locomotives from the Baldwin . . .. The Steel Corporation,
the Telephone Company, the New Haven, the Reading, the
Pullman and the Baldwin Companies, like the Western Union,
buy electrical supplies from the General Electric. The Baldwin,
the Pullman, the Reading, the Telephone, the Telegraph and the
General Electric companies, like the New Haven, buy steel products from the Steel Corporation. Each and every one of the companies last named markets its securities through J.P . Morgan &
Co.; each deposits its funds with J.P. Morgan & Co. , and with
these funds of each, the firm enters upon further operations. 40
Wilson read Brandeis's articles on the money trust and then
delivered a special message to Congress on January 20, 1914. The
president proposed creating a Federal Trade Commission (FTC), giving the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate railroad financing, outlawing interlocking directorates and price cutting
that would destroy competition, and strengthening the penalties for
violation of the Sherman Act. Brandeis wrote triumphantly to his
brother that Wilson's message "has paved the way for about all I have
asked & some of the provisions specifically are what I got into his
mind at my first interview."41 Brandeis then helped persuade Wilson
that the FTC should be a regulatory rather than a purely investigatory
body. This ran counter to Brandeis's usual disapproval of extensive
governmental regulatory involvement. He was nonetheless convinced
that no law could cover all possible violations of antitrust policy, and
an agency with the power to expand upon basic legislative policy should
be created. Brandeis's congressional testimony and lobbying aided
passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act, the Covington Bill (FTC) and
the Rayburn Bill (Interstate Commerce Commission) , although the
Clayton Antitrust Act was somewhat watered down. Wilson then had
to choose commissioners for the FTC . At that point Brandeis and
Wilson began to part company. Wilson decided, largely on the basis
of other political considerations, not to name activist Progressives to
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the ITC. Consequently, the commission functioned so much less effectively than Brandeis had hoped that he held Wilson responsible for
ruining it. 42
Brandeis's fear of bigness accompanied him when he joined the
Supreme Court in 1916. He saw the Court's economic role as reinforcing governmental efforts to return American businesses to the size
they would have been without the artificially created giant corporations. The Court had the responsibilities not to interfere with state
and federal experiments in limiting bigness , such as antitrust laws ;
to encourage the growth of nongovernmental forces , such as unions,
that would aid in curbing the power of bigness ; and to help those
governmental policies, like antimonopoly statutes, that fostered economic competition. Only a year after taking his seat on the Court ,
he dissented from its grant of a decree that in effect permitted a coal
company to prevent its employees from joining a union. Brandeis
argued, as he would continue to do in subsequent cases, that the Court
was wrong to favor business over labor and that the company's policy
was as unacceptably coercive as the Court had found the closed shop
to be. 43
His ideas about the evils of bigness and the need for the Court to
permit state experiments that attempted to deal with it ensured his
being regularly in dissent when the Court decided cases involving
regulatory legislation. In 1928, for example, the Court overturned
a Pennsylvania statute that taxed corporations more heavily than individually owned businesses and partnerships. Brandeis dissented,
writing angrily that "there are still intelligent, informed, just-minded,
and civilized persons who believe that the rapidly growing aggregation of capital through corporations constitutes an insidious menace
to the liberty of the citizen; that it tends to increase the subjection
of labor to capital; that, because of the guidance and control necessarily
exercised by great corporations upon those engaged in business, individual liberty is being impaired and creative power will be lessened; . . . that the evils incident to the accelerating absorption of
business by corporations outweigh the benefits thereby secured; and
that the process of absorption should be retarded."44
In case after case he emphasized the virtues of federalism and decentralized power and argued for the right of the states to experiment . 45
The limits federalism imposed on the central government applied to the
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Supreme Court as well as to the other branches . For almost one hundred years, the Court's holding that federal courts could ignore state
common law had been the law of the land. +6 This led businesses seeking
to evade local law to obtain charters in more than one state and then
claim under the "diversity of citizenship" doctrine that cases involving them could be heard only by federal courts. Brandeis, along with
Holmes, had long protested the power given to federal courts by this
decision, and he was pleased to write for the Court in 1938, overturning the doctrine. +7 Brandeis told his current law clerk that he regarded
his opinion in Erie, stopping federal courts from making their own
law, as his "last major contribution to the law" and a triumph for state
power.+8 He advocated judicial restraint because the Court, as all other
bodies in a democratic society, had an obligation to be moderate in
its use of power+9 and, perhaps, because he himself approved of many
of the experiments that the state and federal governments undertook.
It has been suggested that Brandeis exercised restraint for the latter reason alone 50 and that he might well have approved a more active judicial role if, for example, states experimented with limitations
on labor union activity or encouragement of industrial bigness. It is
true that this was not a situation he often faced, but he did show in
the Oklahoma ice case that he was quite capable of putting his personal beliefs aside in the name of experimentation and judicial
restraint. 51 What he would have done had he lived in another era
is not germane because his entire political thought, including his
jurisprudence, grew out of his experiences at a particular historical
moment. The development of American sociological jurisprudence
during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first ones
of the twentieth was not accidental.
In one sense, sociological jurisprudence was part of a larger political
and intellectual reaction against some of the consequences of the alteration of the American economy from a system based on farming and
small-scale business to one in which great industrialized corporations
and trusts played a major role. The concentration of power that
resulted from the change was one of the engines that fueled the Progressive movement. Lawyers such as Brandeis were particularly concerned about the propensity of courts to endorse that concentration
and to hand down decisions supportive of big business while they
denied legitimacy to state experiments designed to minimize the
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negative human consequences of industrialization. Brandeis could
counsel judicial restraint because it implied judicial endorsement of
experiments he thought were important. Yet the soundness of sociological jurisprudence, and the corollary doctrine of judicial restraint,
has been demonstrated by its continued use in later historical eras
when the questions faced by the Court have been quite different from
those of 1916-1939 . Brandeis's insistent belief in democracy, in the
ability of the people to find truths, and in the necessity of experimentation as part of that process suggest that, had he been confronted
with experiments he disliked, he would quietly have deplored them
but would have considered them constitutionally permissible as long
as they did not violate the basic principles of dispersion of power and
protection of civil liberties.
Brandeis joined Holmes's dissent in Hammer v . Dagenhart, in which
the Court struck down the federal law prohibiting shipment in interstate commerce of articles produced by child labor. Presumably
use of federal power was permissible here because it was clear that
the states were unable or unwilling to deal with a practice that, as
Holmes pointed out, was widely acknowledged to be shocking, and
the statute neither concentrated power nor abridged civil liberties . 52
Brandeis viewed emergency as another appropriate occasion for the
exercise of federal power and for experimentation. Thus he frequently
dissented from the Court's overturning of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. 53
Brandeis had a major opportunity to influence public policy during Roosevelt's presidency. By the time FDR was elected in 1932 the
country was in the midst of the depression, and emergency measures
clearly were needed. Brandeis met with Roosevelt on November 23 ,
1932, at the president-elect's request and urged him to finance publicworks programs by taxing large estates. There were relatively few
meetings of the two thereafter; 54 Brandeis, after all, was a Supreme
Court justice, and should not be seen as politicking. 55 But he received
regular visits from a host of New Deal officials and advisers-highranking officials including Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, National Recovery Administration
heads Gen. Hugh Johnson and Donald Richberg, Tennessee Valley
Authority director David Lilienthal; lesser officials such as Thomas
Corcoran, Benjamin Cohen, and James Landis; brain trusters Felix
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Frankfurter, Samuel Rosenman, Raymond Moley, and Huston
Thompson. Through them and the numerous members of Congress
who also sought his conversation and advice, he had a major effect
on such New Deal legislation as the 1933 Public Securities Act, the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, the 1935 Holding Company Act, and
the 1935 Social Security Act. 56
Brandeis also made two private explicit statements of his preferred
program. 57 The first was outlined in part on December 8, 1933, to
his clerk Harry Shulman. Again, the themes centered on actions the
federal government could take while still avoiding a dangerous centralization of power, on the necessity to keep experimentation alive,
and on the vital importance of continuous employment. Brandeis told
Shulman, as he had Roosevelt, that the government ought to rely
heavily on the federal taxing power to minimize concentration of
power. Taxation, he believed, should be used to keep the banks from
doing more than one kind of banking: "This would avoid all the evil
of great concentration of financial power in the hands of bankers."
The bankers had to be the first object of governmental action, he
thought, because at the moment the government was in the bankers'
hands. The government could get money elsewhere: through postalsystem savings accounts, checking accounts, commercial accounts,
and the issuance of securities. Once freed from the control of the money
trust, the government ought to impose excise taxes of other kinds upon
overly large corporations. Brandeis retained his belief that the federal
government usually should not regulate corporations because this
would concentrate too much power in federal hands, 58 but he advocated using the powers of the central government to keep the corporations small enough to be regulated by the states. In addition,
Brandeis suggested using federal taxes to curb the size of inheritances. 59
Harold Laski had written to Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1922 that
Brandeis "is really a Jeffersonian Democrat, trying to use the power
of the State to enforce an environment in which competition may be
really free and equal. This," commented Laski, "I take to be an impossible task," and he labeled Brandeis "a romantic anachronism." 60
Shulman echoed Laski and others by asking Brandeis if reducing the
size of corporations would be "attempting to do the impossible, to
turn the clock back." "Why shouldn't we turn the clock back?" Brandeis
immediately demanded. "We just turned the clock back on a 'noble
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experiment' [Prohibition], which was unanimously adopted in the
country and was being tried for some time." And then he added, in
effect defining the difference between the thinker and the pragmatist,
"To have that objection raised only confuses the prop01_1ent and directs
his mind away from the real issue . First, we must determine what
is desirable to do and then we can find ways and means to do it."61
They turned to the enormous unemployment caused by the depression. Brandeis envisioned action by both the states and the federal
government. The states should be encouraged to adopt the Wisconsin unemployment plan, drawn up in large part by Brandeis's daughter
Elizabeth and her husband Paul Raushenbush. Technically, the plan
was voluntary for employers; however, nonparticipating employers
were taxed. 62 Elsewhere, Brandeis advocated a massive program of
public works, including a program similar to the Tennessee Valley
Authority. He was certain such a program could get two million people
to work within two months. He also urged credit for small businesses,
help for small farmers and sharecroppers, and, returning to ideas he
had been advocating since early in the century, elimination of holding
companies and interlocking directorates . 63
His New Deal prescriptions demonstrated that Brandeis could
differentiate between his constant fear of bigness and the kind of
emergency situations that might require emergency measures. But
the perils of bigness were not to be ignored, even during emergencies; thus the federal taxing power could be used to limit the size of
corporations, but the powers of the states rather than the federal commerce power should be used to regulate them. Emergencies were not
to be the excuse for a massive concentration of power in the federal
government-a situation that in fact did happen, with Brandeis's warnings being brushed aside.
The second Brandeis document suggesting postdepression policy,
a letter to his daughter Elizabeth, also reflected his continuing fear
of bigness. The states were to play a major part in ending the depression and were to continue as important elements in the American
governmental system. As he emphasized in his letter, "Curb of bigness
is indispensable to true Democracy & Liberty. It is the very foundation also of wisdom in things human .... 'Nothing too much.'" Unless
this was remembered, he warned, "we may get amelioration, but not
a working 'New Deal.' And we are apt to get Fascist manifestations .
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Remember, the inevitable ineffectiveness ofregulation, i.e. the limits
of its efficiency in regulation." After all, he added, "If the Lord had
intended things to be big, he would have made man bigger - in brains
and character." The letter continued:
My idea has been that the Depression can be overcome only by
extensive public works.
(a) that no public works should be undertaken save those that
would be effective in making the America of the future what
it should be,
(b) that we should avail [ourselves] of the present emergency to
get those public works which Americans would lack the insight
& persistence to get for themselves in ordinary times.
These public works are, for every state,
( 1) afforestation
(2) running water control
(3) adult education
(4) appropriate provisions for dealing with defectives and delinquents.
It is absurd to permit either floods or droughts, or waste of
waters. We should so control all running waters, by reservoirs,
etc., so
(a) as to prevent floods & soil erosion
(b) to make it possible to irrigate practically all land
(c) to utilize the water for power & inland navigation
(d) & for recreation. 64
Most of Brandeis's major ideas are reflected here. People were major
"natural resources," and to give them the knowledge and living conditions necessary for informed participation in the democratic process, slum clearance, and adult education were added to land use and
natural resources as targets for short-term federal programs. The federal government could use its money to stabilize the economy during
the existing emergency, but the income derived from federal taxation
had to be shared with the states instead of remaining in Washington
to build up the national government's power. Public-works programs
were of major importance because governments were the only bodies
with sufficient money and motivation to fund the workers necessary to

CHAPTER FOUR

94

these "unprofitable" but socially desirable projects. Initially, publicworks programs would be sponsored both federally and by the states;
presumably, after the emergency had been ended, the states could
take over almost all such programs, not forgetting to use natural
resources for the recreation needed by well-rounded citizens.
Perhaps one reason the economists and other policymakers around
Roosevelt could not understand Brandeis's ideas and thought he was
merely advocating a return to nineteenth-century laissez-faire economic theory was that instead of offering a panacea he couched his
thinking in terms of experiments and multistage developments. The
New Dealers, to the contrary, correctly saw their mandate as finding
fast solutions to the economic and political emergency of the depression. Their attitude was exemplified by the rapidity with which bills
were proposed by the White House during Roosevelt's first "Hundred Days," and it was encouraged by the popular approval and congressional action generated by the legislation.
Brandeis recognized that fast action was necessary, but he remained
aware of the possibly undesirable indirect effects of governmental
measures. The celerity of the governmental response should not be
permitted to conceal tendencies toward long-lasting concentration of
power. He also declined to mistake quick fixes, however essential they
might be at the moment, for permanent solutions. 65 He had been willing to defend Oregon's maximum-hours law for women in Muller v.
Oregon only because the legislation was on the state rather than the
federal level. As he had done in warning other states not to adopt
the Massachusetts savings-bank life insurance system until it had been
used long enough for its strengths and weaknesses to be demonstrated,
so he supported experimentation by the states in regulating labor but
opposed a federal statute mandating minimum wages for women as
premature and possibly unconstitutional. 66 At the time of Muller, he
was still dubious about governmental regulation of men's working
hours or wages, contending that such matters were best handled
through labor-management negotiations, at least until investigatory
commissions established a need and an appropriate procedure, e.g.,
an approach similar to the Oregon statute tying the minimum wage
for women to the actual cost of living. 67 Although he advocated an
eventual move to worker-participation and consumer cooperatives,
he knew there had to be not only many experiments with such systems
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but education of the public about their desirability. He therefore
gradually came to endorse state - again, not federal - establishment
of minimum wages and maximum hours, but only as a temporary
measure, with the thought that government-mandated standards eventually would become unnecessary when the workers had enough time
to teach themselves how to run corporations. 68
Although he supported use of governmental power during the New
Deal period, he would not countenance what he saw as unbridled
power. He made this clear with his votes in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, Schechter v. United States, and Louisville v . Radford. 69 He was particularly concerned about the growing tendency to address problems
by delegating power to the executive branch, even when it was run
by Roosevelt. He commented to Frankfurter, when Congress was out
of session, "There is some comfort in the thought that each day brings
Congress' convening nearer. It was a terrible thing to vest absolute
power in one man, and adjourn for so long a period." He added a
week later, writing about Roosevelt policies he disliked, "They were
the inescapable penalties paid for conferring absolute power. "70 Some
years earlier, he had written an impassioned dissent in Myers v. United
States, when the Court permitted a president unilaterally to fire a civil
servant even though a statute required Senate advice and consent
before such a removal. The Court argued efficiency; Brandeis countered with democracy and a statement that echoed Madison's belief
in balancing power with other power: "The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The
purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among
three departments, to save the people from autocracy." 71
Brandeis opposed early New Deal attempts to limit production and
to raise prices. If the government removed laws making unions illegal
so that workers could negotiate sufficient wages for themselves, and
if prices were lowered and jobs and goods were made available in
part through public works, consumption would equal production. Concomitantly, of course, the end of the artificial maintenance of trusts
by repealing laws supportive of them would encourage the redevelopment of smaller corporations that would set reasonable prices on the
products they chose to stand behind. He was also willing, for the
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moment, to permit states to operate transportation and banking
systems, to tax estates and profits in order to prevent the overaccumulation of wealth and power, to extend credit to small business
and farms, to accumulate and disseminate information about industries
and agriculture, and to limit the activities of bankers and stockbrokers
so that the money trust could not be resurrected. These moves would
help correct past mistakes while avoiding the trap of creating a huge
government. Brandeis saw a vital role for government while industrial
democracy was being fashioned . It was not, however, as centralized,
as extensive, or designed to be as permanent as that envisaged by
the framers of the New Deal.
There was nonetheless a major role for the central government to
play. Speaking to two journalists in 1935, he argued for the imposition by the federal government of heavy taxes on out-of-state corporations, on directors who did business with their own corporations,
on intraorganizational transactions within a holding company, and
on public utility holding companies. The object of all the taxes was
to end the practices and institutions taxed. Thus the federal taxing
power could be used to eliminate wrongs. 72 As Chief Justice John
Marshall had counseled much earlier in the country's history, "The
power to tax is the power to destroy."73 Brandeis was urging that it
be used as such. As he told Alfred Lief, "By taxation bigness can be
destroyed. The power is there: what we create we can destroy." 74 Some
of the New Dealers were listening or at least thinking along similar
lines, as was demonstrated by the Brandeisian use ofthe taxing power
in the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act, the Public Utility Holding
Act, the 1936 Revenue Act, the Guffey Coal Act, and the post-1935
versions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the NRA codes, and the
Farm-Foreclosure Moratorium Act. And Brandeis also envisioned a
long-term federal governmental role in transportation, utilities, and
land development. But the basic economic function of the central
government was negative: It had an obligation to keep citizens free
from tyranny that might otherwise be imposed by some of their fellow
human beings, and the best way to accomplish this was to keep businesses from becoming too big.
One of the differences between Brandeis and the ultimately triumphant New Dealers such as Adolph Berle, Jr., Rexford Tugwell,
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Raymond Moley, and Donald Richberg was this group's unarticulated
assumption that government was best served by a monopoly over
policymaking by a group of bright, dedicated men with expertise in
economics and politics-in short, the New Dealers. The idea that
democracy implied constant citizen-involvement was not one of their
central political principles. They viewed Washington as the home of
the enlightened and the state capitals as benighted outposts. Brandeis,
who knew better than most of them how corrupt and uninterested
in modernization state legislatures could be, nonetheless recognized
that the kind of citizen-participation he considered crucial in a democracy was unlikely if the seat of most major decisionmaking was Washington. He concentrated on state models such as Massachusetts' savings
bank life insurance system and the more recent socioeconomic reforms
such as unemployment insurance that his daughter Elizabeth and
others were creating in Wisconsin. He was reminiscent of Jefferson
in emphasizing the need for dynamic governmental entities that were
geographically accessible to a concerned citizenry. It was precisely
because he knew that many state legislatures and bureaucracies were
corrupt that he mistrusted their federal counterparts, with the far
greater resources they were amassing through federal taxes on individuals and corporations.
The New Dealers could not comprehend Brandeis's insistence on
federalism, which they viewed as a regrettable vestige of historical
necessity. They made no effort at mass mobilization. Instead, the electorate was asked to vote for New Dealers, wait for them to solve the
country's problems, and try to avoid fear in the interim. The big
government created by and in Washington not only signaled a decadeslong negation of meaningful federalism, but it also implied the end
of a practice Brandeis considered vital: experimentation by the states.
He regretted the lure of Washington for the young politically involved
elite. He startled the young New Dealers who came to him expecting
praise for their accomplishments in the nation's capital by admonishing
them to return to the "provinces" from which they had gratefully
escaped. "But Mr. Justice-Fargo, North Dakota!" one young man
exclaimed in horror. To the protest of another that "I have no hinterland. I'm from New York City," Brandeis replied implacably, "That
is your misfortune." Even his law clerks were advised to take their
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talents, much admired by him, back to the states from which they
came. 75
Brandeis's thought, as Paul Freund later commented, was all of
a piece; or, to use Frankfurter's metaphor, "To quote from Mr. Justice
Brandeis' opinions is not to pick plums from a pudding but to pull
threads from a pattern ." His theory of democracy, centered on the
individual, encompassed both a recognition of the kinds of innovative
governmental action required by the industrial age and an awareness
of the limitations that had to be placed on business and on government if the individual was to be emphasized, the economy was to work
well, and efficiency and freedom were to be kept in a proper balance .
The New Dealers preferred to work piecemeal. C. Herman Pritchett
has noted that the chief failure of the New Deal was the lack of "any
consistent social and economic philosophy to give meaning and purpose to its various action programs." James MacGregor Burns has
depicted Roosevelt as a man who "hated abstractions." Arthur Schlesinger has described how the president "wriggled away" when confronted
with the differences between the Brandeis and the Berle camps and
defined the New Deal as the "satisfactory compromise" between Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism and Woodrow Wilson's New
Freedom. Brandeis knew that such a compromise was impossible, and
in effect that is what he told the president, through his votes on the
Supreme Court. 76
Brandeis was fortunate in being able to take the economic policies
he fashioned first to a presidential candidate, then, in a sense, to the
White House; and, finally, to the Supreme Court. He was less so in
getting either the White House, the Court, or the public to understand and support his ideas, particularly about the perils of bigness
and the need for industrial democracy. Americans have remained insistently social Darwinists in their thinking, accepting giant economic
combinations and their mistakes as an inevitable part of the nature
of things . An Edsel or a thalidomide is seen as an aberration rather
than as a symptom. The increasingly rare person who "makes it" after
developing an ingenious invention in his garage and marketing it to
millions is regarded as a hero worthy of the Horatio Alger myth he
helps to perpetuate . The centralization of governmental power is
perceived as a hallmark of civilization as long as it buries its scandals
and makes no dramatic forays into the taxpayer's pocket. Brandeis

THE CURSE OF BIGNESS

99
loathed tycoons, he deplored public apathy, he condemned invasions
of privacy, he feared big government, and he seems not to have
thought much of television. 77 What he did care about, passionately,
was the individual, and thus he was unceasing in his efforts to educate
both the governors and the governed about the curse of bigness .

5
ZIONISM AND THE IDEAL STATE

Let us insist that the struggle for liberty shall not cease until equality of opportunity is accorded to nationalities as to individuals. 1

Brandeis's one trip to Palestine, in 1919, lasted only sixteen days,
but it was a triumphal tour. Brandeis had become the leader in the
United States of the Zionist movement- the drive for a Jewish homeland in Palestine-and the PalestinianJews outdid each other in their
eagerness to applaud him. There was a whirlwind of activity as he
visited all the Jewish cities and twenty-three of the forty-three Jewish
settlements, being greeted at every stop as a hero. He was met by
singing children and an honor guard at the settlement ofMotza. There
were singing children again at Rishon LeZion. Other children, many
in Boy Scout and Girl Scout uniforms, along with adults dressed in
their holiday best lined the roads as he arrived in flag-bedecked Tel
Aviv. He was welcomed to Lod by doctors from Hadassah and by
forty members of the Jewish Brigade. From the Lemel School in
Jerusalem he received a silver-cased parchment extolling his virtues.
The settlement of Zichron Yaacov built a special gate in his honor.
He was as enthusiastic about what he saw as his hosts were about
him . "It is a wonderful country, a wonderful city," he wrote to his
wife from Jerusalem, and from Haifa he declared to English Zionist
leader Chaim Weizmann, "Palestine has won our hearts . . . . It is
no wonder that the Jews love her so." 2
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Brandeis, a thoroughly assimilated Jew who had never considered
Jewishness as a key element of his identity, had become the acknowledged leader of American Zionists and the hope of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine. His transformation resulted at least as much from
the opportunity to apply his political thought as from his ethnic
emotionalism.
He displayed little interest injewish causes until summer 1910 when
he mediated the New York garment strike and discovered the Eastern
European Jewish workers who were the backbone of the American
Zionist movement . His enthusiasm for their potential as citizens of
his ideal democratic state began to grow. Everything about them, including the Zionism that was new to him, piqued his curiosity, and
when a reporter for American Hebrew asked his opinion of Zionism,
Brandeis replied, "I have a great deal of sympathy for the movement."
He spent most of the interview, however, emphasizing that in the
United States, "there is no place for .. . hyphenated Americans" and
that "the opportunities for members of my people are greater here
than in any other country. "3 His close friend Elizabeth Glendower
Evans was certain that the strike was a "profound emotional experience
that gave birth to his realization of himself as a Jew," and Benjamin
V. Cohen attributed Brandeis's newly emerged Jewish consciousness
to his experience with the Jewish workers. Labor leader Henry Moskowitz said that Brandeis's meetings with the workers "became almost
a mystic experience for him." Brandeis acknowledged that the strike
showed him "the true democracy of my people, their idealistic inclinations and their love of liberty and freedom ."4
Shortly after the strike ended, Brandeis met Jacob de Haas, former
secretary to Theodor Herzl, the father of modern Zionism. De Haas
was the editor and publisher of a Jewish newspaper and interviewed
Brandeis about savings-bank life insurance. At the conclusion of the
interview de Haas asked if Brandeis was related to Lewis Dembitz,
whom he described as a "noble Jew." Brandeis listened enthralled as
on that day and at other meetings over the next months de Haas explained Dembitz's Zionism and the Zionist cause . Herzl had founded
the formal Zionist movement in the 1890s, and Dembitz had joined
it only after Brandeis left Louisville, so Brandeis had not known about
his uncle's involvement. He later said that he was "eternally grateful"
to de Haas for "unfold[ ing] the Zionist cause" to him. 5
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The talks with de Haas, coupled with his experience of the garment
strike, led Brandeis to enlist in the Federation of American Zionists in
1912, becoming a member of its Associate Executive Committee. He
also joined the Zionist Association of Greater Boston, the Menorah
Society, and the advisory board of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society. None of this activity was seen as important by the
Zionist community, which was not particularly excited when his membership was announced at the Zionist convention of 1912, because he
had not yet become an activist and was not known as being interested
in Jewish causes. In spring 1913, however, he presided when the wellknown Polish Zionist Nahum Sokolow spoke for two hours to an audience in Boston and gave Sokolow a letter of introduction to Secretary
of State William Jennings Bryan. He began lecturing to Jewish and
Zionist groups and was elected a delegate to the Zionist Congress meeting in Vienna in 1913 . Although unable to attend it, he sent the Congress a message firmly advocating Jewish immigration to Palestine . 6
During this period Brandeis was busy advising President Woodrow
Wilson and actually gave little time to Zionism. In summer 1914,
however, disheartened by Wilson's loss of interest in antitrust and
other Progressive measures, Brandeis went on his annual vacation.
It was typical for him to immerse himself in books and articles about
each new enthusiasm, and he decided to spend much of the month
reading intensively in Zionism and Jewish affairs. World War I broke
out that summer. On August 30, Brandeis went to an emergency conference of American Zionists concerned about the wartime plight of
European Jews and was asked to become chairman of the Provisional
Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs that the conference
had created. It was assumed he would be a figurehead , interesting
his wealthy friends in the cause while an administrative committee
did the real work. But much to the surprise of everyone, he threw
himself into the endeavor with total commitment and quickly became
the acknowledged leader of American Zionism . 7
Zionism proved to be a key part of Brandeis's life and one of his
major activities for years. 8 His view of Zionism is crucial to an understanding of his political thought, and I argue here that Brandeis envisioned the Jewish Palestinian settlements as a potential re-creation
of Periclean Athens and that Alfred Zimmern's Greek Commonwealth
was central to his thinking. 9
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Three factors appear to have been primary in Brandeis's involvement in Zionism . One was his reaction to the Eastern European garment workers, the first working-class Jews he had met. He found them
"possessed of those very qualities which we of the twentieth century
seek to develop in our struggle for justice and democracy- a deep
moral feeling which makes them capable of noble acts; a deep sense
of the brotherhood of man; and a high intelligence, the fruit of three
thousand years of civilization. "10 The second factor was the knowledge,
gained from de Haas, that his adored Uncle Dembitz had considered
Zionism a worthy cause . The third was his developing economic and
political ideology, based on Jeffersonian and Progressive principles
but going further to worker-participation . Zimmern's Greek Commonwealth , expressing political ideas much like Brandeis's and calling attention to notable similarities between Palestine and Greece , played
a major role in Brandeis's Zionism by enabling him to pull together
his growing interest in the movement and his view of the ideal state.
For both Brandeis and Zimmern, the ideal had existed in Periclean
Athens.
Brandeis thought of that period as the high point of democratic civilization. The great tribute he paid his Uncle Dembitz was to say that
"he reminded one of the Athenians." He used a sentence from Pericles'
"Funeral Oration" in Whitney v. California, his impassioned defense
of his ideal democracy; in fact, as Pnina Lahav has demonstrated,
much of the structure and message of Pericles' Oration is reflected
in Whitney. He turned regularly to ancient Athens for wisdom . A journalist who followed Brandeis around for two days in 1916 reported
wryly, "Euripides, I now judge, after having interviewed Brandeis
on many subjects, said the last word on most of them." 11 The poem
that Brandeis liked best and quoted most often because it expressed
his view of citizenship and public service came from Euripides' Suppliant Women . Brandeis looked toward Periclean Athens to discover
how the model citizen would function in the model political society.
Periclean Athens is the subject of The Greek Commonwealth , and
Brandeis read it during winter of 1913-1914, just months before he
startled the Zionist movement by expressing his interest in active participation. He later wrote to Zimmern that the book had been his only
recreation while he was investigating the New Haven Railroad that
winter and that it gave him more pleasure than almost anything he had
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read in recent years other than Gilbert Murray's translation of the
Ba,echae. Brandeis added that Horace Kallen had informed him of Zimmern's interest in Zionism and that they shared a friend in Norman
Hapgood. 12
Brandeis apparently learned of Zimmern through the latter's role
as a translator of Guglielmo Ferrero's The Greatness and Decline of Rome.
After reading The Greek Commonwealth, he used his photographic memory to quote Zimmern's words and urged the book upon all the people
important to him. 13 He tacitly acknowledged Zimmern's centrality
in his formulation of Zionism and the ideal state by arranging for
Zimmern to be one of his only companions when he went to Palestine
in 1919, even though the two men had not yet met when the trip was
organized. Brandeis, the leader of American Zionism, was viewed
by European Zionists as the potential head of the World Zionist Organization; he was known throughout American political and legal
circles and was a member of the Supreme Court. It seems fair to
assume that many people would have liked to accompany him on his
trip, but he chose only de Haas and Zimmern. 14
His choice of Zimmern was made despite the fact that Zimmern
was interested in Zionism but was not a Zionist. The Oxford classicist
occasionally advised London-based Chaim Weizmann, but his major goal was World Federalism. 15 In the meantime , however, he saw
no contradiction in aiding the effort for a Jewish homeland because
Jews had enriched the common culture and were an important element in it.
Zimmern's pan-nationalism was more accepting of cultural differences than was the pan-Americanism Brandeis favored until he became
a Zionist. Brandeis had condemned ethnic separatism, telling the New
York Century Club on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the
first Jewish settlement in the United States, "There is room here for
men of any race, or any creed, of any condition in life, but not for
Protestant-Americans, or Catholic-Americans, or Jewish-Americans,
nor for German-Americans, Irish-Americans, or Russian-Americans."
This attitude was not surprising from the son of a successful and assimilated immigrant family , and it also was in keeping with Brandeis's
belief in universal truths and values that superseded nationalisms :
human dignity, the personal and social benefits of fulfilling human
potential, the need of a democratic electorate for a shared ethos.
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Hyphenated Americans were not for Brandeis. Nor were they for most
successful German-Americans like Jacob Schiff, Felix Warburg, Louis
Marshall, New York Times publisher Adolph Ochs, Henry Morgenthau, or Brandeis's brother-in-law Felix Adler, the head of the Ethical
Culture Society and teacher of ethics and morals at Columbia U niversity who had performed the Brandeis's wedding ceremony. 16
Brandeis's vision of a Jewish state seems to have been based in good
part on thejeffersonianism that runs throughout his thought, but The
Greek Commonwealth helped alter his attitude toward hyphenated Americans and enabled him to connect his political beliefs and his dreams
for the ideal society with the possibilities presented by Palestine. Zimmern's book paralleled Brandeis's thinking about the United States
and brought it together with his love of Greece. Palestine as Brandeis
envisioned it would become the new Periclean Athens, resembling
Athens as Zimmern described it.
Zimmern waxed lyrical when he described Periclean Athens: "For
a whole wonderful half-century . . . Politics and Morality, the deepest
and strongest forces of national and of individual life, had moved forward hand in hand towards a common ideal, the perfect citizen in
the perfect state." 17 He went on to examine the reasons the Athenians
were able to scale such lofty heights; each factor paralleled one of
Brandeis's basic beliefs.
The Greeks "grew up unable to conceive of any . . . state of government" other than local independence, Zimmern wrote; Brandeis championed decentralization and federalism. Zimmem argued, "The record
of civilized States seems to show that no sub-division of the community
. . . is sufficiently well informed or wise or tolerant or unselfish to
be entrusted for long, without control or responsibility, with the powers
and temptations of government"; Brandeis feared political centralization because fallible human beings inevitably would falter and be corrupted by an excess of power and responsibility. Zimmern noted,
"Public business is much the same as private; and men are not able
to transact business in hordes. Large companies are much the same
as small, only more uncomfortable." Brandeis had called big government and big business equally inefficient. Zimmern declared that "it
is only in a state where men are jealous for the maintenance of justice
that the freedom of the individual can permanently be secured," that
"it was Pericles' boast that his fellow-citizens found time to do justice
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both to public and private responsibilities, that they were at once (what
is nowadays considered impossible) the most active political workers
and the most many-sided individuals of their time," and that "democracy is meaningless unless it involves the serious and steady co-operation of large numbers of citizens in the actual work of government."
This could have been Brandeis speaking about the concern for justice
and public affairs that had to exist for the protection of democracy
or about the worker-citizens to whom he wanted to give the leisure
time necessary for participation in public affairs. 18 Zimmern spoke
in Brandeisian terms about the need for industrial reform, castigating
the "modern industrial system" as typified by" 'soulless organization'"
and the decline of the worker's liberty. He also wrote of the corruption of conspicuous consumption and of the necessity to concentrate
instead on individuals' minds and physical abilities. 19
Zimmern made the connection between Periclean Athens and
Palestine by describing the latter as possessing all the physical elements
found in the Athenian state. Both were in the Mediterranean area;
both relied "on the unsettled weather of winter and the big rainfalls
in the autumn and spring, the 'former' and 'latter' rains of the Bible";
Greece's "threefold division" into distinct geographic areas was "as true
of Palestine as of Greece." Zimmern traced one cause of the decline
of Pericles' Athens to the plague that killed a quarter of the citizens.
Brandeis, whose family had kept a bowl of quinine tablets on a table
in Louisville, would make one of his first priorities in Palestine the
eradication of malaria, declaring that a workable civilization could
not be developed where malaria thrived. 20 Again and again, Zimmern
compared Palestine with Greece, quoting Greek poets alongside Hebrew
prophets and maintaining, "It is true to assert of all these regions that,
even if they have not preserved their independence or attained to
popular government, they yet provide conditions which will prove
helpful at any time to their successful exercise."21
The new Athens Brandeis envisioned would have the benefit of
lessons he had learned in the United States. He was never more Jeffersonian than in his approach to Palestine, which he described in terms,
although not specifically the same, that the American Founding Fathers
might well have used in speaking of the colonies . There was arable
land; there were determined pioneers; there was the newness of a
society that might escape class divisions; there was a chance to make
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democracy work, far from the corrupting forces of existing regimes.
His speeches demonstrate that in many ways the Jewish community
in Palestine had become, for him, the fourteenth colony or, perhaps,
the colonies as they should have been. He extolled the "Jewish Pilgrim
Fathers," "the pioneers in Palestine," and called Palestine "a miniature
California" and Zionism "the Pilgrim inspiration and impulse over
again." 22 He reminded audiences that democracy prevailed during
"the early days of the colonies and states of New England" because
"the Puritans were trained in implicit obedience to stern duty by constant study of the Prophets. "23 Applauding the equal value given to
civic duty, education, and democracy by the early New Englanders
and the Jewish settlers in Palestine, he admonished Zionist audiences,
"The Pilgrims had faith, we should have it." 24 He repeated the analogy,
declaring, "The twentieth century ideals of America have been the
ideals of the Jew for more than twenty centuries. We have inherited
these ideals of democracy and of social justice. "25
One might raise the question of exactly how much Brandeis understood about Athens and the New England colonies or whether his
romanticized conception of each existed in spite of his extensive
reading. There were slaves in Athens and in the colonies; indeed,
the Athenian economy was based upon slavery. The two societies
treated women as inferior. 26 Although few if any classicists of Brandeis's
era discussed slavery and chauvinism in Greece and there was still
a paucity of feminist writing about early American history, the man
who had grown up hating slavery and who was a champion of women's
suffrage might have been expected to perceive for himself the inequities that underlay the two societies. But his usually fierce intelligence
seems to have faltered here. Perhaps he assumed that the virtues of
Athens and Plymouth Rock could be replicated without their vices.
In any event, Brandeis had moved from distaste for "hyphenated
Americans" to advocacy of what he called "inclusive brotherhood" and
his colleague Horace Kallen referred to as "cultural pluralism." He
had in fact come to view anti-Semitism as reflecting a failure of
liberalism that did not protect groups as well as individuals. 27 Had
he been on the Supreme Court in the second half of the twentieth
century rather than the first, whether this view might have led him
to approve the extension of constitutional rights to include groups as
well as individuals is a matter for speculation. There is some evidence,
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however, in Kallen's assertion that Brandeis "turned to Zionism out of an
interest partially philanthropic and humane" but remained a Zionist "because he came to apply the conceptions of the Declaration of Independence, which were among the postulates of his faith, to all sorts of
human associations and groups of individuals, as well as to individuals."28
The program that Brandeis fashioned for Jewish Palestine also grew
out of his Americanism. During the Pinchot-Ballinger hearings, for
example, Brandeis not only uncovered government giveaways of
natural resources in Alaska but realized that the larger problem was
ownership and conservation of land and other natural resources . As
usual, he created his own solutions. He spoke of the need to keep
land, mineral deposits, and development of transportation and utilities
in Alaska's relatively untouched terrain away from the "capitalists"
who were certain to use land and mines for speculation and who had
exploited New England by turning its transportation systems and
utilities into monopolies. "We must devise some system," Brandeis
wrote to his ally Sen. Robert La Follette, "by which those who are
willing to go to Alaska, with a view to working there and developing
its resources, shall have not only the assurance of fair treatment, but
the opportunity of operating without undue oppression through
monopolistically inclined competitors. "29
There is again an echo of Locke and the idea that the land should
belong to the person willing to work it, but that was not a realistic
option given the relative monopoly of investment resources by the
capitalists. Brandeis's answer was government ownership ofland, with
only a small return required from those individuals who used it, and
a government-owned but privately operated transportation system.
The government might own at least one mine, to compare with those
that were private, running it as an experimental station. 30
Once the government had established a system for protecting the
interests of the community from the ever-present threat of big money,
it was the people who should rule the territory that had not yet become
a state . Brandeis asked La Follette:
My dear Bob: How would this do for the Progressive slogan:
"Alaska; the Land of Opportunity.
Develop it by the People, for the people.
Do not let it be exploited by the Capitalists, for the Capitalists."31
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What mattered was democratic decisionmaking, which would ensure that the profits went to those people who had earned them through
their labor. There was to be small-scale communal responsibility, with
decisions about land use to be made communally. This pattern was
precisely the approach that Brandeis tried to accomplish in Palestine.
The outline of his goal appeared in the Pittsburgh Program he drew
up for the June 1918 Zionist convention held in that city.

First: We declare for political and civil equality irrespective
of race, sex, or faith of all the inhabitants of the land.
Second: To insure in the Jewish National Home in Palestine
equality of opportunity we favor a policy which, with due regard
to existing rights, shall tend to establish the ownership and control by the whole people of the land, of all natural resources and
of all public utilities.
Third: All the land, owned or controlled by the whole people,
should be leased on such conditions as will insure the fullest opportunity for development and continuity of possession .
Fourth: The co-operative principle should be applied so far
as feasible in the organization of all agricultural, industrial, commercial, and financial undertakings .
Fifth: The system of free public instruction which is to be established should embrace all grades and departments of education.
Sixth: Hebrew, the national language of the Jewish people,
shall be the medium of public instruction. 32
The platform may be the closest thing to a short summary of
Brandeis's political thought that exists. It begins with a notable assertion of human equality. Political and civil equality apply to all people:
not just men, not just Jews . Brandeis's realization that there were
Palestinian Arabs already living on much of the land was reflected
in both the first and second paragraphs, the second including "due
regard to existing rights" of land ownership . Presumably he hoped
enough contiguous land could be obtained "by the whole people,"
meaning the Jewish community, but the reference to "due regard to
existing rights" made it clear that Palestinian Arab landowners were
not necessarily expected to give up their holdings.
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The bulk of the land was to be owned "by the whole Uewish) people,"
not by private companies, and the same was true for all natural resources and public utilities. The community's governing entity was
not to work the land or develop the resources or run the utilities, however; these were to be leased, with the requirement for lessees being
their willingness to develop resources as fully as possible.
The principle of communality went further. Institutions-agricultural, industrial, commercial, and financial-were to be run along
cooperative lines, which meant communal decisionmaking, as it
already existed in the two major types of Palestinian Jewish agrarian
communities. The first, the kibbutz, held land entirely in common,
and decisions as to what crops would be planted, which jobs would
be done by whom, what percentage of any profit would be put back
into the land and infrastructure and what would be used for less pressing necessities were made by the entire community in general
assemblies. The second, the moshav, held the land communally but
sold shares and individual plots to families who would live on the land
and either work both on their plots and on communal land or farm
their plots alone while returning a percentage of their crop to the community. The moshav's members decided jointly about membership
in the community, use of communal profits, and so forth. In Brandeis's
day, the kibbutzim and moshavim existed only as agricultural endeavors. He nonetheless anticipated the existence of industrial, commercial, and financial institutions, some of which were already present
in early form (e.g., small-scale banks, usually linked to a political party,
that helped finance the settlements), 33 and he was thinking ahead about
worker-participation in them.
Brandeis expressed his belief that a democratic system could not
survive without educated citizens; hence the inclusion of"free public
instruction." And it was to be in Hebrew, as the revival of Hebrew
as a living language and as one that would be common to Jewish immigrants from various countries was a major goal of the Zionists. But
Brandeis did not comment upon, and possibly did not consider, the
effect of this measure upon Arab citizens.
The "whole people" who, according to the Pittsburgh Program,
would own and control land, natural resources, and utilities clearly
were the Jewish people. Although the platform also stated that there
would be "political and civil equality irrespective of race, sex, or faith
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of all the inhabitants of the land, "34 there is no indication of the place
the Palestinian Arab population would occupy under a social contract that rested upon the specified pattern of land ownership and
education.
Brandeis, along with many Palestinian Zionists and almost all
American Zionists, apparently knew little about the number and situation of Palestinian Arabs. He seems to have been as unaware as the
other Zionists around him of the extent to which the Palestinian Arabs'
land was being acquired through questionable dealings, particularly
after the Balfour Declaration in 191 7; of the suffering being caused
Palestinian Arabs by the development of the Jewish entity; or of the
existence of a well-developed Palestinian Arab economy, dependent
in part on the land that was being turned into Jewish settlements. 35
He clearly accepted the general Zionist assumption, self-serving as
it may have proved to be, that Jewish economic efforts were benefiting
the Arabs and that Palestinian Arab anger was generated by absentee
Arab landowners opposed to the improvements in the lives of the
fellahin. 36 As a Zionist, his major concern was the creation of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine. Unlike some other Zionists, however, he was
equally certain that a Zionist entity ought to recognize the rights of
all inhabitants. He thought Arabs and Jews could live together, that
Arabs should be permitted to buy stock in Jewish enterprises and to
join Jewish labor unions. 37 Shortly before he died he donated money
for playgrounds in Palestine to be used by Jewish, Moslem, and Christian children. 38
Brandeis could assert that Jews might want and need a Palestinian
homeland, rather than simply helping to build democracies wherever
they found themselves, because he gradually realized that much of
the world would not permit their participation. He had not experienced
anti-Semitism himself and had not been particularly concerned about
it. 39 He discovered it, however, in talking to the New York garment
workers, and he was shocked at the depth of European anti-Semitism
during World War I. "You cannot possibly conceive of the horrible
sufferings of the Jews in Poland & adjacent countries," he wrote to
his brother in 1914. "These changes of control from German to Russian & Polish anti-semites are bringing miseries as great as Jews ever
suffered in all their exiles. . . . The Jews are having a bad time. "40
He knew anti-Semitism existed in the United States, and at least one of
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his colleagues has suggested that Brandeis helped create the American
Jewish Congress in part to help combat anti-Semitism . 41 He did not
think, however, that the level of American anti-Semitism would or
should lead many American Jews to move to Palestine ; given the
American democratic and legal system, he saw no reason for them
to leave. Zionism meant an increase in freedom, specifically, the
freedom of Jews to live "either in the land of their fathers" or, as a
majority Jewish collectivity, under self-rule in Palestine. 42 He considered the United States to be as good a place as Palestine for Jews
to live. This belief was one of the elements of his thought that led
to his eventual dispute with European Zionists, who thought all Jews
should move to Palestine, and to the schism it caused in the world
Zionist movement. 43
Brandeis also recognized a historical "longing for Palestine" among
many Jews, "a manifestation in the struggle for existence by an ancient people"; 44 this yearning, combined with the Jews' long history
in Palestine and with anti-Semitism, was sufficient reason for the
establishment of a Jewish homeland there rather than elsewhere . He
argued that a group of people sharing a combination of elements such
as" 'race, language , religion, common habitat, common conditions,
mode oflife and manners, [and) political association'" have not only
a right but an obligation to assert their nationality and that "the . . .
internationalism" that "seeks the obliteration of nationalities or peoples"
is "misnamed."45
Legitimation of the longing for self-determination was a precondition of world peace. "Deeply imbedded in every nation and people
is the desire for full development," Brandeis told the Economic Club
of Boston in 1915, equating "full development" with nationhood. The
predemocratic idea that strong individuals had a right to exercise arbitrary power had been found wanting, he said, and it was time to
recognize that the assumption of strong nations "that they possess the
divine right to subject other peoples to their sway" was equally outmoded. That assumption resulted in wars and ran counter to the
twentieth-century concept ofliberty, which was based on the recognition of individuality. The national movements of the nineteenth century had demonstrated that "whole peoples have individuality no less
marked than that of the single person." Adherence to the ideal of liberty
required that national individuality be recognized and that "equal
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opportunity for all people as for all individuals" be understood as "the
essential of international as well as of national justice upon which a
peace which is to be permanent must rest." History demonstrated that
people who mistakenly considered their community to be superior
frequently turned to violence, attempting to dominate others in the
name of civilization and progress; people whose inherent right to nationhood was disregarded were equally likely to fight for self-determination. Global peace depended upon acceptance of the equality
of peoples. The Jews sought in Palestine a collective right similar to
that of the Greeks, the Rumanians, the Italians. 46
Brandeis's reasons for the creation of a specifically Jewish entity
in Palestine thus encompassed more than anti-Semitism. He insisted
that the Zionist goal be seen in light of the national movements that
had been a major feature of nineteenth-century Western civilization.
His emphasis on the individual as a member of society included the belief
that maximum individual development could occur only within the
community. A community, however, implied group membership,
which was one of the bases for Brandeis's support for self-determination. "This right of development on the part of the group is essential
to the full enjoyment of rights by the individual," he said in 1915,
because "the individual is dependent for his development ( and his happiness) in large part upon the development of the group of which he
forms a part. We can scarcely conceive of an individual German or
Frenchman living and developing without some relation to the contemporary German or French life and culture. "47
The logic of Brandeis's argument is that self-determination is both
a collective and an individual right. Nationalism, properly understood,
means "that each race or people, like each individual, has a right and
duty to develop, and that only through such differentiated development will high civilization be attained."48 It was nationalism that
"created gallant Belgium .. . freed Greece ... gave us united Italy."49
Each individual who shares in a particular nationalism has a presumed
right to live in a nation dominated by that nationality.
Beneficial though nationalism might be, however, it is not identical
to nationhood; there is a "difference between a nation and a nationality."
Likeness between members is the essence of nationality; but the
members of a nation may be very different. A nation may be
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composed of many nationalities, as some of the most successful
nations are. An instance of this is the British nation .. . the
French in Canada . . . the Swiss nation . . . the Belgian nation
.. . the American nation. The unity of a nationality is a fact of
nature; the unification into a nation is largely the work of man.
The false doctrine that nation and nationality must be made coextensive is the cause of some of our greatest tragedies . 50
Brandeis made it clear that he was arguing for "recognition of the
equal rights of each nationality" in every nation; 51 for tolerance, not
for separatism or for subordination of any nationality. Nations, like
individuals, legitimately can exercise rights only "in such manner and
to such extent as the exercise of the right in each is consistent with
the exercise of a like right by every other. "52
Because nationalities had not only a "right" but a "duty" to maintain a homeland, Jews who felt they could best realize themselves in
a Jewish homeland should have the opportunity to move to one. The
human rights of self-determination and freedom of movement, not
formally recognized in theory by many nations until after Brandeis's
death and still recognized only in theory by some, were contained
in his thought . Because he was speaking in the context of Zionism,
Brandeis emphasized that the Jews, like the Greeks, had made major
contributions to civilization, among them establishment of at least
parts of three great religions, "reverence for law, and the highest conceptions of morality."53 But again, there was no implication of superiority or inequality, only "that the struggle for liberty shall not cease
until equality of opportunity is accorded to nationalities as to individuals."54 When he was asked what he thought of the concept of the
"Chosen People," Brandeis replied, "It would seem to me that even
the strictest adherents of the Jewish faith ought to inquire whether
their belief respecting the election of Israel is not perhaps based on
a misinterpretation of revelation . . . let us teach all peoples that they
are all chosen, and that each has a mission for all." 55
The themes of Brandeis's Zionism echoed the themes of his Americanism and his view of Periclean Athens: the just society, the democratic society, the moral society, equality before the law, participation
in public life, regularity of employment, a reasonable income and
working hours, opportunity for self-realization, access to education,
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proper medical care . For him, Zionism was an extension of Americanism. Like all human beings, PalestinianJews were "capable of noble
acts," and, living in the organizational embodiment of"the brotherhood
of man," they would create a democratic civilization. 56 Brandeis gradually had become convinced "that Jews were by reason of their traditions and their character peculiarly fitted for the attainment of
American ideals," that the culmination of Jewish and American ideals
would be found in Jewish Palestine, and that "to be good Americans,
we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews, we must become
Zionists ."57
The Jewish Palestinian community would become the ideal state
that he hoped would exist, in larger and somewhat different form,
in the United States. He recognized that the latter would take longer
to achieve if it could be attained at all, in part because a recalcitrant
system dependent on bigness and relative inequality was already
established, in part because of the size and heterogeneity of the United
States and its population, in part because it was urbanized and industrialized rather than agrarian. For the moment, therefore, he would
see what he could do about creating the "good society" in Palestine.

6
CIVIL AND ECONOMIC LIBERTIES

In frank expression of conflicting opinions lies the greatest promise
of wisdom in governmental action; and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril. 1
One of Brandeis's major contributions to law and to political theory
lay in the realm of civil liberties. He viewed free speech and privacy
as necessary to individual development and to the creation of the
educated citizens crucial to the democratic state. Speech, privacy,
education, and democracy were elements of the ideal political system.
Therefore, democracy had to be defined as majority rule with full
protection for the rights of individuals. Equally, sociological jurisprudence, which in other spheres mandated judicial deference to the
will of the majority, required that the judiciary play a central role
in preventing democratically elected officials from interfering with individual rights. If law was to reflect felt necessities and new policies
were to be enacted in response to social developments, free and open
discussion of problems and possible solutions by an educated electorate was vital.
Brandeis's goal was a harmony of individual and community. He
frequently spoke of the citizen's right to speech as if the right flowed
from the need of the community for an informed electorate rather
than from any individual need, a view that has misled some scholars. 2
The right to speak and hear could not be defended "as a merely individual right," he said. 3 It was, in fact, more a "duty" for the citizen
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than it was a right, "for its exercise is more important to the Nation
than it is to himself. "4 But he was far from a communitarian, because
his overarching goal was fulfillment of the individual . Ideas were
necessary to individual as well as to social development. People had
to be able to explore all available ideas if they were to learn, stretch
their intellectual horizons, and fulfill their individual capabilities. The
individual's world had to be organized into a community because it
was only within that setting that individual fulfillment could be attained . This obligated the individual to participate actively in the
democratic state so that it would not lose the democratic nature that
made it responsive to individual needs . But means and ends are
not identical, however compatible they may be. The free individual
was the goal; society, the means by which individual freedom was
to be achieved. Society was the framework; the individual, the subject. Ideally, society would be constituted of free individuals living
in a community of self-governing equals. Brandeis spoke of the right
of speech as belonging to the individual, adding that "exercise of this
right by the citizen is ordinarily also his duty ." The individual was
primary.
It is sometimes assumed, because Brandeis and Oliver Wendell
Holmes were friends who frequently voted alike in Court cases, that
they shared an approach to free speech. The assumption is mistaken.
Holmes believed that people's opinions should be tested in the "marketplace of ideas," and he enjoyed watching competing ideologies rising
or falling in popularity as the public will decreed. In spite of his delight
in reading philosophy and playing with ideas, Holmes's social Darwinism prevented him from considering that the specific ideas the majority adopted would make any difference; the "fittest" human beings
would survive and shape society in their image . Thus Holmes was
able, while serving on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and
during his early years on the Supreme Court, to sustain governmental interferences with free speech. 5
This view was anathema to Brandeis. To him, ideas made a great
difference. Without the free exchange of ideas, experimentation could
not take place, solutions could not evolve, and institutions could not
adapt themselves to changing social needs . Only through the airing
of divergent ideas could the people know which ones to choose, and
only then could they give their government the benefit of their advice.
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Choice was difficult. "Differences of opinion are inevitable among
thoughtful men," Brandeis reflected, "if the question under consideration is one worthy of discussion." The expression of various opinions
about controversial subjects was to be encouraged, not prevented:
"Differences in opinions are not only natural but desirable where the
question is difficult; for only through such differences do we secure
the light and fuller understanding which are necessary to a wise decision." "Good" speech, not government repression, was the antidote
for "bad" speech, and so certain was he that the people would be able
to distinguish between them that he advocated the setting aside of
areas "in every park" for speech making. 6
Brandeis did not fear dissent; he welcomed it. Absence of dissent
in a democratic society is artificial, he thought, and "may be due to
indifference"; only a thorough thrashing out of differences could lead
to communal unity. "Like the course of the heavenly bodies," he said
in Gilbert v. Minnesota, "harmony in national life is a resultant of the
struggle between contending forces. In frank expression of conflicting opinions lies the greatest promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril." 7 Like
Holmes, Brandeis put his faith in the marketplace of ideas; unlike
Holmes, he believed that the choices made in it mattered and ultimately would be the correct ones. Robert Cover has noted that
Brandeis doubted that government could function wisely, much less
democratically, in the absence of input from citizens. 8 As David
Riesman said, although Brandeis was "skeptical of power and of human
abilities," he also had "an extraordinary faith in the possibilities of
human development. "9 Perhaps the difference lay in the backgrounds
of the two men, with Holmes's experiences largely confined to the
world of the Boston Brahmins except for the traumatic service in the
Civil War that helped turn him into a social Darwinist. 10 Brandeis,
on the other hand, had worked with laborers whose education had
been minimal but whose ideas seemed far more rational to him than
did those of many Brahmins. His skepticism was reserved for the "experts" - precisely those people Holmes might have seen as the "fittest" and for the concentration of power that was based on the assumption
that any group of human beings knew what was best for all .
The differences in their approach to ideas and the value of free
speech were reflected in their interpretation of the First Amendment's
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enjoinder, "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press." In 191 7 Congress passed an Espionage
Act that made it illegal, in part, "when the United States is at war
. . . willfully [to] cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United
States, or ... willfully [to] obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States." Two Philadelphia Socialists who had participated in the writing and distribution of an antidraft pamphlet were
convicted for violation of the act. When they appealed to the Supreme
Court, Holmes, writing for the Court, upheld the conviction and in
the course of doing so enunciated the famous "clear and present danger"
doctrine. 11
The question Holmes addressed was whether the limitation on
abridgment of speech was meant to be an absolute . He decided it was
not . "We venture to believe," he would write in an opinion handed
down later that year, "that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any
other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to make
criminal the counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech ." 12
This meant that speech could become an act beyond the protection
of the First Amendment. The example he used in Schenck was that
of"a man ... falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."
He offered no criterion for delineating between speech and speechbecome-action, observing only that "the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done ." If the speech was made
during war, the test was different than it would be during peacetime:
"When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not
be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them
as protected by any constitutional right ." If, in the circumstances of
war, "the words used . . . are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent," then Congress has the power
to punish their use . 13
"Clear and present danger" was not defined. It is difficult to see
how the actions of the little group , which apparently mailed out a
few of its leaflets and put the rest on a table in its headquarters for
the benefit of anyone who wandered in, constituted a "clear and present
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danger" of anything more than the most minimal obstruction of recruitment or service in the armed forces. Holmes's belief that the Constitution gave no special protection to speech was spelled out in a letter
he sent to Judge Learned Hand in 1918. "Free speech," wrote Holmes,
"stands no differently than freedom from vaccination"; that is, given
adequate justification, either could be abridged by the state. 14
Prof. Gerald Gunther has argued convincingly that the correspondence with Learned Hand, of which the preceding quotation is only
a small part, altered Holmes's attitude toward the First Amendment.
Gunther finds the first indication of this change in the opinion Holmes
wrote for himself and Brandeis in Abrams v. United States, handed down
in 1919. 15 Dissenting from the Court's decision upholding the conviction of pamphleteers under the 1918 Sedition Act, Holmes asserted
that the Constitution protects free trade in ideas. 16
Brandeis, who silently went along with Holmes's opinion in Schenck,
also rethought it later on and regretted having voted to uphold the
conviction. He told Frankfurter that "I have never been quite happy
about my concurrence . . . . I had not then thought the issues· of
freedom of speech out-I thought at the subject, not through it." He
did more thinking through of the subject of speech during wartime,
which resulted in three dissenting opinions during the following year. 17
The first contained what can only be read as a deliberate misconstruction of the clear and present danger doctrine. Schaefer v. United
States was an appeal by five men convicted under the Espionage Act
for printing misleading articles about the war in two German-language
newspapers. The government alleged that the articles, contemptuous
of the American war effort and suggesting that the war was the doing
of the president, violated the act by obstructing recruitment into the
armed forces of the United States as well as "willfully mak[ing] or
convey[ing] false reports or false statements with intent ... to promote the success of its enemies." Brandeis, reprinting the articles in
their entirety, found it impossible to believe that a jury "acting in
calmness" could find that they created a clear and present danger of
obstruction or of aiding the enemy. So far he had only applied Holmes's
new doctrine; but then he went further, declaring, "The constitutional
right of free speech has been declared to be the same in peace and
in war." This statement was manifestly a deliberate misreading of
Schenck, which quite specifically stated that wartime created a different
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set of"circumstances," justifying the suppression of speech that would
be allowed in peacetime . Brandeis, however, warned that it was
precisely in time of war that "an intolerant majority" was most likely
to be "swayed by passion or by fear ," implying that freedom of speech
was at least as necessary then as in peacetime. 18
Brandeis reiterated his dissenting position in Pierce v . United States.
The case involved another Espionage Act conviction, this one for the
distribution of Socialist leaflets that had allegedly interfered with the
operation of the war effort and had caused insubordination. Brandeis
found it difficult to see how insubordination had been caused, as the
leaflets had been distributed only to civilians, or how the statements
describing the "hopelessness of protest" against the "irresistible power
of the military arm of the Government" and counseling acquiescence
in its will could have interfered with the war effort. Again, he argued,
the test of a grave, imminent, clear and present danger had not been
met; moreover, he asserted the need for free speech whether in peace
or 1n war:
The fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions
through new legislation and new institutions will not be preserved,
if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law . 19
It was "not until I came to write the Pierce and Schaefer cases,"
Brandeis told Frankfurter, that he understood the issues of freedom
of speech. He mentioned Herbert Hoover's belief that "criticism should
end at water's shore .. .. I felt just opposite-wrote those long dissents
in Schaefer and Pierce cases to put on permanent record what we
were not allowed to say." Rather than putting on record what one
was not allowed to say, however, the dissents addressed themselves
to what one should have been permitted to say, and that seemed to be
virtually anything that would be permitted in peacetime, when Brandeis could see no reason for limitations on criticism of foreign or any
other governmental policies. As he did in Schenck, Brandeis had quietly
concurred in Holmes's 1919 opinion for the Court upholding the Espionage Act conviction oflabor leader Eugene Victor Debs for speaking in such a manner as to prevent recruiting. Now he considered
that case also to have been wrongly decided and thought that it should
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have been "placed . . . on the war power - instead of taking Holmes'
line about 'clear and present danger.' Put it frankly on war power
. . . and then the scope of espionage legislation would be confined
to war." Or, stated differently, the "clear and present danger" doctrine allowed too great a limitation on the right of the citizenry to
free speech. 20
Holmes concurred in the dissents in Schaefer and Pierce. He disagreed,
however, with Brandeis's dissent in the third 1920 speech case. 21 A
Minnesota law prohibited any interference with the military enlistment effort. An official of the Nonpartisan League had been convicted
under it for telling a public meeting that the average person had
nothing to say about whether the United States should have become
involved in World War I or whether a draft should have been imposed.
Holmes quietly concurred with Justice McKenna's opinion for the
Court upholding the conviction . Brandeis's dissent asserted that the
Minnesota act violated Congress' exclusive control over the war power
and that it was "an act to prevent teaching that the abolition of war
is possible ." The act in effect outlawed the teaching of pacifism . In
doing so, it violated the right of privacy as well as that of speech because
it made it a crime "to teach in any place a single person that a citizen
should not aid in carrying on a war . . . . Thus the statute invades
the privacy and freedom of the home. Father and mother may not
follow the promptings of religious belief' by teaching their children
that their religion condemned participation in any war. 22
After the Court issued its decision in Gilbert v. Minnesota, Holmes
wrote to Frederick Pollock, "Brandeis . . . dissented in a state case on
free speech in which he had one ground worthy of serious consideration
and others that I thought all wrong-while I heartily disagreed with the
reasoning of the majority. So I, with some doubts, concurred in the
result of the decision." ChiefJustice Edward Douglass White had written a separate dissent making the point about the war power having
been exercised by Congress by its passage of the Espionage Act. Had
that been the "one ground worthy of serious consideration," Holmes
could have joined White's dissent. His failure to do so presumably
indicates that his agreement with Brandeis came on another point,
probably the corollary one that Brandeis made about what he, and
to a lesser extent Holmes, considered the Court's misguided use of the
due process clause to strike down state economic legislation. 23
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Brandeis's own belief in judicial restraint should have prevented
him from getting into a discussion of the due process clause. As he
agreed with White that the Espionage Act had already filled the field,
leaving no room for state action, he should not have ignored the Court's
rule of avoiding constitutional issues and deciding on lesser grounds
wherever possible. But he was too angry for rules, lashing out against
the Court's relying on the due process clause to negate state laws prohibiting employers from "discriminat[ ing] against a workman because
he is a member of a trade union" or preventing a businessman from
conducting a private employment agency but declining to see that
the same logic should apply in the Gilbert case to protect "liberty to
teach, either in the privacy of the home or publicly, the doctrine of
pacifism." "I cannot believe," Brandeis chastised the Court, "that the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty
to acquire and to enjoy property." 24 Brandeis was as infuriated by
the Court's limitations on state experiments in the economic sphere
as he was by its interference with what he viewed as protected speech.
As Walton Hamilton noted, this attitude was the result of the different
values he placed on speech and on property rights. "The right to a
free and full expression of personal opinion," wrote Hamilton in interpreting Brandeis, "has such value that only a positive case will justify
its abridgement; the right of free contract is a business usage which
has its important but limited function." 25
If he could have, Brandeis would have wiped out the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause entirely, in exasperation over its use
by the Court to negate the people's will, especially regarding labor
legislation. That became clear in a conversation he had with Felix
Frankfurter after the Court handed down its decision in another case
in which Brandeis and Holmes were on opposite sides.
In 1923 the Court overturned the conviction of a Nebraska schoolteacher who had violated a state law, passed during the war, that made
it a crime to teach German in the public schools. Brandeis did not
write in this case but concurred injustice McReynolds's opinion for
the Court. Holmes, however, dissented, saying that this "experiment,"
ostensibly designed to make English the "common tongue" of all residents, was not unreasonable and therefore was within the state's
powers. 26 Brandeis commented to Frankfurter that the right to an
education was so fundamental that any impairment of it had to be
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judged by the clear and present danger test, thereby indicating that
he put education on the same high plane as speech. In the course of
what Frankfurter described as "long talk on topic of due process as
to freedom of speech and foreign language cases," Brandeis expressed
his view of the due process clause:
1) d.p. (due process] should be restricted to procedural regularity or
2) in favor of repeal but
3) while it is, must be applied to substantive laws and so as
to things that are fundamental.
Right to Speech
Right to Education
Right to choice of profession
Right to locomotion 27
In other words, if use of the due process clause could not be confined
to purely procedural matters ( the process by which a law was passed
or enforced rather than its substance), it should be eliminated . Failing that, Brandeis would insist that speech be given at least equal
weight with property and that the due process clause be used to strike
down state limitations on speech.
It is quite possible that however great his belief in the importance
of speech, the idea of using the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
it from state abridgment would not have occurred to Brandeis had
he not been so angry at what he saw as the Court's misuse of the due
process clause . It is not an idea of which Holmes appears to have approved, for Frankfurter's notes of the conversation with Brandeis continue, "Holmes says doesn't want to extend XIV"; i.e ., Holmes would
not have used due process as a basis for striking down state action
limiting civil liberties. 28 The Gilbert dissent nonetheless laid the foundation for a major alteration of American law and for a reassessment
of political values . Five years later, while upholding the conviction
of a radical who had published a pamphlet favoring general strikes
that was read as violating New York's prohibition on advocating
forceful overthrow of the government, the Court declared,
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For the present purposes we may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press - which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgement by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the states. 29
This was the first time the Court held one of the liberties of the Bill
of Rights to be "incorporated" into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case and subsequent ones incorporating
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights into the due process clause
are responsible for the assumption, now part of American polity, that
the Bill of Rights is a barrier to state as well as to federal violation
of individual liberties. 30 The Court, adopting Brandeis's earlier reasoning in Gilbert, thereby altered theory, practice, and popular perception . Brandeis and Holmes dissented from the Court's upholding of
Gitlow's conviction, although they of course both agreed with the newly
announced principle that the states as well as the federal government
were limited in their power to abridge speech. 31 It was Brandeis's dissent in Gilbert, however, that had made yet another major contribution to American jurisprudence and political thought.
In Schaefer, Brandeis had altered the clear and present danger doctrine to mean the same thing during war and peace. He attempted
to change it further in his concurrence in Whitney v. California, 32 which
is both a major contribution to free speech jurisprudence and a guide
to many of his basic ideas about the state.
Anita Whitney was a fifty-two-year-old social worker and clubwoman, daughter of a California state senator and niece of Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Field 33 - scarcely the kind of person likely to
be considered a threat to the security of the state. Nonetheless, in
1920 she was convicted by California of organizing, assisting in
organizing, and being a member of the Communist Labor party,
which advocated the use of unlawful force. The statute under which
she was tried was one of many passed by states in an attempt to
minimize the power of Socialist or Communist parties. In this instance, Whitney was convicted primarily because of her presence at
a party convention. During it, she had advocated a purely nonviolent
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role for the party. The convention adopted a more violence-oriented
platform, however, and she was charged and found guilty despite having expressed her continuing disagreement with the platform.
Her appeal reached the Supreme Court in 1927. 34 Justice Sanford,
writing the decision of the Court upholding the conviction, asserted
that the kind of "united and joint action" implicit in the existence of
the party was much more dangerous than individual speech and could
legitimately be punished for the "danger to the public peace and security" it presented to the state. 35 Brandeis believed that the statute was
an unconstitutional limitation on speech that presented no clear and
present danger to the state. Whitney's lawyers had not made that argument, however, 36 and because the Court followed a rule precluding
it from deciding cases on grounds not raised by the parties' own attorneys, Brandeis did not dissent but wrote a separate opinion concurring
with the Court's decision upholding her conviction. 37 The "concurrence" might well have been a dissent, however, as it not only showed
that Whitney did not belong behind bars 38 but also demolished the
line of reasoning followed by the Court so completely that California's governor cited it in pardoning her. 39 Some of the paragraphs
are lengthy but must be read as a piece if they are to be understood.
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage
to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinary adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government . They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear
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breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and
that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing
in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law- the arguments of force in its
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech
and assembly should be guaranteed. 40
There are at least seven ideas implicit in Brandeis's concurrence.
First, human beings are simultaneously "good" in their ability to act
intelligently and "bad" in their susceptibility to the pitfalls of power
and illogical thinking. Second, government is properly created by
human beings to achieve goals unattainable without a state, among
them the liberty necessary to develop individual talents . Third, and
following logically from the second idea, government must be democratic, i.e., responsive to the expressed will of the people . The fourth
idea, again following logically from earlier premises, is that government must not act arbitrarily or in an illegitimately repressive manner,
and mechanisms must be incorporated into its structure to prevent
such behavior because it constitutes a threat to liberty. Fifth, the state
inevitably is an imperfect instrument, not only because arbitrary forces
will challenge deliberative forces and because institutions are run by
fallible human beings but because it is in the nature of humanity to
generate and heed "evil counsels," at least temporarily. No government is to be trusted, no matter who its administrators are, and every
democratic government must be subjected to constant examination
by the people . For that reason, one of the functions of government
is maintenance of the free flow of ideas . Sixth, "examination by the
people" includes exchange of ideas about current and possible governmental policies and actions. Citizens have an obligation to participate
in the discussion, which is possible only if they also have free speech.
As Charles Miller has written, Brandeis thought that "civic virtue for
the individual and political value for the society consisted in the exercise of freedom. Participation in the formation of public policy
through freedom of expression was the high duty as well as the sacred
right of citizens in a democracy." 41 Seventh, government stability is
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desirable because instability may be harmful to liberty, but stability
is of lesser value than the liberty for whose sake it is sought. Prof.
Vincent Blasi argues persuasively that another and key element of
the concurrence is the belief that democracy can work only if it retains the ideal of civic courage. 42
There are overtones here of Madison and his recognition that if
human beings were angels, government would not be necessary.
Brandeis was explicating and acknowledging his agreement with the
ideas he rightly believed to be those of at least many of the Founding
Fathers. But Brandeis was a creature of the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, and his thought
would be of little use if it simply echoed that of American thinkers
two hundred years earlier. Brandeis insisted that the state ought not
merely to be negative , that it could be the agent of liberty as well
as its enemy, and the question was how to enhance the first possibility
without encouraging the second . By the time he began to address the
problem, the American national state had become far more active
than it had been during the government's Founding period . The
thoughtful citizen had now to be concerned with how to keep the
government within acceptable boundaries and, in addition, with ways
to employ as much governmental power as was necessary to foster
individual liberty . A balance had to be struck between two social imperatives: one, a government strong enough to protect citizens from
overzealous majorities and the institutional embodiments of economic
greed; the other, the kind of protection needed by citizens from that
very government. Expanding upon the section already quoted, Brandeis argued that "fear of serious injury" was insufficient justification
for punishing speech and suggested a different standard:
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears . To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech
is practiced . There must be reasonable ground to believe that
the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one .
Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to
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increase the probability that there will be a violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of
approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state
of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it . Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for
denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement
and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and
incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either
that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that
such advocacy was then contemplated. 43
There are a number of important ideas in this paragraph. First,
speech cannot be suppressed unless it is "reasonable" to believe that
"serious" and "imminent" evil is about to occur. If this implies that
all reasonable people must agree that specific speech will cause serious
and imminent evil, an agreement that a governmental limitation on
speech was "reasonable" would be extremely hard to reach. It is not
enough for the danger to be "clear"; it must be "serious." Similarly,
it has to be more than "present"; it has to be "imminent." Elaborating
on the meaning of "imminent" and once again citing the beliefs of
the Founding Fathers, Brandeis continued,
Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards . They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost ofliberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with
confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied
through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can _!:)e deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence . 44
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The two excerpts indicate that Brandeis was not naive about the
power of ideas. On the contrary, he counted on good ideas being
adopted, for it was the only way progress would be made toward the
achievement of democracy. He well understood they could be dangerous to existing laws and institutions; that, he might have said, was
part of their function. Political change, however, was not to be feared;
liberty was more important than protection of the existing order.
Speech therefore could not be abridged or punished as long as there
was time for other voices to respond. It could not legitimately be
stopped, he went on, if the only danger was "some violence or ...
destruction of property" - an admonition that perhaps should have
been better remembered during the sit-ins of the 1960s and the student protests of the 1970s and that might well be kept in mind today
when dealing with racist or sexist speech. The sole triggering element
that would permit suppression of speech was "the probability of serious
injury to the State," and that could occur, as Brandeis had said in
Gilbert, only if there was an "emergency [that] does not permit reliance
upon the slower conquest of error by truth." Speech that resulted in
violence or destruction of property might be punished but it could
not be suppressed. People could be silenced only if there was imminent "probability of serious injury to the State" because "among free
men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgement of
the rights of free speech and assembly." Brandeis trusted that truth
ordinarily would conquer error; otherwise, democracy made no sense.
Perhaps more important, he believed that the difficult job of engaging in debate and refuting error, unlike the comparatively easy method
of suppressing it, would contribute to building democratic habits and
character. The answer to bad speech was good speech, and lots of it. 45
The importance of this idea is not in the niceties oflegal doctrine,
particularly as the phrase "clear and present danger" has been notable
primarily for the paradox of having been incorporated into the American
political vocabulary at the same time that it has been virtually ignored
as the real basis for judicial decisionmaking. 46 The Brandeis-Holmes
debate over clear and present danger, conducted in the opinions written by the two men, is significant for the information it provides about
a major element of Brandeis's political thought. Much of his concurrence originally was written for a dissent in Ruthenberg v. Michigan, an
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appeal not by a seemingly harmless person like Anita Whitney but
by a top Communist party leader who believed in illegal action
in the name of the cause. Brandeis indicated his awareness that
the party was a conspiracy aimed at the training of cadres for infiltration of the government. That did not matter; there was no evidence that Ruthenberg's actions caused immediate danger, and
there was time to rebut his beliefs through discussion. The case was
mooted when Ruthenberg died before the Court could hand down
its decision. 47
Brandeis probably was as fervent a democrat as has ever sat upon
the Supreme Court, if democracy is defined as a willingness to rely
upon the wisdom of the electorate while at the same time recognizing that the electorate will not always be correct. Because the majority
may be wrong Brandeis insisted on the individual's right to free speech
even in defiance of the majority will. One is again reminded of Winston
Churchill's comment that democracy is the worst form of government ever invented, except for all the others. Holmes might have
responded that the form of government does not much matter as the
human future inevitably will be determined by the forces of Darwinian struggle. Brandeis probably would have chided Churchill
for belittling democracy. As Alvin Johnson said, Brandeis was an
"implacable democrat." Donald Richberg went further, writing that
to Brandeis, "democracy is not a political program. It is a religion ."48
One of the tenets of the religion was the centrality of education.
Consciously or not, Brandeis followed both Jefferson and John Dewey
in seeing a vital connection between democracy and education. 49 Like
Jefferson, Brandeis emphasized free speech and press because he
believed both in democracy and in the possibility of creating the
knowledgeable electorate crucial to it. It is not surprising, therefore,
that he elevated the "Right to Education" to the same high plane upon
which he placed the "Right to Speech."
Democracy, speech, and education went hand in hand. One scholar
has suggested that Brandeis's insistence on small-scale businesses would
have resulted in fewer consumer goods and that Americans, in buying the products of business, have in effect answered him by demonstrating their preference for the fruits of bigness over the economic
liberty that inevitably would have been accompanied by economic
rigors. 50 Brandeis would have replied that the solution in both cases
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was more education. "Education is necessary to save democracy from
economic wrongs," he had told the Civic Federation of New England
in 1906. "The citizen should be able to comprehend among other things
the many great and difficult problems of industry, commerce and
finance, which with us necessarily become political questions. He must
learn about men as well as things." Only in this way could the society
be "saved from the pitfalls of financial schemers on the one hand or
of ambitious demagogues on the other." Education was unlikely to
result in immediate improvement, he wrote two decades later, because
"democratic methods are necessarily slow" and the instrument of
democracy was "man with his weaknesses and defects." But democracy and education were inextricably linked because the first could
not succeed without the second. 51
Brandeis joined or helped to found numerous organizations while
he was "the people's attorney"-the Public Franchise League, the Election Laws League, the Good Government Association and its Aldermanic Association, the Industrial League, the Advisory Committee
of the National Municipal League's Municipal Taxation Committee,
the Civic Federation of New England, the National Committee of
Economic Clubs, the People's Lobby, the Municipal Transportation
League, the Savings Bank Insurance League. They revolved around
public problems of concern to him, and he used them as educational
mechanisms. When he was fighting the proposed Boston subway
monopoly, for example, he wrote to Edward Filene, then head of the
Public Franchise League's Publicity Bureau, "Have editorials and
similar notices in various papers, particularly the Springfield Republican, the Worcester Spy, and the Pittsfield papers .... Have the labor
organizations repeat their protest. . . . Have personal letters written
to members from the Metropolitan District, particularly from Boston,
by their constituents . . . . We rely upon you for hard work. "52 He
sent similar letters to supporters all over the state. 53 Such action was
typical of his battles on behalf of the public, as was his role as an
educator. During the fight for savings-bank life insurance in Massachusetts he wrote to his brother about speaking before the Central Labor
Union, the Unitarian Club, the Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers,
the Industrial League, and a Unitarian church. A few weeks later
he reported that he had spoken at two meetings the night before and
had six more lectures coming up. 54
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One of his key allies in educating the public was the press. After
Norman Hapgood, editor of Collier's Magazine, wrote favorably about
one of Brandeis's insurance speeches, Brandeis began to send Hapgood
letters and copies of articles. Eventually he suggested, "In considering the best method of undertaking to secure to our working people
life insurance under proper conditions, it seemed to me that you might
deem it wise to have Collier's lead in the movement." 55 Collier's hired
Brandeis as counsel in the Pinchot-Ballinger affair, during which
Brandeis made extensive use of other representatives of the press. Each
evening, he would invite the newspapers' Washington correspondents
up to his hotel room, explaining which parts of the day's proceedings
he considered it important for them to report. They responded with
articles that both enhanced Brandeis's national reputation and
"educated" their readers, leading Brandeis to call the members of the
press "our real Chorus." 56 When the Senate committee rejected his
arguments, Brandeis calmly sent hundreds of copies of his brief to
newspapers and magazines with letters urging that they make use of
them . 57 He turned Collier's, Harper's Weekry, and La Follette's Weekry into regular outlets for his views on a wide variety of subjects. 58 In addition to giving numerous campaign speeches during Woodrow Wilson's
1912 campaign, Brandeis wrote articles, letters to the editor, and even
unsigned editorials for Collier's. 59 He could no longer give lectures or
write articles once he joined the Supreme Court, so he had others
do so for him, bombarding Felix Frankfurter in particular with suggested topics for editorials and articles in weekly magazines and law
reviews. 60
Both his belief in the press as a force for education and his certainty
that wrong ideas would not triumph became apparent when he intervened during the 1931 oral argument in Near v. Minnesota. The Saturday
Press, published by Jay Near, had been enjoined from publication
under a Minnesota statute aimed against periodicals that were
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory." Minnesota acted after the
newspaper accused puQlic officials by name of being participants in
a gambling ring. The publication was also noted for its virulent antiSemitism, and many Court watchers expected Brandeis, by then
known not only as the Court's first Jewish member but as the leader
of American Zionism as well, to take the side of the state. But Brandeis
interrupted Minnesota's deputy attorney general's presentation to the
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Court. It was common knowledge, Brandeis declared, that "just such
criminal combinations" involving public officials did exist, "to the
shame of some of our cities." Brandeis could not tell whether this was
true in Minnesota, but he did know that Near and his partner had
exposed what they believed to be such a combination. "Now, is that
not a privileged communication, if there ever was one?" he asked.
"How else can a community secure protection from that sort of thing,
if people are not allowed to engage in free discussion in such matters? . .. You are dealing here not with a sort of scandal too often
appearing in the press, and which ought not to appear to the interest
of any one, but with a matter of prime interest to every American
citizen."61
The attorney general responded that citizens ought to be concerned
if the allegations were correct, but that in this instance they had been
defamatory. "Of course there was defamation," Brandeis replied. "You
cannot disclose evil without naming the doers of evil. It is difficult
to see how one can have a free press and the protection it affords in
the democratic community without the privilege this act seeks to limit.
As for such defamatory matter being issued regularly or customarily,
how can such a campaign be conducted except by persistence and
continued iteration?" Brandeis, the veteran of battles with a corrupt
Massachusetts legislature, praised the publishers for their "campaign
to rid the city of certain evils." "So they say," the lawyer commented.
"Yes, of course," Brandeis agreed, "so they say . They went forward
with a definite program and certainly they acted with great courage.
They invited suit for criminal libel if what they said was not true.
Now, if that campaign was not privileged, if that is not one of the
things for which the press chiefly exists, then for what does it exist?"62
Brandeis did not write an opinion in Near , simply adding his name
to ChiefJustice Charles Evans Hughes's opinion for the Court, which
struck down the statute. His comment during oral argument, however,
indicates either that he believed all speech had to be allowed but that
some speech could be punished or that in Near he merely appeared
to accept the idea oflibel laws for the sake of argument. A later Court's
decision in Times v. Sullivan, establishing the doctrine that the standard of proof in a successful libel action was higher for public officials
than for private individuals and contemplating only civil libel as a
remedy, 63 might well be read as a logical extension of Brandeis's
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approach to speech . It is possible that his thinking would have
developed in this direction; admittedly, however, that is speculative.
Perhaps his apparent acceptance oflibel laws, which strikes a somewhat dissonant note for someone as convinced as he that the people
ultimately would be able to differentiate truth from falsehood, stemmed
from his attitude toward privacy. Brandeis and his partner Samuel
Warren had written the 1890 article that Harvard Law School's dean
Roscoe Pound later credited with "nothing less than add[ing] a chapter
to our law," that chapter being the one about privacy. 64
The Brandeis-Warren article on "The Right to Privacy" was written
in outrage at the lurid newspaper coverage given to Samuel Warren's
personal life . It combined the issue of privacy with a conception of
the law as a changing entity, arguing that new inventions with the
potential for violations of privacy had to be brought under law: "Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops ."' The article
became "perhaps the most influential law journal piece ever published."
It made Judge Thomas M. Cooley's phrase "the right to be let alone"
part of American political discourse. 65
In 1890 "the right to be let alone" could be seen as a right that people
might want to assert against the press. By 1928 government had grown
bigger, and still newer inventions enabled it to be at least as great
a threat to privacy as the press. The reactions of Holmes and Brandeis
to the threat again reflected the differences between the two, illuminating the latter's thinking.
The public stage for their disagreement was set when the Court
heard the case of Casey v. United States , in which a Seattle attorney
was convicted of violating the federal Harrison Antinarcotic Act. The
warden of a county jail suspected Attorney Casey of supplying his
clients with drugs. The warden took his suspicions to federal narcotics
agents, who induced two prisoners to offer Casey money for morphine and arranged to record their conversations, in which a deal was
struck. A relative of the prisoners testified that she then picked up
the drugs from Casey's office. 66
Holmes wrote for the Court, sustaining the conviction, there being
no question that Casey had violated the act. Brandeis, however,
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dissented on the grounds that the government had instigated the crime
and that, absent government action, there would have been no
evidence for the government to record. It was one thing for the government to "set decoys to entrap criminals," Brandeis argued, but here
"the act for which the Government seeks to punish the defendant is
the fruit of their criminal conspiracy to induce its commission. . . .
[The Government] may not provoke or create a crime and then punish
the criminal, its creature ." Casey had not pleaded entrapment, although his lawyer did raise the question of the wiretap's constitutionality . It might have seemed logical for Brandeis, who , in Whitney, had
meticulously followed the Court's rule that issues not raised by the
parties would not be decisive , to concur here. But he dissented, he
explained, "not because some right of Casey's has been denied, but
in order to protect the Government. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To protect the purity of its courts." Presumably
the difference between Casey and Whitney was that the California
legislature that had passed the act under which Whitney was convicted
could be assumed to have acted in good faith, however mistaken its
understanding of what the Constitution allowed, but that the officers
in Casey had not. There was no evidence that the officers knew themselves to be acting illegally and so the distinction appears somewhat
artificial. Be that as it may, Brandeis found it sufficient to enable him
to dissent in Casey. 6 7
The Court immediately went on to consider the case of Olmstead
v. United States. The government suspected that a group of men were
violating the National Prohibition Act . For almost five months, it
tapped their home and office telephones, making 775 pages of notes.
Here, the men did raise a constitutional issue at trial, asserting that
wiretapped evidence violated the search and seizure clause of the
Fourth Amendment. They were nonetheless convicted.
Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote for the Court, sustaining the conviction. The question that had been discussed in the justices'
conference was whether the Volstead Act was constitutional, and they
could find no reason to believe it was not. Taft and the four justices
who agreed with him considered the Fourth Amendment argument
specious . There had been no physical trespass, nothing had been
physically seized, and no one had forced the men to talk over the
telephone. 68
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Brandeis found both the acts of the government and the decision
of the Court incredible in their bland ignoring of privacy. He thought
wiretapping far too intrusive: "Whenever a telephone line is tapped ,
the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and
all conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper,
confidential, and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping
of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of
every other person whom he may call, or who may call him. . . . Can
it be," he demanded, "that the Constitution affords no protection
against such invasions of individual security?" He recalled the concern of the Constitution's writers about writs of assistance and general
warrants. By comparison with wiretapping, such devices were "but
puny instruments of tyranny and oppression." Brandeis noted that
James Otis had objected to such writs and warrants because "they
put 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every officer,'" and Lord
Camden had called "a far slighter intrusion [than wiretapping) 'subversive of all the comforts of society.' "69
Worse still, greater invasions were undoubtedly on the way. "Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet," he warned.
"The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some
day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it
will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of
the home." Brandeis saw television as such a potential "means of espionage." One of his working folders for Olmstead contains a 1928 clipping reporting on the development of that new medium, and an early
draft of his opinion included the sentence, "By means of television,
radium and photography, there may some day be developed ways
by which the Government could, without removing paper from secret
drawers, reproduce them in court and lay before the jury the most
intimate occurrences of the home." 70
He considered it irrelevant that the writers of the Fourth Amendment had not specifically mentioned wiretapping. Of course there was
no such thing when they wrote, but if a proper approach was taken
to constitutional interpretation, it was clear that the spirit rather than
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the specifics of the Fourth Amendment banned wiretapping. Chief
Justice John Marshall had admonished, "We must never forget that
it is a Constitution we are expounding," meaning that the country's
basic law, designed to last for many years, necessarily was contemplated as sufficiently flexible to encompass new circumstances.
Marshall used the phrase in explaining why the powers granted to
the federal government by the Constitution had to be understood in
the light of altered conditions; Brandeis used it to argue that this idea
applied equally to clauses containing limitations on governmental
power. 71 "Rights of . . . the liberty of the individual must be remolded
from time to time," he wrote in another opinion, "to meet the changing needs of society." 72
Most important to Brandeis in the Olmstead case was the spirit of
the Fourth Amendment, which was intended to ensure privacy: "The
makers of our Constitution undertook . . . to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Here Brandeis demonstrated the connection he made between
speech and privacy, for the protection that was given to "beliefs,
thoughts, emotions, and sensations" extended to the expression of
them. Both the thoughts and their utterance were necessary not only
to the free flow of ideas but also to the growth of the individual, which
could not occur if government had a right to invade privacy. 73 The
"right to be let alone" had to be given the greatest protection: "To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." The argument that government had violated the right in the name of the greater
good included in law enforcement was relevant but for a reason quite
different from that accepted by the majority of the Court: "Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding." 74
The lack of"understanding" was such that government officials not
only failed to recognize how wrong their violations of the right to
privacy were but, even worse, they also did not see that their own
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actions encouraged the very disdain for law they intended to punish.
Government had to recognize that it inevitably played an educational
role, particularly about respect for law. Objecting some years earlier
when papers stolen from a defendant and given by the thief to the
government were admitted in evidence, Brandeis had written, "At
the foundation of our civil liberty lies the principle which denies to
government officials an exceptional position before the law and which
subjects them to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. And in the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a large factor. Respect for law will not
be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means which shock the
common man's sense of decency and fair play." 75 Now, in Olmstead,
he added, "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime
is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law: it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy." Use of illegal means to attain desired ends was
not only immoral but counterproductive: "To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare
that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal -would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face." 76
Brandeis was distressed once again at the Court's inconsistent use
of the Fourteenth Amendment. His brethren were quick to employ
it to strike down governmental interference with what they viewed
as the right to control property, but they were much more lenient
about violations of civil liberties: "I suppose," he lamented to Frankfurter, "some review of the wire tapping decision will discern that in
favor of property the Constitution is liberally construed- in favor of
liberty, strictly." He was equally concerned at the executive branch's
improper behavior. Discussing the case with a niece, he commented,
"Lying and sneaking are always bad, no matter what the ends," and
"I don't care about punishing crime, but I am implacable in maintaining standards." 77
It was in the name of "maintaining standards" - standards that the
government transmitted to the people through its own acts - that
Brandeis condemned government "espionage." He knew that most
people would fail to see that the "greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
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insidious encroachment" by well-meaning zealots. He also understood
that, under circumstances such as war, Americans would applaud such
acts. Two years earlier he had written to Frankfurter,
Wouldn't it be possible to interest . . . [Harvard Law School
teachers and students to write articles for the Law Review] bearing on the redress for the invasion of civil and political rights
through arbitrary, etc. government action, by means of civil suits?
I think the failure to attempt such redress as against government
officials for the multitude of invasions during the war and postwar period is also as disgraceful as the illegal acts of the government and the pusillanimous action of our people in enacting the
statutes which the states and the nation put on the books .
Americans should be reminded of the duty to litigate ... . There
are times of ease & prosperity when the pressing danger is somnolence rather than litigiousness. . . . I have grave doubt whether
we shall ever be able to effect more than superficial betterment
unless we succeed in infusing a sense (A) of the dignity of the
law among a free, self-governing people and (B) of the solemnity
of the function of administering justice. Among the essentials
is that the government must , in its methods , & means, & instruments, be ever the gentleman.
His judgment about government espionage was, "It is un-American.
It is nasty. It is nauseating;" 78
Though Brandeis's condemnation of government espionage perhaps
unfortunately has not become part of mainstream American political
thought, the right to privacy that he asserted in his 1890 article and
in his Olmstead dissent is now integral to it. It illuminates the case
law upholding the constitutional right to privacy 79 and is the basis
for provisions in a number of state constitutions.80 It seems appropriate
that his conceptions of speech and privacy have endured, because rights
were of key importance to him. During the Pinchot-Ballinger hearings, when he learned that President Taft was part of a cover-up,
Brandeis wrote what for him apparently were words of ultimate contempt: "[Taft] is simply impervious to a conception of the people's
rights. "81
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The "people's rights" were of key importance to Brandeis, and two
points remain to be made about his enunciation of them. The first
involves an apparent lapse; the second, an indication of how far in
advance of his time his thinking may have been.
Brandeis's great value to American political thought and jurisprudence lay in his creative questioning and analysis of phenomena that
were treated as givens by most of his contemporaries . It is therefore
somewhat surprising that he took such little note of the extent to which
the American political system had been created for the benefit of white
men. The Constitution specifically legitimized slavery and, by leaving suffrage criteria to the states, disenfranchised women. The inability
of the United States to end slavery without enduring the trauma of
the fiercely contested Civil War, the socially condoned brutalization
of southern blacks from the post-Reconstruction period through the
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the continuing pervasiveness
ofracism throughout the United States raise the question of whether
the exclusionary nature of the political system was structural or capable
of being altered through extension of the franchise . A similar question
can be raised about women, particularly in view of the governmental
and social resistance first to what ultimately became the Nineteenth
Amendment. The fact that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
made so little difference to the real condition of the former slaves might
well have led Brandeis to ask whether the women's suffrage he came
to espouse would be sufficient to produce true gender equality. 82 That
may be condemning Brandeis for not being even further ahead of
his time as most suffragettes assumed with him that the right to vote
would go far toward altering the condition of women. The same,
however, cannot be said of black Americans.
The southern states had made clear their intention of keeping black
Americans in a condition that lacked only the formal name of slavery.
In this context, it is puzzling that Brandeis offered no indication of
how the excesses and failures of federalism might be confronted.Justice
John Marshall Harlan, a fellow Kentuckian, had attacked segregation and argued that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 83 Brandeis's dislike ofracism was clear. He subscribed not only to the beliefs
of "my uncle the abolitionist" 8 4- but to the ideal of racial equality, as
reflected in his admonition, "Let us teach all peoples that they are
all chosen, and that each has a mission for all. "85 He suggested action
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to eliminate racial discrimination and to enhance racial equality to
Felix Frankfurter and to the president of Howard University. 86 He
did not address either the unlikelihood of piecemeal reform making
any major change in the status of nonwhites or the human inequality
and suffering that therefore would continue.
Like most politically active white citizens of his day, Brandeis probably knew relatively little about the lives of most black Americans,
southern or otherwise. Although his world was largely white after he
moved from Kentucky to Boston, he undoubtedly learned something
about the situation of black Americans from friends, like Frankfurter
and Stephen Wise, who were active in the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People. He was not one of the small
number of white Americans involved in the struggle for racial equality;
he had more than enough causes to champion. Neither, however, did
his belief in federalism normally affect his willingness to strike down
state statutes when he considered them violative of rights, and yet
his record on racial equality is mixed. Relatively few race cases went
to the Court during the years that Brandeis was on it. When they
did, he voted with the majority. That meant, in his early years on
the Court, going along with decisions that usually but not always struck
down discriminatory state or federal statutes and actions 87 as well as
joining one that reaffirmed the separate but equal doctrine in transportation and another that upheld a state's insistence that a Chinese student go to a black rather than a white school. 88 It is possible that
Brandeis truly believed, along with the rest of the Court during the
years he sat on it, that the equal protection clause did not prohibit
state segregation. Given his advocacy of judicial restraint and the way
formal and informal segregation permeated the United States, it is
equally possible that he believed the judiciary was not the proper institution to solve the problem. 89 During his later years, as the Court
moved against segregation in primary elections and, gradually, in educational institutions, so did Brandeis. 90 In this, he was very much
a man of his historical moment.
Whatever the explanation for Brandeis's seeming failure to appreciate the nature and extent of American racism, a number of his preCourt speeches indicate that he cherished not only the traditional
"political" rights but some of those today subsumed under the heading

CIVIL AND ECONOMIC LIBERTIES

143

"economic rights." That is not a phrase Brandeis used, but the evidence
that he was thinking in such terms lies in his own words. He spoke frequently of meeting people's economic needs, both because doing so was
right and because it was necessary if people were to be able to participate fully in government . An examination of the way his language
might be read to indicate that he had begun to think not only of economic needs but of constitutionally protected economic rights follows.
Early in his career, Brandeis had been appalled to discover the plight
of Boston's paupers, which had led to his involvement in an 1894
crusade to improve the city's treatment of them. The waste of potential shocked him most. "These people are not machines," he declared;
"these are human beings ... [with] emotions, feelings, and interests . . . . They should have entertainments, they may be literary,
they may be musical." He took what was, for 1894 and the heyday
of social Darwinism, the rather startling position that their poverty
was not of their making but that they were victims of a system that
did not provide them with work; that without work and the necessities
including leisure they could buy with it, they could not function fully
as human beings; and that because society had created the problem,
society had a moral responsibility to solve it . 91
It was one thing to say that a particular approach ought to be policy;
another that the Constitution mandated it. Brandeis began moving
in that direction at least as early as 1914, when he was quoted by
The Independent as elaborating upon constitutional protection of what
might today be called the quality of life :
The "right to life" guaranteed by our Constitution is now being
interpreted according to demands of social justice and of democracy as the right to live, and not merely to exist. In order to live
men must have the opportunity of developing their faculties; and
they must live under conditions in which their faculties may
develop naturally and healthily.
In the first place , there must be abolition of child labor, shorter
hours oflabor, and regular days ofrest .. . . In the second place,
the earnings of men and women must be greater, so that they
may live under conditions conducive to health and to mental and
moral development. 92
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Brandeis went on to suggest that the constitutionally guaranteed "right
to life" required a government- most likely, given his philosophy, state
rather than federal- to be responsive to "demands for shorter working time, for higher earnings and for better conditions." He noted
that "men and women must have leisure, which the Athenians called
'freedom' or liberty." Thus he brought together his own strong view
of individual autonomy, his admiration of Athenian democracy, and
what he suggested was a constitutional mandate. In using the word
"liberty" in a passage about the Constitution, he obviously was referring to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due-process-clause
guarantees ofliberty. Far from claiming "original intent," he emphasized that the "right to life" was "now being interpreted" in a way that
comported with social justice and democracy, suggesting that social
justice and democracy were now seen as impossible without the right
of citizens to "live under conditions in which their faculties may develop
naturally and healthily. "93
Here, in effect, Brandeis seems to have brought together traditional
civil liberties and the beginnings of what today are called economic
rights. The goal was "mental and moral development," both necessary
in a democratic polity. These qualities could not be developed in the
absence of health and leisure, which in turn could not be assured unless
workers were required to put in no more than reasonable workdays.
A logical extension of this train of thought is that if the Constitution
guarantees Brandeis's version of the "right to life," which is both the
right "to exist" and much more, those people unable for whatever
reason -youth, age, disability, absence of work opportunities - to earn
the necessities of life for themselves must be provided with them by
the society. And since the whole purpose of the Constitution is to
establish a governmental system that will enable the furtherance of
social goals, it is presumptively the governmental system that has the
obligation to provide for those people who cannot do so themselves. 94
Brandeis made the same assertion a few months later when he delivered the annual July 4 oration at Boston's Faneuil Hall on "True
Americanism."95 Part of his speech concerned "the American standard
ofliving." Asking rhetorically, "What does this standard imply?" he
answered, "the exercise of those rights which our Constitution guarantees, the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." 96 In fact,
he used the formulation found in the Declaration of Independence
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rather than the "life, liberty and property" of the Constitution's Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and it is scarcely believable that he
did so by accident. "Life, in this connection," he went on, "means
living, not existing; liberty, freedom in things industrial as well as
political; happiness includes, among other things, that satisfaction
which can come only through the full development and utilization
of one's faculties ." He spoke of adequate wages and of hours that would
not endanger health; but, he continued, "The essentials of American
citizenship are not satisfied by supplying merely the material needs
or even the wants of the worker."97
Note should be taken here of the logic of Brandeis's argument. He
began with the premise that the Constitution embodied the right to
life, which implied at least a minimal level of freedom from material
want, the level no doubt fluctuating with the historical moment and
society's perception of felt necessities. As the Constitution was the work
of the citizens who created and ratified it and was designed to permit
them to continue exercising the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, they must necessarily have included in the "right to life" those
aspects crucial to their participation as citizens. The Bill of Rights
prohibits the government from interfering with a person's "life" without
due process oflaw. This could have meant no more than that government had the negative obligation not to create the circumstances that
would negate the quality of any citizen's life. But he had said, in discussing the Boston paupers, that the entity responsible for depriving
someone of a "good" life had an obligation to rectify the wrong. He
also argued that the establishment of a democratic government implied the citizen's right and obligation to participate in it and that
the government created by the Constitution bore some of the burden
for making this possible; e.g., the creation of schools.
Brandeis described the quality of life as a constitutionally guaranteed
right. He did not argue that the government was obliged by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments not to obstruct a citizen's access to the
"right to life" but that the government guaranteed it. He applauded
Franklin Roosevelt's program of public works and suggested projects
in the states for purposes such as afforestation, flood control, and irrigation. He was strongly in favor of the government-owned Tennessee
Valley Authority, an entity that clearly was designed to outlast the
emergency conditions of the depression. 98 He did not speak of the
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government as an employer of last resort in times of normalcy, for
he assumed private industry (eventually, of course, worker-owned)
would suffice. But he had no objection to substantial numbers of state
employees, he approved of the Civilian Conservation Corps that put
young unemployed men to work on environmental projects and of
the "Wagner-Perkins Federal Employment projects" (the Public Works
Administration), 99 and it seems fair to assume he would have condoned government training programs and jobs at other times of largescale unemployment.
Brandeis saw government in a democratic state as playing a far
more positive role than did the Founders such as Madison and Jefferson whom he admired, and in part he was drawing the latter's thought
out to some of its logical conclusions. This led him to the subject of
education. Foremost among the "essentials of American citizenship,"
Brandeis declared, was the right to an education, "broad and continuous," and the child had to be "given education adequate both in
quantity and in character to fit him for life's work." He was speaking
of the schoolroom but of much more as well: "This essential of citizenship is not met by an education which ends at the age of fourteen,
or even at eighteen or twenty-two. Education must continue throughout life." 100 Some years before, he had praised the Massachusetts law
that made education compulsory through age fourteen, adding that
"the intellectual development of citizens may not be allowed to end
at fourteen. With most people whose minds have really developed,
the age of fourteen is rather the beginning than the end of the educational period. " 101
He did not mean that government had to provide adult education,
which could occur "in classes or from the public platform, or . ..
through discussion in the lodges and the trade unions, or .. . from
the reading of papers, periodicals and books," 102 although there were
situations in which specific forms of adult education could be undertaken by the government. In a speech to the Chamber of Commerce,
Brandeis mentioned the federal and state "agricultural experiment stations" that provided information to farmers, and he spoke of the
government's "duty to give to the farmer the opportunity of education. "103 Whatever the source of the education, there was one quality
without which it could not take place, and that was "freshness of mind,"
for which "a short workday is as essential as adequate food and proper
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conditions of working and of living." "Leisure," he stated flatly, "is
an essential of successful democracy." There was a clear implication
of governmental responsibility for the existence of leisure, which in
turn depended upon a "curb . . . upon capitalistic combination." If
citizens were to use education as a tool for democracy, they had to
have "industrial liberty," and they had to have "some degree of financial independence." 104 Not all of these essentials were the duty of the
government: Brandeis spoke of the obligations of unions to fight for
working conditions that would result in provision of necessities, including leisure; and in listing the various routes along which education
could be pursued he was clearly calling upon private organizations
to participate in the educational process.
Judging from his fear of concentrated power, it seems fair to hypothesize that Brandeis would have preferred small private entities
to ensure the minimum conditions he viewed as necessary if citizens
were to be "free." If, as he came to recognize in the case of minimumwage and maximum-hours laws, social forces were insufficient to secure
them, then the duty devolved on the state governments. The burden
should not be that of the federal government because placing it there
would only encourage a big bureaucracy. But one way or another,
the conditions had to be provided: "The standard worthy to be called
American implies some system of social insurance. " 105 The standard
also demanded medical care. Brandeis declared that the child had to
be "not only well fed but well born" and provided with "conditions
wholesome morally as well as physically. " 106
This view was in keeping with the "two pillars" that Brandeis saw
as differentiating democracy from aristocracy. One was "the principle
that all men are equally entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and the other, the conviction that such equal opportunity will
most advance civilization." In rejecting aristocracy, he declared, the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had established "the equal right
of every person to development." 107 The implication is that citizens
are not merely to be free from government interference; they can demand those things necessary to their development.
This, then, was Brandeis's understanding of one requirement of
American constitutionalism. Like his theory of worker-participation,
its details were neither fully expressed nor worked out. This was only
to be expected, given his belief in experimentation and experience as a
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guide for social and political action. As a sociological jurisprudent
he would scarcely have argued that the Founding Fathers, or the
writers of state constitutions, were thinking in terms of a minimum
wage; that was irrelevant. They had established a flexible system into
which each historical era was expected to read its perception of at
least those minimal conditions necessary to enable citizens to pursue
life, liberty, and happiness. The leisure to become sufficiently informed
to participate in the democratic process was not a newly discovered
concept; Brandeis traced it as far back as the Athenians, where he
also found the need for citizens to be educated for democracy. The
simple recognition that overworked or underfed children or those
where not "well born" (that is, medically cared for) could not learn
and that overworked or underfed adults could not fulfill their democratic responsibilities meant to him that the government had an obligation to organize society in such a way that basic needs would be met. 108
This is not to say that the government itself had to meet those needs,
but neither could it allow creation and continuation of organizations
and entities that would interfere with the fulfillment of basic needs .
The Progressive might say that this meant regulating the trusts;
Brandeis told Frankfurter that it meant providing an educational
system, 109 and he said repeatedly in his letters and at government
hearings that it also meant worker-participation. 110 Yet until workerparticipation had been experimented with and become the dominant
form of economic organization in the country, until the basic socioeconomic underpinnings of the country had altered to the point where
workers could protect themselves without intervention of government,
the federal judiciary was required to permit states to adopt minimumwage and maximum-hour laws. Similarly, whatever the mechanism
adopted for their protection, citizens had a constitutional right to basic
necessities .
Brandeis's thought was couched in terms of "industrial liberty" and
the political "rights" of citizens. It is precisely his emphasis on the key
right of participation in the political process and all the phenomena
necessary to it, including adequate education, proper medical care,
and the leisure to engage intelligently in the process, that leads logically
to governmental protection of economic rights. It seems reasonable,
for example, to imagine the advocate of unemployment compensation laws supporting a similar system to provide health care . It is true
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that his economic theories were not spelled out in great detail. Combined with his thoroughly articulated concept of democracy, however,
they provide the beginnings of a theory of economic rights in a democratic society and an intriguing starting place for those individuals
concerned with current issues in American political thought and policy.

CONCLUSION:
THE INDIVIDUAL AND
THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

I believe that the possibilities of human advancement are
unlimited.
Must we not fight, all of us, even for the peace that we most crave? 1
American constitutionalism is based on the ideas of individual
sovereignty and the social contract, with the latter an agreement among
individuals to establish and respect the authority of a government they
create for specific and limited purposes. Social-contract theorists postulate the existence of free people who choose to subject themselves to
governmental authority because of the benefits that accrue, particularly
in the areas of personal and collective physical safety and in the security
of property . 2
Under this theory, the terms of the contract are precise. Government
legitimately can exercise only those powers specifically given to it by
the people, who retain the right to alter or to revoke the terms of the
agreement if and when they choose. 3 The government is the handiwork
of the sovereign people and therefore does not share the people's right
to unilateral alteration of the contract. This means, for example, that
the federal government in the United States cannot abridge freedom
of speech or religion (the First Amendment) or exercise powers in
areas such as health or education unmentioned in the Constitution.
To present those examples is to demonstrate the disparity between
the theory as it existed when the United States was founded and
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American history and praxis . Societies transform themselves constantly, even if the speed at which they do so varies according to the
historical moment. That characteristic was not of great importance
to early social-contract theorists, who envisioned the government as
so insignificant to the daily lives of the people that there would be
no reason for it to respond to most social change. On those relatively
rare occasions when social phenomena demanded alteration of the
contract, the people were free to modify it. American history, however,
has not worked quite that way.
The Bill of Rights, for example, was adopted at the behest of those
individuals who were afraid that in its absence the federal government might consider itself entitled to interfere with the liberties of
the people. 4 By keeping the federal government from abridging individual liberties, it in effect gave a monopoly over such interference
to the states, unless the citizens of each of those states enacted constitutional restrictions on their governments. The First Amendment
has not been changed, the social contract has not been altered, and
yet the federal government has indeed curbed the liberty of the people
to say those things it believes constitute a "clear and present danger"
or to practice their religion in ways the government finds unacceptable. 5 Similarly, the federal government plays a major role in health
and education policies, subsidizing students, programs, books, hospitals, and providing medical insurance, and the reelection by the
people of the legislators and presidents who have enacted the relevant statutes indicates the electorate's approval of the federal programs.
Constitutional scholars agree that the reinterpretation of the constitutional mandate has been made possible largely by judicial review
and the willingness of judges, particularly those sitting on the Supreme
Court, to read the Constitution in light of "felt necessities ." The purpose of the sociological jurisprudence espoused by Brandeis was to
solve the problem of how to maintain a social contract with minimal
formal alteration and still be responsive to major social changes. Other
aspects of Brandeis's thought indicate that implicit in his sociological
jurisprudence was the view that the government had in fact violated
the social contract by throwing the weight of its power on the side
of capital and against labor and that it was now appropriate for the
government to take remedial action so that the basic terms of the contract could be restored.
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The social contract was perceived by many people as minimalist
at the time of the Constitution's ratification. In Jefferson's thinking,
that government was best that did least and left the governing of the
people to the people themselves. Certainly the government furthest
away from the people geographically, i.e., the federal government,
was to exercise a minimum of power, because the fact of distance alone
made it least responsive to the wishes of the people. 6 When Hobbes
typified life before the fashioning of a social contract as "poor, nasty,
brutish and short," 7 he implied that the government had an obligation to keep people from harming each other, not that it had an
affirmative duty to enhance the quality of life by any means beyond
providing physical protection. Most social-contract theorists postulated
that the physical harm people might do to each other in the absence
of governmental restraint was caused not by innate viciousness but
by a desire for property, whether the action prompted by the desire
took the form of attempting to take someone else's property or of trying to protect property one already possessed. Thus the notion of
private property and its importance was an integral feature of social
contract philosophy. A corollary axiom was that a major part of the
contract would be government's pledge not to interfere with private
property or its owners' enjoyment of it.
Brandeis's political thought began at approximately that point. He
initially accepted laissez-faire economics and believed in the value to
society of small businessmen operating free of governmental constraints.
His early life as the son of a successful businessman, the law that he
learned at Harvard, and his clientele of other small businessmen when
he was a young attorney predisposed him to believe that the social contract was in operation and that as a result the political system was functioning properly. Much of his later thought revolved around his answers
to the question of whether the government had exercised the selfrestraint implicit in both laissez-faire and the American Constitution.
His speeches and writings give no indication of whether he considered laissez-faire ever actually to have existed or to have been a
viable policy. The historical development of the United States, and
particularly industrialization, had rendered that question moot by the
time he began addressing it. It was the prospect of even greater industrialization and the mass production of cheap consumer goods that
accounted for the attractiveness of big business and the concentration
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of capital after the Civil War. The clock could not be turned back
to the preindustrial age, and there is no reason to believe Brandeis
thought that it would be a good idea to do so. He was concerned that
the government had expanded well beyond its original powers in ways
that he found unacceptable .
Governmental growth as such was not necessarily bad, but growth
so extensive that it resulted in bureaucracy and bigness most certainly
was. In Brandeis's sociological jurisprudence, the Constitution was a
living entity that had to expand and contract in response to social needs.
(Brandeis was never a state judge and did not write about state constitutions, but he considered his jurisprudence as applicable to state constitutions and judiciaries as to their federal counterparts: State judges
were expected to view constitutions as dynamic and to permit as much
governmental experimentation as possible.8) As life became more complicated, it was neither irrational nor out of keeping with the social contract to expect governmental involvement in it to become similarly
complex. Yet the government had responded to new social circumstances by redefining itself in a way that had made people less free . It
had damaged American liberty by permitting the growth of absolutism.
Brandeis made the unarticulated assumption that a social contract
might not begin on a totally level playing field but was designed to
create one that was reasonably even. The people who entered into
the contract came from a world in which there were only individuals
and small economic entities and were motivated to accept the contract in part by their fear of governmental absolutism as well as of
each other. The Constitution was a step forward in the development
of democracy . "One hundred years ago the civilized world did not
believe that it was possible that the people could rule themselves,"
Brandeis told a group of workers, but "America in the last century
proved that democracy is a success."9 He did not say "America in the
twentieth century" because his point was that democracy had been
a success in the United States in the past and could work equally well
in the future if given a chance. The people had the capacity to rule
themselves, but "industrial absolutism" 10 made it impossible for them
to do so, and that absolutism had been created with the assistance
of the federal and state governments.
Social-contract theorists had postulated only two social forces: the
people and the government . In the late nineteenth century, however,
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a third force, big business, had emerged and by doing so had altered
the very nature of society. The Constitution said nothing about "industrial absolutism," a phenomenon that did not yet exist when it was
written and could not have been anticipated. And yet if the objectives of the social contract were the negation of absolutism and the
safeguarding of liberty, the social contract was not now working. 11
Brandeis's knowledge of the Massachusetts legislature and his experiences with Congress in the Pinchot-Ballinger affair had convinced
him that the power of the corporations equaled that of government. 12
Corporate money could buy governmental policies, which, by the
terms of the social contract, were to be created only by the people.
The chief villain of the piece was big business, but Brandeis also
held the state and federal governments culpable (the word "government" without modifier in what follows is meant to apply to both).
Government did not invent big business, but it became a coconspirator
by abandoning what should have been its position of restraint and
neutrality as industrialization increased the tensions between business
and labor. Government had taken the side of capital in a multiplicity
of ways, most significantly by turning corporations into constitutionally
protected "persons" while simultaneously denying legal protection to
the activities of labor unions. 13 It was governmental action that had
permitted businesses to grow to the point where they had become
massive concentrations of power unmatched by any entity outside the
government itself and certainly not by labor. It was government, putting itself at the service of big business, that had created the version
of "liberty of contract" enforced by the courts, a version that made
impossible the natural growth of labor unions that could counteract
the power of big business. Government thus had deprived workers
of the right to participate in the democratic process that was at the heart
of the social contract. To Brandeis, if government not only permitted
but abetted the development of a power center that made democracy
impossible, it had lost its legitimacy. He held no brief for those individuals who, sharing his awareness, reacted with violence or gave up on
the system, but he understood and validated their frustration. "Lawless
or arbitrary claims of organized labor should be resisted at whatever
cost," he told a group of employers. But he added, "if labor unions
are arbitrary or lawless, it is largely because employers have ignominiously submitted to arbitrariness or lawlessness ." 14
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The social contract had been violated; the times were seriously out
of joint . Government no longer kept one citizen from preying on
another. Instead, through its protection of corporations, government
enabled employers to prey on employees. It was not fulfilling its function of keeping people physically safe; typically, it had not protected
the striking workers at Homestead from the guns of the Carnegiehired Pinkertons . Locke had written of four "bounds" on government:
It had to rule by established law that would be the same for rich and
poor, it could enact only laws that were for "the good of the people,"
it could not raise property taxes without the people's consent, and
the legislature could not transfer its powers to others. 15 Although there
is no direct evidence that Brandeis read Locke , they were in clear
agreement about the key duties of government and the equally crucial
limitations on it. Brandeis examined government and found that its
laws in the economic sphere were different for rich and poor, although
not explicitly, and antithetical to the good of the people. Government
was not impartially protecting the property of all people; it had in
fact made true liberty of contract impossible, ifliberty of contract was
defined as the freedom of the individual to participate in a meaningful
negotiating process. The result was a situation of "employer[ s] so
potent, so well organized, with such concentrated forces and with such
extraordinary powers of reserve and the ability to endure against strikes
and other efforts of a union, that the relatively loosely organized masses
of even strong unions are unable to cope with the situation." Instead
of liberty of contract, "you have necessarily a condition of inequality
between the two contending forces ." 16 What had emerged, "within
the State," was another "state so powerful that the ordinary social and
industrial forces existing are insufficient to cope with it."17 Like Locke,
Brandeis opposed extensive delegation of power by the federal legislature .18 He was even more adamantly opposed to the government
informally ceding its policymaking functions to big business.
Brandeis concluded that government had kept social problems from
being solved in a manner that would have maintained i.odividual
freedom. Balancing the needs and desires of business and labor in
the industrial era was a difficult problem . The government had acquiesced when big business stepped in and had given business virtual control of labor, so that long hours, low wages, poor working
conditions, and child labor prevented the development of the informed

CONCLUSION

156

citizenry necessary to a democratic state and thereby negated the
possibility of true citizen-participation. 19
To Brandeis, the very existence of the social contract-the Constitution-was predicated on the assumption of governmental responsiveness to the electorate and the active participation by all citizens
in the democratic process. A true social contract, in other words, could
exist only in a democratic state, and democracy was impossible without
the ability of the people to make the government comply with the
popular will. The social contract postulates the citizen as active participant, not as passive subject. But citizen-participation had become
negligible, the corporations had monopolized power, and government
was a major cause of the new and undemocratic situation.
Brandeis was not a theorist and did not speak or write like one.
There is no record of his having read any of the social contract or
other political theorists, although he occasionally referred to some; 20
certainly he did not comment on them as he frequently did when mentioning the works of history he seems to have preferred . 21 He knew
De Quincey's Plato's Republic, did not like it much, and seems never
to have bothered to look for the original . 22 Perhaps his opinion of
at least some philosophers would have changed had he been familiar
with John Dewey's statement that "the philosopher has received his
problem from the world of action" and "must return his account there
for auditing and liquidation."23 As it was, after Brandeis had been
told that Columbia University students were reading philosophy and
that many of them had bought Will Durant's Story of Philosophy, 24 he
wrote to Frankfurter, "I think some one should make clear to the public
that this is a very bad sign." He elaborated, "Philosophy is rather the
cyclone cellar for finer souls. As it was in the declining days of Greece,
and as the monastery was in the so called Dark Ages." And he continued, "In our Democracy, the hopeful sign would be recognition
of politics & government as the first of the sciences & of the arts." 25
Facts and human beings rather than abstract analyses concerned
Brandeis. He described life in the steel industry as "so inhuman. . . .
The Steel Trust . . . looks on its slaves as something to be worked
out and thrown aside. The result is physical and moral degeneracywork, work, work, without recreation or any possibility of relief save
that which dissipation brings. The men coming out of these steel mills
move on pay day straight to the barroom . Think what such men
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transmit as a physical and moral heritage to their children and think
of our American citizenship for men who live under such conditions."26
The severity of the perversion of the social contract and its horrendous effects on human beings had gone unnoticed by too many people.
Now, however, "the awakened social sense of community" had begun
to demand working conditions that would enable the citizenry to regain
its rightful place in public affairs.27 Brandeis, without using quite these
words, proposed to use "the awakened social sense of community" to
reinvigorate the old social contract between the people and the government and to create a new social contract in the workplace . In effect
he argued that the social contract could not be confined to the political
sphere because of the interaction between politics and economic life.
Again speaking of the hard, demeaning lives and laboring conditions
of steelworkers, he asked, "Must not this mean that the American
who is brought up with the idea of political liberty must surrender
what every citizen deems far more important, his industrial liberty?
Can this contradiction - our grand political liberty and this industrial
slavery- long coexist?"28
Because the country now faced the reality of a nongovernmental
form of threatening institutional power, Brandeis considered resurrection of the original social contract to be necessary but insufficient.
It was equally important to fashion a social contract between management and labor because a person cannot "be really free who is constantly in danger of becoming dependent for mere subsistence upon
somebody and something else than his own exertion and conduct. "29
The labor unions had been attempting to negotiate a social contract
within the world of work, and Brandeis continued to maintain that
validation of unionism was a precondition of industrial democracy.
The social contract that he ultimately came to favor, however, was
quite different. It would make the unions unnecessary by turning
workers into their own employers and would resemble the contract
among citizens more than any agreement between labor and management. For the moment, however, one element of any revitalized contract between the electorate and the government would have to be
the government's promise to recreate greater equality in the workplace.
Only then would there be real "liberty of contract."
Brandeis was not arguing for the reimplementation either of an
outmoded economic system or an irrelevant interpretation of the
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Constitution. He was calling upon the government to undo its wrongs.
That demand necessarily implied a more positive governmental role
than the one included in the original social contract . Just as government had permitted the growth of industrial giantism at the expense
of the worker, government now had to enact statutes that would
destroy bigness. Governmental neutrality would no longer suffice, for
neutrality was in effect maintenance of the unacceptable status quo.
"Neutrality is at times a graver sin than belligerence," he declared, 30
and this was a time when it could not be countenanced.
Brandeis's conception of the social contract was largely similar to
that of Locke and Jefferson in its notion of property. Locke insisted
on the freedom to acquire and control property as necessary for individual protection. Jefferson's desire for an agrarian state reflected his
similar belief that property was a necessary precondition for individual
independence. Brandeis, too, placed the highest value on the liberty
of the individual, as even a cursory reading of his opinion in Whitney
v. California makes clear. 31 He described property as "only a means,"
not an end. 32 This belief is implicit in all his thought, but it is worth
noting the specific formulation quoted by Ernest Poole:
Property must be subject to that control . . . which is essential
to the enjoyment by every man of a free individual life. And when
property is used to interfere with that fundamental freedom of
life for which property is only a means, then property must be
controlled. This applies to . . . all the big industries that control
the necessities of life. Laws regulating them, far from being infringements on liberty, are in reality protections against infringements on liberty. 33
He regretted the "frequent error of our courts that they have made
the means the end. Once correct that error, put property back into
its right place, and the whole social-legal conception becomes at once
consistent."34 It was not the Constitution that needed amending. "Instead of amending the Constitution, I would amend men's economic
and social ideals," he declared, calling the Constitution "perhaps the
greatest of human experiments."35 The fight for industrial democracy
was in keeping with the gradual evolution of democracy in the United
States: "First we had the struggle for independence, and the second
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great struggle in our history was to keep the nation whole and abolish
slavery. The present struggle in which we are engaged is for social
and industrial justice."36 Brandeis's approach was essentially conservative, based on a conviction in the validity of the political system
codified by the Constitution. He was nonetheless radical in his rejection of accepted wisdom, his insistence that many existing power relationships and institutions were neither good nor immutable, his vision
of industrial liberty, his refusal to validate almost any limitations on
speech, and his goal of a vibrant, egalitarian democracy.
Brandeis lambasted the acts of judges, 37 but in his calmer moments
he retained his belief in the power of ideas and included his judicial
colleagues in the category of redeemable humanity. "What we must
do in America is not to attack our judges," he told Poole, "but to educate them." They had interfered with the will of the people. "They
have no such right," but they could be instructed. 38 So, presumably,
could officials in other branches of government. Brandeis's belief in
the educational process surely surpassed that of most professional
educators. He became exasperated with individuals but maintained
his faith in secular redemption. Shown the proper path, government
officials would understand the need to rectify past acts and get on with
the business of undoing concentrations of power.
Governmental responsibility might well go beyond destruction of
bigness. There were other effects of its wrongdoing that had to be
rectified. "If the Government permits conditions to exist which make
large classes of citizens financially dependent," Brandeis proclaimed,
"the great evil of dependence should at least be minimized by the State's
assuming, or causing to be assumed by others, in some form the burden
incident to its own shortcomings. "39 Governmental ineptitude had contributed to the depression. If the way to alleviate the situation was
to enact minimum-wage and maximum-hours laws, that was government's responsibility-as long as the enactment itself did not add to
bigness, which meant that the appropriate enacting body was the states
rather than the federal government. If one road out of the depression
lay through a program of public works and public employment, then
that road had to be taken - as long as it was taken primarily by the
states. If another avenue was destructive taxation of corporations, it
should be followed - as long as the taxes were not used to build up
an overly large concentration of federal power. 40
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Brandeis's emphasis on education meant that the ideal state could
not be viewed as a purely neutral, reactive body, even after some kind
of equilibrium had been restored. It was clear that he favored public
schools 41 - again, to be run by the states, not by the federal government, and presumably to be a key provision of the new social contracts that would be enacted within states. Equally, he saw health as
an essential for both students and citizens . 42
That did not necessarily mean that government had to provide
health care, and certainly few voices were raised during his lifetime
on behalf of public health insurance plans except as part of an overall
social security system for the aged and the indigent. 43 Brandeis might
have restated Jefferson's admonition, "That government is best that
governs least," as "That government is best that undertakes only such
socially necessary programs as are proved by experimentation to be
unworkable when left to the private sector." He had designed a life
insurance program that could be implemented by savings banks, for
example, and so there was no reason for government to concentrate
power by entering that sphere. The unions were his favored mechanism for ensuring fair working conditions, at least until the days of
worker-participation. There were times, however, when cooperation
between the public and the private spheres was necessary. It was legitimate in emergencies, whether as all-inclusive as the depression or
simply when a group of people were being treated so unjustly that
not only their physical well-being but their concomitant ability to participate in public life was impaired. This tenet presumably explained
Brandeis's advocacy of an unemployment compensation plan that
technically was voluntary but that included coercive state taxation
of nonparticipating employers. 44 Private ownership of irreplaceable
natural resources had proved too great a temptation for misuse, so
Brandeis suggested a partnership of government and the private sector in Alaska, combining government ownership of land with a system
of leasing all the land to those people who would work it. 45
Brandeis believed the possibilities for human advancement to be
unlimited but he did not think the same of human beings. Bigness
and the overly great burden it placed on fallible humanity was still
to be avoided. Responsibilities had to be shared and power had
to be kept in check. The judiciary had to permit governmental
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experimentation, but it was also obligated to protect the rights of the
people so that the democratic process would remain viable .
Above all, the United States had to find a formula for workplace
democracy that would parallel the social contract underlying the political system. "The civilized world today believes that in the industrial
world self-government is impossible," Brandeis declared to a group
of workers. It was the opinion of the "civilized world" that "we must
adhere to the system which we have known as the monarchical system,
the system of master and servant, or, as now more politely called,
employer and employee. It rests with this century and perhaps with
America to prove that as we have in the political world shown what
self-government can do, we are to pursue the same lines in the industrial world. "46
When Brandeis first came to Boston, he kept notebooks filled with
quotations that he particularly liked. Prominent among them were
aphorisms from William James and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Brandeis
thought the latter, whom he met at least once, to be especially impressive. The passages he copied from Emerson included, "They can conquer who believe they can," "It is easy in the world to live after the
world's opinion . . . but the great man is he who in the midst of a
crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude," and
"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds." He put into
his notebookjames's statement, "I am .. . in favor of the eternal forces
of truth which always work in the individual and immediately unsuccessful way . . . till history comes, after they are long dead, and
puts them on top ."47 He read other authors-Shakespeare, Swift,
Walpole, Lowell, Arnold, Milton, Tennyson, Longfellow-but took
even more notes on comments by his professors, jokes, and information about law and Boston. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that if
Brandeis can be classified with any particular school of theory, it is
the pragmatists; certainly, pragmatism describes his approach to
political life .
In spite of his distas_te for what he considered the abstruseness
and irrelevance of philosophy, the views Brandeis articulated fit socialcontract theory and added important new elements to it . Brandeis's
emphasis on individual rights, including privacy from governmental
intrusion, is similar to Locke's statement that "every man has a property
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in his own person." 48 Brandeis also would have agreed with Locke
that the highest civic virtue lies not in obedience to positive law,
however important that may be, but to a higher law. This view is
implicit in Brandeis's contempt for laws that violated individual liberty
and permitted concentrations of power that would also harm liberty.
Locke's conception of property as the creation of labor found its
counterpart in Brandeis's delineation first of the inherent right of
workers to share in a business' profits and, later, to become the
managers of it through worker-participation.
Locke left open the question of the extent to which accumulation
of property was legitimate. He argued that no one had a right to property he could not use and that would spoil but acknowledged that much
property had evolved into money and nonperishable goods. Perceiving the relationship between property and power, Locke described
property as protection against the power of others. Brandeis answered
the question and consolidated these thoughts by asserting that the accumulation of property exceeded acceptable limits when the property
resulted in a concentration of power that endangered liberty.
One of Brandeis's contributions to social-contract theory concerned
the reason for entering into it. Democracy was not only the appropriate
alternative to absolutism; it also possessed what might be called a
psychological component. It was wise for the individual to be a member
of a democratic community both because it would make policies helpful
to the individual and because participation in public policymaking
was a key element of individual growth. Even if a state performed
only wise actions, the individual who was not continually involved
in the formal community created by the social contract would be
deprived of experiences necessary to individual self-fulfillment. 49
Other elements of Brandeis's thought were reminiscent of John
Stuart Mill, most obviously in the extent to which each would have
provided both conscience and speech with the greatest possible leeway
but not to the extreme of declaring speech an absolute right. Mill
argued in Political Economy that capitalism and socialism had to be
judged by the criterion of which system provided "the greatest amount
of human liberty and spontaneity. "50 He added in his unfinished Chapters on Socialism that collective ownership should be tried first among
"elite groups" and expressed doubt that a fully collectivized economy
would contain sufficient "asylum" for true freedom of thought. 51
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Brandeis implicitly agreed. He distrusted state socialism, believing
it would concentrate power in a governmental bureaucracy and inevitably interfere with freedom of speech. He preferred the experimental form of socialism practiced on the kibbutzim , which he thought
compatible with liberty.
Brandeis would have agreed also with the theory of gender equality
spelled out in Mill's Subjection of Women. 52 The man who spoke against
suffrage early in his professional career went on to preside over a
meeting of the Boston Equal Suffrage Association addressed by Jane
Addams, joined Addams and suffragette Carrie Chapman Catt in
judging designs for a women's suffrage symbol in a contest sponsored
by Alice Stone Blackwell's Women'.s- Journal, and spoke to Boston audiences along with his older daughter when she decided to spend a
year after college working for the suffrage movement. When Franklin
Roosevelt became president Brandeis admonished Frankfurter, who
was advising Roosevelt about appointments, "There ought to be a
woman Ass. Atty. [Assistant Attorney] General again." He commented
about Roosevelt's choice of Frances Perkins as secretary oflabor that
she was "the best the U.S . affords; & it is a distinct advance to have
selected a women for the Cabinet. "53 Typically, when he was asked
what had made him a supporter of women's suffrage, Brandeis
answered that he had learned from experience . In this case it was
his "experience in various movements," where he had seen "the insight which women have shown into problems that men did not and
perhaps could not understand." His pride in his older daughter's having
become a lawyer and the younger an economist in the days when most
"ladies" did not adopt professions is evidence of a commitment to
gender equality that went beyond the vote. 54 He was not a feminist;
but then, he had no experience of feminism .
He was seemingly unaware of possible defects in the concept of the
social contract. Arising in largely agricultural, homogeneous societies,
the contract was based on the assumption that its primary goals of
security of person and property would be met once individual acts
of violence or illegitimate use of government violence were condemned
and punished. This of course made no provision for the situation of
Native Americans or black slaves. Neither did it address the problem
of private and public violence condemned in theory but encouraged
by governmental practice. The first permitted the battering and
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intimidation of women of all races; the second, violence against the
entire southern black population after the Civil War.
If it is questionable whether the American social contract ever included women and nonwhites, it is certainly clear that it was not
fashioned to apply to an industrialized, urbanized society. Brandeis
responded to the second problem but not to the first. His version of
the social contract included creation of circumstances under which
people could achieve self-fulfillment, and he recognized that the contract had to apply to nongovernmental entities. Neither the social contract in the political sphere nor his proposed economic contract was
addressed to the problem of status, equality, and the possibility of
self-fulfillment in a society whose governmental and private institutions reflected an ideology of racism and sexism . Brandeis seems to
have assumed that suffrage would be a sufficient condition for true
gender equality and that self-fulfillment for both sexes and for all races
would follow workplace democracy. He did not deal with the issue,
for example, of how or whether one got into the workplace in the first
instance. In this respect he was far from a radical; he was very much
a man of his time.
That element of Brandeis's truth-seeking should not be forgotten.
Ultimately, however much or little his thinking may have drawn upon
the ideas of social-contract theorists 55 and whatever his ideas may offer
to those individuals still seeking to perfect their own, his thought was
pragmatically derived from the American experience of industrialization and was focused primarily on the problems arising from it.
He was a product of a particular historical moment as well as of a
tradition based largely on the conception of individual freedom as
a primary value . He made no claims to a systemic philosophy, and
what he would have said about specific aspects of an otherwise apparently coherent ideological outline can only be inferred. As he commented about himself, "I have no general philosophy. All my life I
have thought only in connection with the facts that came before me." 56
The only certainty is that ifhe addressed a problem, his solution would
have been fashioned in ways that he believed would enhance liberty,
democracy, and self-fulfillment.
The answer to workplace injustice was workplace democracy. The
cure for bad speech was good speech, to be heard by as many people
as possible. Donald Richberg was correct in saying that Brandeis's
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religion was democracy.57 That being the case, Brandeis might well
be thought of as one of democracy's proselytizers if not one of its high
priests. Neither is an appellation that he would have appreciated,
however accurate either might be. It is precisely because he was a
democrat that he would no doubt have preferred to be called a good
citizen. In that capacity he went beyond progressivism to begin sketching a new social contract that contained the outlines of industrial
democracy. The outline remains incomplete . Perhaps other good
citizens are needed to fill it in.
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9. William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some
of Life's Ideals (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1908), pp. 297-98.
10. LDB, "Employer and Trades Unions," p. 19.
11 . Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 104-7.
12. James Madison, Federalist Paper no. 51; cf. Mill, Considerations on
Representative Government, pp. 43-44: "Human beings are only secure from
evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have the power of being,
and are, self-protecting; and they only achieve a high degree of success in
their struggle with nature in proportion as they are self-dependent, relying
on what they themselves can do, either separately or in concert, rather than
on what others do for them ."
13 . Closed shop: LDB, in National Civic Federation Review, May 11, 1905,
quoted in Alpheus T. Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life (New York: Viking, 1946), p. 150; conduct of negotiations: LDB, "Employer and Trades
Unions"; trusts: LDB, testimony, U .S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
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Corporation," Business History Review 63 (Autumn 1989): 614-56.
55. LDB, Scientific Management and the Railroads, incorporates about half
of LDB's brief submitted to and some of the testimony in a hearing about
proposed railroad freight rates before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), In the Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates by Carriers, 61st
Cong. , 3d sess. , Doc. 725, January 3 and 11, 1911, and LDB, "Brief on
Behalf of Traffic Committee of Commercial Organizations of the Atlantic
Seaboard," ICC, Freight Rates, vol. 8, Briefs of Counsel, Docket No. 3400.

NOTES TO PAGES

43-50

180

See also LDB, "Organized Labor and Efficiency," address to Boston Central Labor Union, April 2, 1911, published in Survey, April 22, 1911, pp.
148-51, and reprinted in Business, pp. 37-50.
56. LDB, "Organized Labor and Efficiency," pp. 39, 41, 42.
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that democracy necessarily included economic democracy; see Dewey, The
Ethics of Democracy (Ann Arbor: Andrews and Company, 1888), pp. 25-28.
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p. 95). Mason misidentified it as coming from Euripides' Bacchae; Blasi corrected the attribution (Vincent Blasi, "The First Amendment and the Ideal
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a year in 1890; that of the average lawyer was $5,000. By the second decade
of the twentieth century his income from investments alone was close to
$100,000 (tax free, as Mason notes, until 1913), of which the frugal family
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Jewish Tribune, August 23, 1929, pp. 3, 9; Lief, Brandeis: American Ideal, pp.
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32. Cf. H. N. Hirsch, A Theory of Liberty: The Constitution and Minorities
(New York: Routledge, 1992).
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by the New York law (Lochner, at 61) . In Holden v . Hardy, 169 U .S. 366
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44. John E. Semonche has noted that the Supreme Court had upheld other
statutes limiting hours in Charting the Future: The Supreme Court Responds to
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54. Laski to Holmes, August 12, 1933, in Howe, Holmes-Laski Letters, p.
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55 . LDB, "Living Law," p. 325 .
56. Holmes, "Path of the Law," p. 166.
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58. Mason, Brandeis, pp. 248-49, 38.
59. LDB, interview with Ernest Poole, quoted in "A Great American,"
Philadelphia North American, February 11, 1911, BP, Addendum, Clippings
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64. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U .S. 312, 378 (1921).
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conditions: Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 355-57 (1921) (dissenting).
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Washington, D.C.; Willard H. Hurst, September 24, 1980, Madison, Wis.;
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A Law Clerk's Remembrance," Americanjewish History 68 (1978): 7-18, on
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68. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U .S. 517, 533 (1933) (dissenting), at 548-49 .
69. Ibid., at 564n, 50-569 n . 61, 573 n. 65, 565-67 .
70 . Ibid., at 566-68.
71.Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,517 (1924) (dissenting),
at 520.
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Half Son ": The Letters of Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1991), passim.
83. Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution," p . 51.
84. See chapter 6.
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1. LDB, testimony, U .S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate
Commerce, Hearings on Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in
Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong., 2d sess., 1911 , pt. 16, pp. 1146-1291, on
p . 1170 (hereafter Hearings) .
2. LDB, "The Employer and Trades Unions," address to the Boston
Typothetae, April 21 , 1904, reprinted in LDB, Business-A Profession , ed.
Ernest Poole (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1914), pp. 13-27, on p. 17 (hereafter
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3. The case was Schechter v. U.S. , 295 U .S. 495 (1935). For FDR's comment , see Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and the Progressive Tradition
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1981), p . 162.
4. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1960), p. 280.
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Kunststii.cke ("clever tricks"); see LDB to FF, February 27, 1934, Melvin I.
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Views of Mr. Justice Brandeis, ed. Alfred Lief (New York: Vanguard , 1930),
and Business. Jacob de Haas, Louis D. Brandeis: A Biographical Sketch (New
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9. Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush, interview with author, September
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10. LDB, The Public Papers of Louis Dembitz Brandeis in theJacob and Bertha
Goldfarb Library of Brandeis University (microfilm), Document 9, lecture notes ,
pp. 321-34.
11. LDB to Matthew Berning, January 23 , 1905, BP, I 1-1. For the story of
the insurance fight , see Alpheus T . Mason, The Brandeis tt-ay (Princeton, N .J.:
Princeton University Press, 1938). Cf. LDB, "Life Insurance: The Abuses
and the Remedies," address to the Commercial Club of Boston, October 26,
1905, reprinted in Business, pp. 109-53; "Savings Bank Insurance," published in Collier's Week!),, September 15, 1906, reprinted in Business, pp. 154-81.
12. LDB to Louise Malloch (his secretary), November 4, 1907, BP, NMF
1-H-1; Edward F . McClennen, "Louis D . Brandeis as a Lawyer," Massachusetts Law Quarter!), 33 (1948): 24.
13 . The story of the New Haven battle is told in Henry Lee Staples and
Alpheus T. Mason, The Fall of a Railroad Empire (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse
University Press, 1947). Cf. U.S. Congress, Senate, Financial Transactions
oftheNew YorkandHartfordRailroad, 63dCong., 2dsess., 1914, S. Doc. 543,
pp. 37-38.
14. Quoted in LDB, The Brandeis Guide to the Modern World, ed. Alfred Lief
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1941), p. 22; LDB to Harold Laski,
quoted in Unpublished Opinions ofMr. Justice Brandeis, ed. Alexander M. Bickel
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p . 120; LDB, "Trusts,
Efficiency and the New Party," Collier's Week!), 49 (September 14, 1912),
reprinted in Business, pp. 198-217, on pp. 216-17.
15. Unnaturalness of trusts : LDB , "Competition," in American Legal News
44 Qanuary 1913): 5-14, reprinted in Bigness, pp. 112-24, on pp. 115-16,
and Supreme Court: Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. , 118
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Virginia, 1970). State governments: see LDB in New State lee Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S . 262 , 280 (1932) (dissenting); federal government: see, e.g.,
LDB, "Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition?" Case and Comment 18
(1912): 494-96, reprinted in Bigness, 104-8, on 104-6; LDB , "The Regulation of Competition against the Regulation of Monopoly," address to the
Economic Club, November 1, 1912, reported in New York Times, November
2, 1912, reprinted in Bigness, 109-11, on p. 109.
16. La Follette to LDB, December 30, 1910, with accompanying
transcript, BP, SC 1-2.
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17. Mason, Brandeis Way, p. 368; LDB, "Interview," New York Times Annalist, January 27, 1913, p . 36, reprinted in Bigness, p. 41. LDB told Alfred
Lief in 1934, "I was always a conservative. Of course, I did not want to
conserve the things that were bad. I believed in conserving for the many,
not for the few" (Lief, Brandeis Guide, p. 211, quoting a conversation with
LDB on May 20, 1934).
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McGraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984),
chap. 3.
19. See, e.g. , Albro Martin, Enterprise Denied: Origins of the Decline ofAmerican
Railroads, 1897-1917 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Thomas
K . McGraw, "Rethinking the Trust Question" in McGraw, ed., Regulation
in Perspective: Historical Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), pp.
1-55; McGraw, Prophets of Regulation, chap. 3; and Thomas K. McGraw,
"Louis D . Brandeis Reappraised," American Scholar 54 (1985): 525-33.
20. McGraw, Prophets of Regulation, chap . 3.
21. See LDB, Other People's Money, pp . viii-ix.
22. Standard Oil v. United States, 22 U .S. 1 (1911), LDB to Moses Clapp,
June 22, 1911 , BP, NMF 43-4 .
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with him" (LDB to Alice Brandeis, December 14, 1911, Brandeis Family
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24. LDB, "Competition," p. 115.
25. Ibid., pp. 116-17.
26. U .S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hearings, pp. 1146-1291; LDB, "Competition," pp. 112-24; LDB, "Trusts and
Efficiency," pp. 198-217; LDB, "Trusts, the Export Trade, and the New
Party," Collier's Weekfy 50 (September 21, 1912), reprinted in Business, pp.
218-35; LDB, "The Solution of the Trust Problem," Harper's, November 8,
1913, reprinted in Bigness, pp. 128-36; and LDB, "Competition That Kills,"
Harper's, November 15, 1913, reprinted in Business, pp . 236-54.
27. Bigness, p . 116.
28. Hearings, and LDB to the editor of the Boston Globe, December 2, 1911,
BP, NMF 803 .
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see Arthur Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House (Princeton, N .J.:
Princeton University Press, 1968), chap. 13.
30. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1954), pp. 20-21, 28, 48.
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31. LDB to WW, September 30, 1912, Letters, 2: 686-94, and Link on
memo: Link, Road, pp. 491-92. The memo also became the basis for articles
by LDB and for editorials in Collier's; see LDB, "Trusts and Efficiency," p. 14,
and "Trusts and the Export Trade," p. 10. Editorials: LDB to Hapgood,
September 4, 1912, BP, NMF 46-3, September 25, 1912, BP, NMF 50-3,
and October 2, 1912, BP, NMF 52-2.
32 . LDB to Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush, April 8, 1926: "It is my
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else" (Letters, 5:216).
33. Wilson is quoted in John Milton Cooper, Jr., The ffiimor and the Pn·est:
Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1983), p . 120. Wilson's thinking is analyzed and contrasted with that of
Roosevelt throughout the volume, but see particularly chapter 14, "The New
Nationalism versus the New Freedom." For Wilson's thought generally, see,
e.g., Link, Progressive Era, and William Diamond, The Economic Thought of
Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1943).
34 . Woodrow Wilson, 6 vols. A History of the American People (New York
and London: Harper and Brothers, 1922), 5:267-68, and Norman Thomas,
"Mr. Wilson's Tragedy and Ours," World Tomoffow, March 1921, p. 82; cf.
Link, Road, pp. 24, 27.
35. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin,
1885).
36. Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1908), pp. 68, 82-111, 128, 191.
37. Link, Progressive Era, p. 48.
38. LDB on money trust: Other People's Money, passim; LDB to WW, June
14, 1913, Letters, 3:113-15; Federal Reserve bill: Melvin I. Urofsky, "Wilson,
Brandeis and the Trust Issue, 1912-1914," Mid-America 49 (1967): 3-28, on
p. 18; H. Parker Willis, The Federal Reserve System (New York: Ronald Press,
1923), passim; and Link, Progressive Era, p. 48.
39. LDB to Franklin K. Lane, December 12, 1913, Letters, 3:210-11; on
price maintenance: LDB to John Commons, May 27, 1913, BP, NMF 58-1;
to William Cox Redfield, May 27, 1913, BP, NMF 58-1; and LDB,
testimony, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Patents, Hearings, 62d
Cong., 2d sess., 1912, No. 18, pp. 3-25, reprinted in part in LDB, Social
and Economic Views, pp. 400-403.
40. LDB, Other People's Money, pp. 36-37.
41. LDB to Alfred Brandeis, January 23, 1913, BP, M 4-1.
42. Testimony and lobbying: Melvin I. Urofsky, A Mind of One Piece:
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Brandeis and American Reform (New York: Scribner, 1971), pp. 24-25, 27;
Alpheus T. Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life (New York: Viking, 1946),
p. 402; Link, Progressive Era, pp. 71-72; disappointments at ITC and Federal
Reserve Board appointments: LDB to Henry French Hollis, November 4,
1914, BP, NMF 68-2; to Charles McCarthy, December 2, 1914, BP, NMF
66-3; to WW, March 6, 1915, BP, NMF 68-2; to George Rublee, March
20 and 29, 1915, BP, NMF 66-3 ; to Gilson Gardner, September 7, 1915,
BP, NMF 66-3; to William Smyth, September 22, 1915, BP, NMF 66-3;
and to Charles Crane, October 9, 1915, BP, NMF 66-3.
43. Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 263, 271 (1917)
(dissenting). Cf. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U .S. 443, 479 (1921) (dissenting); Truaxv. Corrigan, 257 U .S. 312,354 (1921) (dissenting); Bedford Cut
Stone v. Journeymen Cutter's Association, 274 U.S. 37, 64 (1927) (dissenting).
44. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 289,403, 410-11 (1928)
(dissenting).
45 . See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)
(dissenting); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279 (1932) (dissenting); Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 533 (1933) (dissenting).
46 . Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
47. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 340 U.S. 64 (1938). Cf. Holmes, dissenting with LDB and Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, in Black & White Taxi Co.
v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co. , 276 U.S. 518 (1928), at 533.
48. W. Graham Claytor, quoted in Helen Garfield, "Twentieth Century
Jeffersonian: Brandeis, Freedom of Speech, and the Republican Revival,"
Oregon Law Review 69 (1990): 527-88, on p. 579. Cf. Henry J. Friendly,
"In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law," New York University Law Review 39 (1964): 383-422.
49. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341-48 (1936).
50. See, e.g., G . Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 168-69, 176.
51 . New State lee Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (dissenting).
52. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 177 (1918) (dissenting). LDB
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attempt to use its taxing power to regulate child labor (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 [1922]). It is possible that LDB considered the case
to be trumped-up, as his unpublished memorandum in the similar case of
Atherton Mills v .Johnston (295 U.S. 13 [1922]) suggested. See Bickel, Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis, chap. 1. For an interesting critique of
this explanation, see Clyde Spillinger, "Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and the Book of Brandeis," Journal of American History 79 Oune
1992): 125-51.
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the dissent of Cardozo, J.); Railroad Retirement Board v . Alton R .R . Co . , 295
U.S . 330, 374 (1935) (concurring in the dissent of Hughes, J.); United States
v. Butler, 297 U .S. 1, 78 (1936) (concurring in the dissent of Stone, J.); Carter
v . Carter Coal Co. , 298 U .S. 238 (1936) (concurring in the dissent of Cardozo, J .).
54. First FDR-LDB conversation: Harlan B. Phillips, ed., Felix Frankfurter
Reminisces (New York: Reyna! , 1960), pp. 239-40, and LDB to FF,
November 24, 1932, FF-LC, Box 98. For later meetings of the two, see
Frances Perkins to FF, April 5, 1933, quoted in Nelson Lloyd Dawson, Louis
D . Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and the New Deal (Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1980), p. 52, and see also pp. 53 , 65, 91, 96; LDB to FF, March
13, 1933, FF-LC, Box 28; LDB to FF, April 12, 1933, Urofsky and Levy,
''Half Brother, " p. 518; to Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush , November 17 ,
1933, Letters, 5:526-27; to FF, September 22 , 1935, FF-LC, Box 28; Raymond Moley to FF, October 31 , 1935, FF-HLS, Box 20; and Arthur M .
Schlesinger, Jr. , The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1958), pp. 236, 328 .
55 . Bruce Murphy gained an unfortunate measure of publicity by alleging improper behavior on LDB's part because, while he was a judge, he
gave FF a regular and supposedly secret "allowance" so that the Harvard
Law School professor with a relatively small income could undertake the
same kind of public interest activities LDB had enjoyed. See Bruce Allen
Murphy, The Brandeis/ Frankfurter Connection (New York: Oxford University
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see Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 373-75, 474-75 nn . 5, 7, 8; Leonard
Baker, Brandeis and Frankfurter: A Dual Biography (New York: New York
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of his energy and talents .. . . Nonetheless, one must sadly conclude that, as
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Brandeis said in the Myers case, dispersion of power is more important to
a democracy than is efficiency" (Strum, Brandeis, pp. 402-4).
56. Impact on legislation: Thomas Corcoran to FF, October 10, 1933,
quoted in Dawson, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and the New Deal, pp. 95-96, and
see also 94-98; Corcoran to FF, December 30, 1933, LDB to FF, December
30, 1933, LDB to FF, January 10, 1934, cited in ibid., p. 96; Corcoran
to FF, November 16, 1933, and December 30, 1933, FF-LC, Box 116; LDB
to FF, December 17, 1933, FF-LC, Box 115; LDB to FF, July 26, 1934,
Urofsky and Levy, ''Half Brother," p. 548; Schlesinger, New Deal, pp. 442,
456-57, 466; and Rexford Tugwell, The Art of Politics as Practiced by Three
Great Americans (New York: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 247-48.
57. He also sent shorter letters to FF containing some of the ideas mentioned in the two statements. See, e.g., LDB to FF, August 3, 1933, and
August 3, 1934, Urofsky and Levy, ''Half Brother," pp. 526, 550.
58. The Federal Trade Commission was an obvious exception.
59. Shulman memorandum, FF-HLS, 188-8. I am grateful to Prof. H.
N. Hirsch for bringing this memorandum to my attention.
60. Laski to Holmes, August 12, 1933, Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., The
Holmes-Laski Letters (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 1448.
61. Shulman memorandum.
62. Ibid. See Elizabeth Raushenbush, "Labor Legislation," in John R.
Commons, History of Labor in the United States, 4 vols. (New York: A. M.
Kelley, 1966), 3:399-700; Paul A. Raushenbush, The Wisconsin Unemployment Reserve Law (New York: New York House of Refuge, 1933); and Paul
A. Raushenbush, Unemployment Compensation: Federal-State Cooperation
(Madison: Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 1943).
63. LDB to FF, August 3, 1933, Urofsky and Levy, "Half Brother, "p. 526;
Joseph P. Lash, From the Diaries of Felix Frankjurter(New York: Norton, 1975),
pp. 134, 135; Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, p. 236; LDB to FF, January
30, 1933, FF-LC, Box 28; LDB to FF, August 3, 1934, Urofsky and Levy,
''Half-Brother, "p. 550; FF to LDB, August 31, 1934, BP, G 9-2; Dawson,
Brandeis, Frankfurter, and the New Deal, pp. 30-31, 72, 91; and LDB, "Interlocking Directorates," address to American Academy of Political and Social
Sciences, printed in its Annals 57 Qanuary 1915): 45-49, and reprinted in
Business, pp. 320-28.
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31. Git/ow v. New York, 268 U .S. 652, 673 (1925) (dissenting).
32. Whitney v. California , 274 U .S . 357 , 372 (1927) (concurring).
33. See Vincent Blasi, "The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civil
Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California ," William and Mary
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